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INTRODUCTION 
(a) The Background of the State Enterprises 
In 1915, under the leadership of T.J. Ryan, Labor* came to power 
for the first time in Queensland with a convincing electoral victory. 
It immediately set about implementing a range of reform policies which 
reflected the interests of its supporters among whom were numbered the 
wage-earners, mining communities, small farmers, producers and 
businessmen. Although Ryan's speech delivered at Barcaldine before 
the 1915 elections followed the lines of the 'socialist' objective 
which had become a major element of Labor's policy platforms at both 
Federal and State levels, it also owed much to the radical liberal 
principles of the previous century. The ideology of Labor in 
Australia had been characterised as "socialisme sans doctrines" after 
Metin's 1901 analysis. In the case of Queensland, the influence of a 
pragmatism borne out of the political and economic climate of that 
2 
time and the need for electoral survival has been acknowledged. Yet 
the historical judgment of Labor's initial period in government from 
1915 to 1929 has tended to emphasise the socialist intent of its 
policies. While protection and security for the worker, and 
agricultural settlement and encouragement for the small producer were 
areas where Labor reforms challenged the status quo, the major 
contribution to Labor's socialist label lay in its proposals for an 
extension of state intervention in economic matters through 
state-owned business undertakings. These were not to be the public 
enterprises established by non-Labor governments to develop or to 
regulate natural resources where private enterprise was unable or 
unwilling to do so. These undertakings were to compete with private 
enterprise. Ryan's electoral platform had identified the issues at 
the centre of the widespread dissatisfaction with the previous 
Denham government and had consequently focused on the high prices and 
shortages of basic foodstuffs which were said to be the result of the 
4 
operation of cartels and monopolies. The strategem of attacking the 
private trading monopolies had already been successful in Western 
Australia where public demands had sanctioned the Labor government's 
establishment of state-owned businesses in competition with private 
*This spelling, officially adopted after 1920, is used throughout 
the study. 
undertakings. Ryan's policy speech also addressed the problems of the 
small producer for whom the high cost of machinery and transport, as 
well as the instability of the agricultural produce market, were 
proving to be barriers to survival. 
The Governor's address to the first session of Parliament after 
Labor took office outlined measures "to regulate trade and cope with 
trusts and combines and for a further extension of public ownership 
5 
and the establishment of State enterprises". The Nationalist 
(Liberal) opposition members in Parliament argued that a policy of 
State enterprises for Queensland was not "sensible" in view of the 
failure of similar ventures in Western Australia and New South Wales. 
Moreover, while State ownership was acceptable in some areas, such as 
the railways, they did not want "the whole bottle of State 
socialism." Yet Ryan and his supporters did not intend to implement 
Labor's "socialist objective" - the nationalisation of production, 
distribution and exchange. They wanted to promote the goal of 
benefiting the community through reduced consumer prices and market 
regulation. Capitalism would not be overthrown. It would be made to 
o 
work for the good of the many rather than the few. 
Initially, state enterprises were to encompass a wide range of 
goods and services with local authorities being empowered to control 
certain public utilities. This distribution of responsibility had 
some similarity to that of the British municipal corporation whereas 
in Western Australia the role of the local councils in running public 
9 
utilities was not clearly defined. But what was eventually 
established differed in many respects from the original proposals. 
Between 1915 and 1920 Labor established state enterprises associated 
with mining, primary production and marketing, workers' insurance and 
banking. They failed to establish any manufacturing industries, yet 
included state butcheries, state pastoral stations and railway 
refreshment rooms, none of which had been in the party's list of 
preferred areas of state ownership. 
What comprised the Queensland State Enterprises has been 
variously interpreted, as has the actual meaning of the term 
'government enterprises'. For example, Chester cast a very wide net 
in seeking to find a common definition for the public or government 
authorities in Britain. Closer to home. Bland identified the 
problem of definition in Australia: "Broadly speaking, it may be said 
that by 'Government enterprises' is meant something wider than 'public 
utilities' and some thing narrower than 'public services'." State 
or government enterprises have generally come to denote services or 
functions outside government's traditional role of maintaining law, 
order and defence. They often have a commercial or business 
character, and have been defined by their capacity to earn revenue by 
making a charge for the provision of goods and services which allows 
for "payment of interest on capital depreciation, reserves for 
12 development and running costs." In Australia's developmental years, 
government or public enterprises were accorded varying degrees of 
independence from political control and interference, and the device 
of the public corporation was widely employed in preference to the 
ministerial department as the means of securing independent and thus 
13 
economical and efficient administration. Railways in all States and 
the management of natural resources in New South Wales and Victoria 
were examples of such public enterprises. 
A group of the enterprises established by the Ryan government 
differed from these developmental enterprises in a number of respects, 
which Eggleston summed up in drawing the distinction between what he 
called "the great public enterprises" of Victoria and the 
14 
"miscellaneous socialism" of Queensland. Contrary to Labor's 
original intention, the State Enterprises never expanded to the size 
of the Victorian or New South Wales enterprises for reasons which have 
varied in the recounting but which are usually seen to include Labor's 
financial difficulties, intense political opposition. Labor's 
inexperience in government, the nature of the enterprises and the poor 
calibre of their managerial staff. They differed not only in their 
eventual size and scope but also in their aims and the means of 
achieving them. The Labor government established the State 
Enterprises to reduce consumer prices by competing with and 
undercutting private enterprise prices. They were to trade in food 
and basic commodities and organise, extend and stabilise primary 
produce marketing through the virtual elimination of the 
15 
'profiteering' middleman. This type of extension of State ownership 
followed closely the path mapped out by the Moore and Scadden 
governments in Western Australia where an extensive range of 
'shop-keeping' enterprises operated from 1911 to 1916. The Holman 
government in New South Wales had also embarked on a number of 
State-owned business undertakings during this period but whether their 
purpose was to supply cheap goods to the consumer, to reduce 
1 fi 
government costs or both, has remained a matter for conjecture. In 
Queensland, New South Wales and Western Australia the "meat and fish 
shop" enterprises were considered by the non-Labor forces to be 
unjustifiable government functions. In their view, government 
enterprises could only be justified where their purpose was to assist 
private enterprises. 
Brigden dismissed such criticisms following his 1927 survey of 
State enterprises across Australia. He believed the shop-keeping 
ventures to be as justifiable as government railways, ship-building 
and irrigation works: 
from the 'development of resources' by road, railway and 
other public utilities, it has been but a short step to 
business enterprises of a more novel character; indeed, if 
the conditions of most of the latter are examined, it has 
been no step at all . 
However he attempted some distinction by drawing up a functional 
classification with seven categories: 
(1) Land settlement; 
(2) Transport facilities; 
(3) Other public utilities to facilitate or protect private 
enterprise; 
(4) Banking and marketing; 
(5) Subordinate enterprises supplying State requirements, and 
insurance; 
(6) Enterprises to assist or protect the ultimate consumer; 
18 
(7) Enterprises intentionally socialistic. 
Although he saw Queensland as the only State to follow a consistent 
policy directed towards socialism, he classified Ryan's State Business 
Enterprises, with few exceptions, as enterprises established to assist 
and protect the ultimate consumer. 
To establish these state enterprises, Ryan followed the path 
mapped out by the experiences of the Scadden Labor government in 
Western Australia to place each enterprise as a separate entity within 
an appropriate ministerial department. A manager was appointed to 
each enterprise and although he was responsible to the Minister and 
the enterprise was dependent for funds on public revenue, there was to 
be autonomy in day-to-day managerial decision-making, with the 
expectation that the enterprise would be run on "business" lines. 
Unable to secure the assent of the Legislative Council to a statutory 
base for the enterprises, Ryan resorted to the Western Australian 
19 
precedent of establishing them by executive action. The State 
Butcher Shops, State Pastoral Stations, State Coal Mine, Smelters and 
Batteries, Sawmills, Cannery, Hotel and Railway Refreshment Rooms came 
into operation by this means. In 1916 the State took over fish 
marketing in South-east Queensland under "The State Fish Supply Act" 
which provided for the establishment of the State Fishery Business and 
in the following year "The State Produce Agency Act" validated the 
opening of a State Produce Agency. 
Towards the end of 1918, after Labor had made a number of 
attempts to gain Parliament's assent to legislation for the extension 
of state enterprises, "The State Enterprises Act" was passed. The Act 
distinguished between those state enterprises which were to be grouped 
together under the Chief Secretary as the nominated Minister for State 
Enterprises-and those which would be the responsibility of other 
Ministers. Thus the Treasurer and Secretary for Public Works was 
responsible for all State Sugar Mills, the Secretary for Public Lands 
for all State Canneries, and the Secretary for Mines for Coal Mines 
which had not reached the production stage. Arsenic Works, Iron and 
Steel Works and Batteries. The Chief Secretary was responsible for: 
State Pastoral Stations, State Butcher Shops, State Sawmills, State 
Fish Supply, State Produce Agency, Railway Refreshment Rooms, State 
Hotel and Coal Mines which had reached the production stage. 
The Act provided for the appointment of a Commissioner for Trade 
who was to be a 'corporation sole' and who was empowered to carry on 
the business of those Enterprises which were the responsibility of the 
Chief Secretary, through the establishment of a State Trade Office. 
The Commissioner's powers and duties were defined as were the areas of 
Ministerial control, and although the precise limits of Ministerial 
control and managerial independence were often unstated, an 
over-riding power of veto was vested in the Governor-in-Council who 
also had the power to make regulations. Managers were retained at the 
head of each enterprise and could be delegated all the powers of the 
Commissioner. Financial accountability was provided for along lines 
determined by the Auditor-General, and the enterprises were expected 
to be run on commercial lines. The Act validated existing and future 
state enterprises and provided for the machinery of administration. 
Thus, after 1918, the Queensland State Enterprises combined some 
features of the 'great public enterprises' with those of the socialist 
'shop-keeping' ventures operating in Western Australia and to some 
extent in New South Wales. They were under Ministerial and Executive 
control, they retained some provision for managerial independence, and 
the Commissioner charged with carrying on their administration was 
given the legal identity of a corporation. 
Between 1918 and 1920, the composition of the group of State 
Enterprises administered by the Commissioner changed. The State 
Batteries, Smelters, Coal Mines and Sawmills reverted to their 
original parent departments, while the State Cannery was transferred 
from the Lands Department to the State Trade Office. Larcombe in his 
1918 pamphlet "Socialism at Work" made expansive claims for the 
implementation of socialist plans in Queensland, and State Enterprises 
were seen, at one time or another, to include such diverse government 
activities as the Railways, the ChiUagoe Mines, the State Farms, the 
State Stallion Breeding Program, State Insurance Office and Day-Labour 
System. However, the present study is concerned only with those State 
business undertakings which were the responsibility of the 
Commissioner for Trade and the nominated Minister for State 
Enterprises (see Table 1). 
(b) The Rise and Fall of the State Enterprises 
The period covered by the study begins with the establishment of 
the State Enterprises in 1915 and concludes after their final full 
year of trading in 1930. The years between saw the enterprises 
register some initial success and then gradually fail as the pressure 
of a number of influences began to take effect. 
In the 1918-19 period, Queensland enjoyed prosperous economic 
conditions which were reflected in the financial performance of many 
of the Enterprises. The State Butchery, State Pastoral Stations and 
the Railway Refreshment Rooms expanded rapidly and both the Butchery 
and the Refreshment Rooms made substantial trading profits. While 
cheap food and services were made available to over one million 
customers, the ratio of working expenses to charges made to consumers 
meant the enterprises were operating on a low net profit margin of, 
for instance, 1 penny per pound weight of fish and meat sold. 
Moreover, in the case of the State Fishery and the State Cannery, 
prices paid to producers were above the market rate. This low margin 
for reserves, drought conditions, crop failures and the collapse of 
primary produce markets from 1920 on, combined with instances of poor 
management to undermine the financial performance of all the Enter-
prises except the Railway Refreshment Rooms and the State Hotel. By 
1923 they had recorded an annual trading loss and had significantly 
increased their Treasury debt. Rescue measures introduced the 
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following year facilitated a minor recovery and restoration of a 
trading profit in all but the State Pastoral Stations, but questions 
about their viability were already being asked, not only by Labor's 
opponents but also by Labor politicians who saw the dismal business 
performance of the enterprises as electorally damaging. Moreover, the 
introduction in 1922 of legislation to initiate a compulsory produce 
marketing scheme showed promise of being more workable and electorally 
appealing. From 1926, the State Stations continued to register an 
annual trading loss but by then McCormack who, as Labor Premier, was 
struggling with a disenchanted electorate, hostile trade unions and a 
worsening economic situation, had publicly declared his intention of 
20 disposing of the Enterprises. 
The State Stations Enterprise had been by far the worst 
performer. Established at a comparatively large capital cost, this 
chain of cattle grazing properties failed, in the short term at least, 
to measure up to the ideal expounded by Labor's Frank Cooper in 1917: 
The cattle stations are not for today. The cattle stations 
are not for tomorrow. But they are to build up a great 
future for the Government of this State; build up a great 
future in the matter of the meat supply not only for the 
people of Queensland, but in..the years to come for the whole 
of the people of Australia. 
Its poor financial returns and capital debt of over half the total 
owing on all the Enterprises overshadowed the performance of the 
remainder of the Enterprises in fulfilling their Treasury 
obligations. Between 1926 and 1929, State Butcheries were closed or 
sold by tender, the Cannery, Fish Markets and Produce Agency were 
disposed of, and the Railway Refreshment Rooms returned to the 
Railways Department. Labor was defeated at the polls in 1929 and the 
new Moore Country/Progressive/Nationalist government completed the 
sale of the Stations (which had twice been offered for sale by 
McCormack), the State Hotel and the remaining Butcher Shops. The 
experiment of the State Enterprises was officially terminated by the 
passing in 1931 of "The State Enterprises Repeal and "Under-Secretary, 
Department of Labour and Industry" Corporation Act of 1931", although 
the winding up of some of the enterprises was not finalised until 
22 1936.'^ '^  
(c) The Aims of the Thesis 
The political events surrounding the State Enterprises and the 
implications of their establishment and demise for socialist economic 
policy have attracted a wide range of commentary. The general view 
has been to label them socialist experiments and to identify their 
innovative character for Queensland government activity. In addition, 
there has been a tendency to identify their functions and services as 
being distinct from the public enterprises developed by Liberal 
governments particularly in other States, although there is an equally 
strong view that their orientation was pragmatic rather than towards 
23 the achievement of an ideologically based collective ownership. The 
historical judgment has been that the enterprises were a financial 
failure and contributed little to the public benefit. Although Murphy 
disputed the latter claim in citing the record of the State Butchery 
(and here the Fishery, the Cannery, the Produce Agency and the Railway 
Refreshment Rooms should also be included) in delivering cheaper goods 
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and services to a vast number of customers, the Enterprises' 
unresolved Treasury debt had meant that the cheap goods and services 
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were government subsidised and thus provided by indirect taxation. 
Moreover, the judgment has been that poor and at times corrupt 
management was the major cause of the commercial failure of the 
Enterprises. However, there have been relatively few references to 
how Labor's policy of experiments in government competitive trading 
undertakings was implemented and administered. 
Spann has reflected that: 
the job of creating and maintaining an organisation suited 
to particular ends is not simply a case of combining a set 
of routine standardising procedures ... creation works best 
when it is able to build a distinctive structure uniquely 
suited to the particular enterprise in hand. 
Bland also campaigned for a new administrative system suited to the 
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new tasks and objectives demanded of and provided by government. 
Did the Labor government establish a form of administration for its 
trading undertakings that was distinct both from the earlier Liberal 
arrangements for government enterprises in Queensland and in other 
States, and from Labor's trading experiments in Western Australia and 
New South Wales? Were the enterprises to be "a different outfit", a 
phrase Herbert Morison used to describe the 'new' administration of 
the public corporation for Britain's nationalised industries and the 
features that distinguished it from conventional departmental 
administration? Or did the administration of the Enterprises conform 
with existing arrangements - 'a set of routine standardising 
procedures', in fact? Moreover, did the status of corporation confer 
managerial freedom from political interference and thus an expectation 
10 
of business efficiency, or was it, as Sawer has suggested, a legal 
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convenience not intended to proscribe Ministerial control? 
The central aim of the thesis can be stated simply as the pursuit 
of answers to these questions. The process of doing so identifies 
further aims - to expand the store of information available about the 
Enterprises in the administrative as well as the purely political 
sense, to expand the understanding of the role of the management in 
the performance of the Enterprises, and to assess whether their 
reputation in history is deserved. Encompassing all of this is a 
wider aim of contributing to administrative history. Spann commented 
that studies of past examples, trends and patterns are a prerequisite 
29 to an informed view of the present and it is hoped that the 
following process of exploration and comparison of a specific type of 
government enterprise will contribute to an understanding of the 
development of government administration in Queensland. 
(d) Methodology 
There are two problems which affect the scope and method of a 
study such as this. The first concerns the availability of primary 
sources. Research into aspects of the administrative history of 
Queensland is hampered by the failure of administrators through the 
years to keep personal records or to compile commentaries for public 
consumption on their area of administrative experience. They were 
generally either not interested or were prohibited from writing for a 
public forum. Formal records do not tell the whole story; they omit, 
for instance, the influence of human relationships, an important 
factor in Queensland's relatively small administrative world, and can 
give few explanations for the gap that often occurs between a 
political or administrative decision and how it is implemented. 
Annual reports to Parliament by the Commissioner for Trade and 
the Auditor-General provide the only consistent source of information 
about the administration of the State Enterprises. Other sources of 
information are the Parliamentary Debates and newspaper reports but 
these are often fragmented in terms of administration. The 
'departmental' files of the State Enterprises from 1918 onwards were 
mostly destroyed by order of the government in 1947, more because of 
lack of space than for any sinister reason. Of the ones that survive, 
the greater number deal with the early successful years of the State 
Butcher Shops, while others detail the selling off of the various 
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enterprises and the persistent efforts, which continue to the present 
day, to establish a State Iron and Steel Works. The key to the 
location of more files, often within the files of departments linked 
with the State Enterprises, is gradually being deciphered, but 
currently there is no detailed available information, outside the 
annual reports, on the internal administration of the rest of the 
Enterprises. 
Wherever possible, the material for this study has been drawn 
from departmental files but it has been necessary to depend largely on 
annual reports, newspaper accounts and questions and debates in 
Parliament. Consequently, the operation and effect of informal 
relationships is a matter for speculation, often without the means of 
confirmation. Furthermore, there is a persistent awareness that a 
construction of events and reasons for them compiled from official 
records may be at odds with the 'real' story hidden behind those 
records. Inevitably the scope of the study is limited by these 
considerations. 
The second problem is concerned with omissions. All studies are 
finite in scope and require decisions to be made about inclusions and 
exclusions. In this instance, the decision to focus on the 
administrative aspects of the Enterprises with particular emphasis on 
their identification as an administrative entity meant that the 
individual organisation and objectives of each of the Enterprises was 
overshadowed. It became clear in the course of the research that each 
enterprise, while part of an administrative whole - the State Trade 
Office - and administered by a single statute, had its own 
administrative 'life' and its own story to tell. While some of the 
high and low points of the operation of the enterprises provide 
examples throughout the study, space does not permit a fuller 
treatment of this individuality and, of course, its implications for 
the successful administration of the Enterprises. Again, other 
important administrative principles of organisation and structure have 
been omitted in favour of a concentration on the central issue of 
government enterprises - the dilemma of "popular control" versus 
administrative "efficiency". Finally, the more complex aspects of the 
enterprises' financial management and legal standing have been only 
briefly mentioned, being beyond the scope of the study. 
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(e) Methodology - the Theoretical Base 
To confirm or negate the central hypothesis of the study - that 
the administration of the Queensland State Enterprises conformed to a 
public enterprises model - the statutory features and the operations 
of the State Enterprises were tested against those of public 
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corporations, and against the theories or established concepts of 
public enterprises in the literature. Because the Queensland 
enterprises were not established and operated according to a 
departmental mode of administration, it seemed that some separation 
from the central processes of control, defined by statute, was 
intended. The various attempts by the Labor government to institute 
State Enterprises' legislation finally succeeded in 1918. "The State 
Enterprises Act" confirmed the government trading enterprises as 
one statutory authority. It was an authority established by statute 
and the provisions of the Act distinguished it from a ministerial 
department. 
That there was no single model on which such statutory 
authorities were based was emphasised by Chester. His attempts to 
find a common pattern for the non-departmental bodies which had 
proliferated in Britain since early in the twentieth century, clearly 
established the wide variations obtaining in their constitutional 
31 features, their functions and the manner in which they operated. In 
Australia, a specific type of statutory body, the public corporation, 
had been used by governments since the second half of the nineteenth 
century. It was the preferred means of securing independence from 
political interference for government enterprises with a business or 
revenue-earning function. There was an expectation that, in 
consequence, greater administrative efficiency than evident in a 
ministerial or conventional government department would result. 
Victoria was said to have pioneered the public corporation as an 
32 instrument of public enterprise administration. 
Statutory or public corporations were distinguished from other 
public bodies in that they had a legal personality independent of the 
Crown which enabled them to be placed on the same legal footing as 
private corporations. They had perpetual succession, could enter into 
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contracts, buy and sell land, and sue and be sued. Where 
governments wished to distance themselves from a public activity, or 
alternatively to pursue an activity not "suitable" to existing 
34 
administrative structures, separate legal status was an advantage. 
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Other advantages crystallised by the early experience with Victorian 
railways administration were listed as: 
independence from partisan politics and their interference which 
would enable a concentration on policies singularly appropriate 
to the activity and the promotion of technical and managerial 
efficiency; 
the administrative advantages of staff appointed and promoted on 
merit, free from the rigidity of Public Service controls, and the 
consequent building up of a corporation esprit de corps which 
would reduce the pressures for political patronage; 
The possibility of representative management - to encompass the 
specialist, the producer, the worker and the consumer; 
The removal of Parliamentary interference on behalf of employees, 
consumers and other beneficiaries; 
The institution of a specific system of accounting which would 
produce economy and efficiency, and the adoption of business 
principles; that is, in the case of revenue-earning activities, 
to generate sufficient income to cover running expenses, interest 
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on capital, depreciation and reserves for development. 
The public corporation was seen to be of particular application 
to certain types of government functions and there have been numerous 
efforts to extract common features from the diversity of public 
corporation forms according to the types of functions they perform. 
However, it was generally conceded that the functional approach to 
classifying enterprises and public corporation administration masked 
important differences in their constitutional features and thus tended 
to obscure their position in terms of political control or 
37 independence. Across the range of writers both in Britain and 
Australia, it has been agreed that the constitutional features of 
statutory authorities and statutory corporations indicated four "key" 
points at which political control might be exercised. These were: 
(1) the appointment and composition of the Board; 
(2) staff appointments and conditions; 
(3) finance; and 
(4) Ministerial control. 
Other government departments and agencies. Parliament and the 
judiciary were also considered to have a potential capacity for 
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control. 
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The degree of external control or its absence exhibited at these 
points tended to demonstrate the degree of independence granted to 
statutory bodies and assist in their classification as either within 
the range of a ministerial department configuration or a 
semi-autonomous or autonomous public corporation. However, the 
existence of numerous variations in constitutional features has 
precluded a rigid classification along these lines, while emphasising 
the absence of any uniform public corporation or public enterprise 
legislation. In Eggleston's view, the public corporation emerged as 
the result of experimentation with administrative forms and 
structures, and exhibited the variations in its constitutional 
features because of the demands of political parties and the 
39 idiosyncrasies of Ministers and Parliamentary draughtsmen. 
In the Australia literature, the advantages of employing the 
public corporation form over that of the department, the crises its 
use provoked and the remedies attempted, supplied a point of reference 
for analysing the efficacy of the many variations in public 
corporation features and for suggesting new or altered forms of public 
enterprise administration. 
Although there had been statutory boards and corporations in 
Britain for a considerable time, it was not until the 1930s that the 
public corporation was advocated as the "chosen institution" of 
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administering nationalised industries. In his work Socialisation 
and Transport published in 1933, Herbert Morrison outlined his concept 
of the public corporation and its role in a planned approach to the 
administration of public enterprises. It embodied many of the 
principles which had emerged from the struggle to establish a form of 
administration free of political interference in the Australian State 
Railways. Beginning in Victoria, a central and common theme was the 
reconciliation of administrative independence, as represented by the 
public corporation, with the democratic imperative of public 
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accountability. Both in the case of the Victorian enterprises and 
according to the Morrisonian concept, there should be no undue 
interference in public corporation management except on matters of 
42 importance. The principle of intervention "in the national 
interest" was emphasised in post-war reviews of Britain's nationalised 
industries, but was never concisely defined. 
Morrison was concerned to distinguish the principles of the 
public corporation and its application firstly from the conventional 
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ministerial department, and secondly from the private business 
corporation. "We are seeking a combination of public ownership, 
43 public accountability and business management for public ends.' He 
advocated the use of a public corporation instead of a department as 
the means of achieving a flexible and more efficient administration. 
this was a different outfit from a State Department ... we 
were giving this greater degree of managerial autonomy in 
order that we could get a higher degree of business 
efficiency and less red tape and bureaucracy. 
Although in Morrison's view the public corporation would adopt 
business methods, its foundation was public ownership and public 
service. 
The Public Corporation must be no mere capitalist business 
the be all and end all of which is profits and dividends ... 
It must have a different atmosphere from that of a 
shareholder's meeting: its Board and its officers must 
regard themselves as the high custodians of the public 
interest. 
He also rejected the "anti-socialist" means of State 
nationalisation through a State department and under Ministerial 
control. No Minister would, in his opinion, have sufficient 
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specialist expertise or be free from political pressures. Moreover, 
while he believed that one objective of public ownership was to assist 
the workers and better their life conditions, he was against worker 
representation in public corporation management since it would be seen 
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as promoting sectional interests. 
Morrison's theory of the public corporation,set out in brief form 
by Robson, consisted of five leading principles. These principles 
have formed the basis on which the constitutional provisions of public 
corporations have subsequently been examined: 
(1) Freedom from parliamentary inquiry into the management of the 
concern as distinct from its policy; 
(2) Disinterestedness - the neutralising of sectional or 
profit-making interests in favour of the higher order of public 
interest. Board members should be selected on the basis of 
public service and financial policies should reflect the public 
interest. 
(3) The personnel did not form part of the Civil Service - therefore 
there would be no control by Treasury, the Civil Service Board or 
even Parliament over these matters. 
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(4) Self-contained finance - Public corporation finance does not form 
part of the national budget, although Treasury may exert some 
form of control. Capital development is funded from public 
revenue and advances may be made from annual appropriations. 
(5) Fixed term for Members and Chairman of the Board - this frees 
them from the restrictions of permanent tenure and from the 
uncertainties of political appointment, although power of removal 
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remains with the Minister. 
In the Australian context, Webb challenged what he called the 
romantic idealism of Morrison and Robson. He discounted their view of 
administration as simplistic. He argued that "the romantics are those 
who, exasperated by the methods and outlooks of government departments 
are determined to find in the statutory corporation the means of 
reconciling managerial efficiency with public ownership", but these 
same romantics have not questioned whether in fact the public 
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corporation possessed these means. The challenge was taken up by 
Wettenhall who devised a classification system for Australian 
statutory bodies according to the strength of ministerial control over 
them. Wettenhall adopted a continuum approach which placed the 
ideal-type Ministerial department and its antithesis, the public 
corporation, at its two extremes. He described the features of the 
Ministerial department and the public corporation, and identified the 
principal intermediary points. These were: 
(1) Departmental Offices which were "uncompromosingly" Ministerial 
departments but had certain features which differed from them. 
They mainly comprised departments under the Public Service Acts 
headed by non-political officers exercising statutory powers in 
their own right, but were protected from Parliamentary review and 
from political control in the departmental sense. Among such 
departmental offices he included the Auditor-General and Public 
Service Commissioner's Department. 
(2) Departmental corporations where the staff were formally part of a 
public service department but whose governing organs had the 
status of corporate bodies. The agency's function is often of a 
commercial kind and ministerial control is limited. The 
two major reasons for their separate classification from public 
corporations lie in the departmental status of their personnel 
and central budgetary management. 
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A further category refers to regulatory bodies which have many of the 
features of an independent corporation. Although often labelled 
administrative tribunals, Wettenhall preferred that these bodies be 
regarded as satellites of the principal agencies to which they were 
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attached. Cotterell had adapted this type of classification for 
Queensland but he omitted any reference to public corporations or 
departmental corporations as irrelevant to the Queensland machinery of 
government and expanded the different categories of departments 
according to the character of ministerial control and their 
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relationship with the Public Service Act. The resultant categories 
were: the Ministerial Public Service Department; the Ministerial 
Public Service Sub-Department; Ministerial Non-Public Service 
Department; and Non-Ministerial Public Service Department. 
From the legal standpoint, Sawer distinguished two types of 
corporations, with a further group bridging the gap between the two. 
Firstly, Crown corporations were those who utilised the corporate form 
usually by designating the Minister or a public official as a 
"corporation sole", but which were agents of the Crown and thus had 
all the rights, privileges, powers and immunities of the Crown. In 
Sawer's view, they might "just as well have been simply departments of 
52 the central government." However, he identified a separate group of 
corporations whose legal status was that of a Crown corporation but 
which differed from it in that there was an obvious intention of 
53 
managerial autonomy expressed in their statutory provisions. The 
second major category was the autonomous statutory corporation which 
followed the lines established in Victoria and New South Wales. 
According to Sawer and in contrast to Wettenhall's findings, there are 
a large number of autonomous statutory corporations in Australia 
54 
although the extent of their autonomy varies considerably. 
Thus, in order to determine whether the Queensland State 
Enterprises conformed with public enterprises administration and to 
assess whether this means they conformed either to a departmental 
configuration, to that of a public corporation or to some other form, 
the organisational, constitutional and operational features of the 
State Enterprises have been examined. They have been compared with 
the constitutional features and practice of public enterprises in 
Britain and Australia, the theoretical concepts and public corporation 
model espoused by Morrison and Robson, its predecessor in Victoria and 
the various classifications of government machinery and statutory 
18 
bodies that have been outlined above. Particular emphasis has been 
placed on the four "key" points of political or external control of 
public enterprises, since they are important indicators of the degree 
of ministerial control and managerial autonomy, and thus of the type 
of administration the State Enterprises exhibited. 
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SECTION 1 
THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE ENTERPRISES 
Introduction 
From a political viewpoint, the Queensland State Enterprises were 
not considered to be "avowedly socialistic". They have variously been 
described as pragmatic socialism, State capitalism or applied 
Fabianism, rather than the first steps on the road to the 
nationalisation or socialisation of industry. But the question 
remains: how did Labor intend they should be administered? If Labor 
planned to introduce economic reforms through the innovative means of 
State-owned trading enterprises, did this signal an innovative 
approach to their administration? 
Initially, in 1915, the Enterprises were established by executive 
minute. They operated separately within existing government 
departments, and received their establishment funds by executive 
minute, the funds then being included in that department's 
supplementary or unforeseen expenditure accounts. They were the 
responsibility of the departmental Minister and, although their 
finances formed part of the Public Account until 1918, and some staff 
appointments were then listed in the Public Service Blue Book, each 
enterprise operated as a separate unit from the department under the 
direction of a manager. By 1917, two enterprises had been established 
by legislation: "The State Fish Supply Act of 1916", and "The State 
Produce Agency Act of 1917". The fact of legislation made little 
difference to the administrative arrangements of the State Fishery 
Business and the State Produce Agency. With the other enterprises 
established by then, they continued to be administered by a manager, 
they remained within a ministerial department and they were 
responsible to that Minister. Their staff was still appointed by the 
Governor-in-Council and they did not come under the Public Service 
Act. One change was that by 1917, the Auditor-General had moved to 
exert some form of accountability for the Enterprises' expenditure. 
He had instituted a monthly audit of accounts and was attempting to 
impose a centralised accounting system which would enable a 
comprehensive annual report on the Enterprises to be presented to 
4 
Pari lament. 
Several Bills had been introduced into Parliament by the Labor 
Government during this time, with the object of obtaining a 
legislative base for the operation of the Enterprises. All failed to 
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gain the approval of the Nationalist dominated Legislative Council. 
Finally, at the end of 1918, an extensively amended State Enterprises 
Act was passed by both Houses of Parliament. The Act confirmed the 
Enterprises as an administrative entity, validating their 
establishment as a government body. Under its provisions, the 
Enterprises were to be separate from existing departments and their 
finances distinct from the Public Account. Their administration was 
to be co-ordinated and centralised through a State Trade Office under 
the control of a Commissioner for Trade. The Commissioner was to be a 
"corporation sole" but responsible to a Minister, the Chief Secretary. 
The Secretary for Public Works was given responsibility for the 
Enterprises after 1921, although the Minister without Portfolio was 
sometimes designated the Acting or Assistant Minister for State 
Enterprises (see Table 16). In 1926, the Department of Labour and 
Industry was created. Austin, the Commissioner for Trade, was 
appointed Under-Secretary of the new department. At the same time, he 
retained his former appointment as Commissioner and the State 
Enterprises became the responsibility of the Secretary for Labour and 
Industry. These arrangements did not alter the administration of the 
State enterprises in any apparent respect. They continued to operate 
according to the provisions of the 1918 Act until the Moore government 
signalled their formal closing down with the enactment of "The State 
Enterprises Repeal and "The Under-Secretary, Department of Labour and 
Industry" Corporation Act of 1931". 
Thus the administration of the State Enterprises was conducted in 
accordance with some aspects of a ministerial department while others 
were similar to a public corporation. From 1915 to the early 1920s, 
Labor's opposition was persistent in its hostility towards any move to 
extend government-owned enterprises although they were sometimes less 
than clear on the details of their stance. For example, they were not 
opposed to State Railways and they were ambivalent about a State-owned 
insurance facility. On the other hand. Liberal parties in both 
Britain and Australia since the nineteenth century had supported the 
use of public enterprises to extend government services. According to 
a number of writers, Australia could be considered the home of the 
statutory corporation as an instrument of government enterprise 
administration. 
Did Labor intend that the State Enterprises should have a measure 
of independence along the lines of a public corporation, which would 
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have given them some protection from political control? Especially in 
view of the Legislative Council's intransigent attitude towards State 
Enterprises, Ryan might have been determined to remove their 
operations from Parliamentary scrutiny and control. Or was their 
success so crucial to Labor's success and the mistrust of autonomous 
corporations, as Sawer suggested, so firmly rooted in Australian Labor 
governments, that ministerial and executive government control were 
to be foremost? 
A further alternative was that, in seeking to serve the public 
interest by securing lower food and commodity prices. Labor was 
concerned to institute a particular mode of administration that would 
result in greater efficiency than that obtaining in either a 
ministerial department or in private enterprise. 
A more detailed examination of the background to the concept of 
State Enterprises and Labor's attempts to enact State Enterprises' 
legislation in Queensland may hold some of the answers to these 
questions. 
(a) Some Possible Origins 
The Governor's address to Parliament in 1915 outlined Labor's 
two-pronged plan of intervention in the State's economy. It consisted 
of regulation of existing industry and the extension of public 
ownership into competitive trading with private business enterprises. 
Public ownership was recognised as a legitimate form of 
government intervention in the economy where it involved the provision 
of services in the public interest which private enterprise was unable 
or unwilling to supply or which had a regulatory function. These 
included transport infrastructure and services, water and power 
g 
supply, postal services and port facilities. 
Public enterprise had been evident in Britain even before the 
Reform Act of 1832 promoted the centralisation of government functions 
Q 
within the Ministerial department. Its incidence had been confined 
in scope and it was not until the introduction of the concept of 
nationalised industries in the 1930s that large-scale co-ordinated 
public enterprises were planned. In Australia, the nature of the 
environment, the spread of population and the emphasis on development 
of natural resources were said to have accelerated the establishment 
of government-owned enterprises and services, and public acceptance of 
this type of role for the State. They could be distinguished by the 
need for large capital investment, as with the railways and some 
attempt at regional if not national co-ordination. 
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In Queensland, the government had invested in public works of a 
developmental kind from the time of its establishment as a separate 
Colony. Its incursions into public enterprise were defined by 
separate statutes which usually provided for the establishment and 
regulation of a specific service or utility, the means of its finance 
and its relationship with both the lines of government responsibility 
and with the public. Questions of land usage, resumption and 
compensation, and the terms and conditions of service for staff 
appeared to have a paramount importance in the enabling legislation. 
While the means of administering such utilities and services 
showed some variation, they were ultimately responsible to Parliament 
and Parliament was at least nominally in control of their finances. 
What Ryan's government proposed was to extend the range of government 
enterprises beyond the existing functional boundaries. In his speech 
at Barcaldine in 1915, Ryan had outlined what this would encompass. 
He did not seek the nationalisation of industries with its overtones 
of worker control of production, distribution and exchange but 
government action on behalf of the worker and "small entrepreneur". 
Public enterprises in competition with private enterprise, were to be 
established to benefit the public. Thus the kind of enterprise the 
Labor government would undertake became an important criterion for 
debating whether they represented a 'legitimate' publicly acceptable 
government function. Labor's list of proposed State enterprises and 
empowering of local councils to acquire and control public utilities 
such as fish markets, bakeries and meat depots were in accordance with 
Fabian principles of state intervention but as the Honourable 
J. Tolmie declared in the Legislative Council, they were "an 
12 innovation in a State, as that of Queensland." In terms of the size 
of Labor's electoral support both in the 1915 and 1918 elections, the 
proposals appeared to be publicly acceptable. On the other hand, 
non-Labor politicians objected to state enterprises being a proper 
role for government on the grounds that they represented the first 
step on the nationalisation of industry and because of the well 
publicised failure of similar ventures in other States. For them, 
'the proper' role of government was to assist the development of 
13 private enterprise. 
The Federal Labor-in-Politics Conventions had already established 
an ideological base for state ownership and listed the economic areas 
where government enterprises would operate, well before Western 
£D 
Australia and New South Wales began to establish their trading 
enterprises. Queensland Labor's plan to establish specific public 
enterprises was not a unique response to local political issues. 
Crowley, for instance, has said of Western Australia's expansion of 
government functions under Moore and more extensively under Scadden 
from 1911 to 1916, that the Labor Party introduced a variety of 
government enterprises and business undertakings which they felt were 
14 in the best interests of the wage-earning classes. With the New 
South Wales state business undertakings, while they may have been, as 
Evatt saw it, proof of Holman and Griffith's "reasoned policy of State 
15 
socialism", they were, in the view of the New South Wales 
Auditor-General, a means of effecting considerable savings for the 
1 fi 
State's administration. 
However, what eventuated from the initial platforms of reform 
tended to reflect the dominant economic issues of each region, and for 
Queensland there was little doubt that the emphasis was on the 
resources of primary production. What industrial undertakings were 
proposed in Queensland were part of the means of ensuring the future 
of an agriculturally based State economy through price regulation, 
so that a State iron and steel works would produce lower-cost farming 
machinery and implements and a State shipping industry would provide 
ships to carry primary produce to markets, avoiding the constraints of 
21 high-priced private shipping. The means of their administration was 
not identified, although worker control of government industrial 
enterprises would have had support from those members of the Labor 
Party who promoted the 'Socialist objective'. 
Queensland was well aware of the government enterprises 
established in the other Labor States. Ryan and Theodore in 
particular had taken a close interest in the legislative arrangements 
for establishing the enterprises in Western Australia and had been 
warned by Scadden that in the face of solid Legislative Council 
opposition, there was little expectation of state enterprises' 
legislation being passed through Parliament. 
The enterprises finally established as State Enterprises differed 
again from Labor's 1915 fighting platform. As Murphy has pointed out, 
the two most extensive enterprises, the State Butchery and the State 
19 Stations, were not included in it. The State Butchery and the 
Cannery were clearly identifiable responses to the needs of certain 
sections of the community, in the same way as the State Batteries, 
II 
Smelters and Assay Offices were responses to the needs of the small 
miners, and in this they were similar to the meat and fish supply 
20 
enterprises established in Western Australia. 
Despite the Western Australian example and perhaps encouraged by 
the comparative ease with which "The Sugar Acquisition Act" had been 
passed by Parliament in July 1915, Ryan pressed on with his moves for 
state enterprises' legislation. However, as he soon discovered, the 
Sugar Acquisition Act was a special case. Passed in a spirit of 
patriotism by the Legislative Council which expected it to be in force 
only for the duration of the war, the Act allowed the government 
compulsory acquisition of commodities necessary for the war effort. 
For Labor, its prime purpose was the protection of the Queensland 
sugar industry but under the Act's provisions, meat was to be 
compulsorily acquired for supply to the Imperial forces and for a 
guaranteed minimum supply to the home market. Domestic supplies of 
all basic foodstuffs for consumption regardless of price had for some 
21 time been a major problem for Queensland governments. The failure 
of previous governments to initiate measures to alleviate shortages 
and high prices particularly for the northern mining and agricultural 
22 
communities had afforded Labor a popular, winning electoral issue. 
One of the worst aspects of the meat industry which had been publicly 
23 
acknowledged as inefficient concerned the operation of the meatworks 
throughout Queensland. Plagued by industrial troubles, unsanitary 
conditions, uneven supply and demand and allegations of profiteering 
through monopoly ownership, they were closed for long periods each 
year. The Meatworks Bill, introduced in September 1915, was the first 
shot fired by Ryan in the battle to establish a permanent statutory 
foundation for the state enterprises. The intention of the Bill was 
"to provide for the regulation of meatworks and other Enterprises and 
24 for their acquisition by Government". The power of regulation and 
acquisition was vested in the Governor-in-Council and with the 
provisions for compulsory acquisition much was made by Labor of the 
need to safeguard the public interest. 
Although the Legislative Council was prepared to sanction some 
form of a Meatworks Bill in view of the gravity of the problems in the 
meat supply industry, the major stumbling block to their acquiescence 
lay in the clauses giving wide-ranging power to the Governor-in-
Council for compulsory purchase of commodities and establishment of 
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state enterprises. Throughout the efforts made by the Ryan government 
to legislate for what it considered to be its mandate to institute 
state enterprises - the three Meatworks Bills of 1915, 1916 and 1918, 
the Commissioner for Trade Bill in 1916, the original State Produce 
Agency Bill of 1917, some aspects of the Fish Supply Bill and the 
first draft of the 1918 State Enterprises Bill - the opposition in 
Parliament attempted to block proposals to extend government functions 
in this way and to expend public revenue on what they saw as socialist 
ventures. It was the constant inclusion in the Bills of provisions 
giving effect to such proposals, which halted their passage through 
the Legislative Council until they were finally lost or significantly 
amended. 
When the first Meatworks Bill was blocked by the Legislative 
Council, Ryan followed the Western Australian example of using 
executive action to establish a State Butcher's Shop in November 1915, 
and a State Coal Mine and Sawmills in December of the same year. The 
following year, in a departure from the experience of New South Wales 
and Western Australia in state business undertakings but in keeping 
with administrative practice established under non-Labor government 
since the middle of the previous century, the Ryan government 
introduced the Commissioner for Trade Bill. Although its impetus may 
have come from the Auditor-General's pressure on the government to 
institute some form of public accountability for state enterprise 
expenditure, it was a further attempt after the Meatworks Bill to 
establish a legislative base for the enterprises. It differed 
significantly from New South Wales and Western Australia in proposing 
a centrally controlled auditing procedure, the appointment of a 
Commissioner who would be a 'corporation sole' to manage all the state 
enterprises, and the concept of a co-ordinated entity of state 
25 business undertakings under one administration separate from 
existing departments. 
The Secretary for Lands, the Honourable J.M. Hunter, who had been 
given the responsibility for State Enterprises, introduced the Bill to 
Parliament in the closing stages of the 1916 Parliament. Its purpose 
was to appoint a Commissioner for Trade who, through a State Trade 
Office, would manage and control all State undertakings and who would 
be a corporation with perpetual succession and could sue and be sued. 
The Commissioner was also charged with investigating and regulating 
trade, and was to have power to seek and establish local and overseas 
markets for State produce. His powers could be extended by the 
29 
Governor-in-Council as the latter saw fit. The Enterprises would be 
conducted along business lines and a separate State Trade Fund would 
be maintained. Hunter explained that the enterprises were taking up a 
great deal of the time of the individual Ministers whose 
responsibility they were. The government believed the enterprises 
should be removed from them and placed under the management of a 
Commissioner who would be free from the political interference that 
plagued Ministers and who would be able to run them in a profitable 
26 
way. 
Again this Bill included provision for compulsory acquisition of 
commodities and private businesses, where there were offences against 
the Act or public complaints, and this constituted the major ground 
for the Opposition's hostility. They also complained about the timing 
of the Bill's introduction. They had been given little information on 
its content and allowed insufficient time for debate before Parliament 
adjourned for the Christmas recess. They were adamant that it would 
be impossible to find a "Pooh Bah" capable enough of overseeing such a 
27 
variety of businesses. Some thought it a government ploy to appoint 
the only government member with business experience - Hunter - to the 
position. Others believed it to be the means of shifting the 
responsibility for the less than profitable showing of some of the 
enterprises, such as the Sawmills, away from the Ministers and the 
28 government, onto some "public officer". 
The Nationalist opposition stood against non-Ministerial 
administration of State business enterprises. They rejected the 
notion of a public authority removed from political influence or, as 
they saw it, from control by Parliament. However, there had been some 
support for devising a means of protecting the individual managers 
from the interference which had already hampered decision-making on a 
business basis. Co-ordinating the enterprises under one authority to 
ensure more readily accessible information on their performance than 
had been forthcoming from individual Ministers was also seen to be 
29 desirable. 
W.H. Barnes, the ex-Treasurer and Nationalist member for Bulimba, 
summed up the opposition's view when he said, "Some Minister, not an 
acting Minister [as Hunter was] but a Minister directly controlling 
these businesses - should assume the responsibility, and be able to 
30 give members the information they require". Moreover, as Vowles, 
the Nationalist member for Dalby asserted, there was no need for a 
30 
further expert appointment to ensure financial accountability. All 
31 
that was required was a 'proper auditor' to report on the accounts. 
The opposition's major concern was to block Labor moves to concentrate 
power over the means of production and distribution in the hands of 
the Minister or the Executive government with little opportunity for 
scrutiny or control by Parliament and in particular by the non-Labor 
dominated Legislative Council. To this end they rejected a system of 
government enterprise administration - the semi-independent/ 
independent commissioner or board with the powers of a corporation -
which had been utilised by Liberal governments in all States of 
Australia for a number of decades. 
The Commissioner for Trade Bill was lost, but it must be 
remembered that at the same time, Ryan was involved in negotiating the 
successful passage through Parliament of the Workers' Compensation 
Bill and the Industrial Arbitration Bill, major reforms of workers' 
conditions that were of crucial importance to the labour movement and 
to the maintenance of continued electoral support. The conscription 
issue which was to divide Australia and bring down every Labor 
government except Queensland's, was also at its height. It was 
therefore not surprising that Labor did not press for further 
consideration of a Bill dealing with State Enterprises when 
executive action had so far supplied finance and personnel for the 
various undertakings being established. Not that the government had 
at this stage given up on enabling or validating legislation for the 
enterprises. The Meatworks Bill was again presented and rejected in 
1917, while the State Produce Agency Bill was finally accepted in 1917 
after extensive amendment. There had been considerable resistance by 
the government to the nature of the amendments insisted on by the 
Legislative Council which, it said, negated the principles of the 
Bill. Only the State Fish Supply Bill of 1916 was successful in 
giving control of fish marketing to the government within a designated 
area of the State. Although there was some general support for a 
government attempt to regulate the fish industry which, like the meat 
32 industry, was acknowledged as being in difficulties, an important 
factor contributing to its largely uneventful course through 
Parliament was the absence of any provision for the blanket powers of 
control over commodities and enterprises which had characterised 
previous legislation. 
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In the first sitting of Parliament after the 1918 elections when 
Labor was returned with a large majority, it introduced an amendment 
to the State Produce Agency Act to allow wider scope for purchasing 
and control of 'produce' and a Bill for the establishment of a State 
Iron and Steel Works. Both failed to survive the Legislative Council 
but, immediately following this. Hunter moved to bring in a Bill to 
authorise the establishment and "carrying on of State Industrial 
Enterprises". When the opposition members in the Assembly objected 
strongly to the manner in which the Bill was presented without 
information as to its content. Hunter replied that the Bill proposed 
to group all the State Enterprises together "to constitute an office" 
and place them under the control of one Minister. When challenged by 
Morgan, the member for Murilla, whether he meant one Minister or one 
Commissioner, Hunter repeated that they would be under the control of 
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one Minister. 
This proposal was a complete about-face for the government from 
its position in 1916 when it had proposed the appointment of a 
Commissioner for Trade, and a departure from recent practice in 
Labor's appointments of a State Insurance Commissioner and a 
Commissioner for the Government Savings Bank, both of whom had been 
given significant administrative independence. The opposition's 
immediate response was to reject the necessity for such a Bill since 
the government had been content for three years to operate the State 
enterprises illegally, that was, without any legislation at all. 
Moreover, they did not want another Commissioner appointed if he were 
given "the extraordinary and undemocratic powers" of the Savings Bank 
34 Commissioner. 
The State Enterprises Bill contained the same 'dragnet' clause as 
the previous Acts which attempted to vest power over commodities and 
the establishment of current and future State enterprises in the 
Governor-in-Council. In addition, there was provision for the 
Minister for State Enterprises to raise loans for the enterprises from 
private financial institutions, subject only to the approval of the 
Governor-in-Council. In terms of administrative arrangements, the 
Bill provided for the grouping of the State enterprises under 
one Minister who would be responsible to Parliament for them. The 
Minister was to be a corporation and funds would be advanced from 
consolidated revenue. Each enterprise would have at least 
one manager, but it was not proposed to appoint a general manager. 
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There was no doubt that the government planned to employ a 
Ministerial departmental form of administration with managers heading 
sub-departments within a Department of State Enterprises. The 
Minister would have corporate powers as had been the case with the 
corporation of the Treasurer established by a Liberal government to 
administer the Central Sugar Mills under "The Sugar Works Guarantee 
Act of 1893". According to Hunter, close control through direct 
Ministerial responsibility of the enterprises was necessary to 
safeguard Labor's future since the success of the Party depended on 
their success. 
A further volte face became evident when the Legislative Council 
returned to the Assembly a list of 63 amendments to the Bill. The 
Council now sought the appointment of a Commissioner for Trade 
whereas, in 1916, they had rejected such a device. Accordingly, they 
proposed an amendment to the clause of the 1918 Bill which had 
provided for administration by a Minister. For Labor, the amendment 
altered the whole principle of the Bill. Opinion among the opposition 
in the Legislative Assembly was divided. Corser, the member for 
Burnett who had been against "government by Commission" in the 1916 
debate and again when "The Government Savings Bank Act" was passed, 
reiterated his view that Labor should have to bear the responsibility 
for the failure of the enterprises, rather than an appointed 
35 Commissioner. Petersen, the member for Normanby, who by this time 
had crossed the floor to stand in opposition to Labor, argued that a 
Commissioner who was appointed for a number of years "can snap his 
fingers at the Government ... at members of Parliament and even defy 
the Act itself." However, the dominant view of the Nationalist 
members was summed up by Vowles, the opposition Deputy-leader: 
if many of these enterprises are to be carried on they 
should be carried on on purely business lines outside of 
political control and for that purpose we think it would be 
far better for all concerned if a Commissionec were 
appointed at the head instead of a Minister. 
As far as the Legislative Council was concerned, the members were 
prepared to agree to the establishment of a Department for State 
Enterprises which would obtain its funding from the normal 
Parliamentary appropriations. However, it could not agree to a 
proposal which vested power in one Minister and removed his actions 
38 from Parliamentary control. 
The debate in the Assembly resolved itself into deciding whether 
to endorse a "Kaiser" or a "Pooh Bah". The opposition rejected the 
33 
"granting of autocratic power to a Minister, making him a Kaiser - a 
39 
virtual government in himself", while Labor members argued against 
the appointment of an official, a "Pooh Bah" who would be outside and 
above government control. Labor brought up all the arguments used by 
non-Labor in 1916 against the appointment of a Commissioner for 
Trade - where would a Commissioner be found who was capable of 
administering such a wide range of businesses; the appointment would 
concentrate power outside Parliament and undermine the principle of 
ministerial responsibility, particularly in regard to responsibility 
for public expenditure. Non-Labor adopted Labor's former position in 
1916 to argue for the impartiality, continuity and greater efficiency 
that would result from appointing a Commissioner for Trade. Where, 
they asked, would the government find a Minister who would be 
competent to run all the State Enterprises, especially on a 
40 Ministerial salary? 
Finally, after numerous messages had passed between the Council 
and the Assembly, a greatly altered State Enterprises Bill was agreed 
to by both Houses in November 1918. It allowed for the appointment of 
a Commissioner for Trade who was designated a corporation sole. His 
position as administrator was not clearly defined, as S.6 (1) provided 
that "subject to the Act, every State Enterprise shall be administered 
by the Minister; and the Commissioner, as representing the Crown, is 
hereby authorised and empowered to carry on the same." Overall, many 
of the powers originally vested in the Minister were transferred to 
the Commissioner, subject to an over-riding sanction by the 
Governor-in-Council. Correspondingly, much of the final draft of the 
Bill was taken up with defining the scope and limitations of the 
Commissioner's office, powers and duties. 
The introduction of a Commissioner as the means of administering 
the State Enterprises prompts a return to considering the initial 
question - what was the model for the enterprises' administration? 
Moreover, why did Labor change from proposing a Commissioner for Trade 
in 1916, to a position of placing control over the Enterprises with a 
Minister, in 1918? To what extent was the stance of the Legislative 
Council and Labor's opposition in general influential in altering 
Labor's plan for the administration of the Enterprises? Finally, 
where did the specific administrative provisions of both the 1916 and 
1918 Bills originate? 
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(b) The Genesis of the State Enterprises Act 
The use of Commissioners to administer certain government 
functions was well established in Australia, having been adapted from 
early examples in British administration where Commissions or Boards 
operated both independently of ministries and within them. In 
addition to public services such as Health, Commissioners were 
appointed to many functions of a developmental nature, the prime 
example in most of the Australian Colonies and States being the 
railways which expanded rapidly in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century and became totally a State responsibility. The Acts governing 
the administration of the railways demonstrate a model of legislative 
provisions for public enterprise administration by commission, as well 
as by variations of the public corporation. 
Although Commissioners were appointed in other areas of 
government services under similar provisions, it is through railway 
legislation that the genesis of the provisions for a State Trade 
Commissioner in Queensland can be clearly identified. For example, 
the New South Wales "Railways Act of 1858" provided for the 
appointment of three Commissioners for Railways who were to constitute 
a body corporate with all the attendant powers and disabilities. They 
were given authority to buy and sell land, and to enter into 
2 
contracts. The Governor-in-Council was authorised to appoint and 
remove Commissioners and other officers, with the exception of minor 
appointments, and to make regulations. 
These provisions were transposed almost verbatim to the 
3 
Queensland Railways Acts of 1863 and 1864. From that time to the 
major consolidating "Railways Act of 1914", various amendments and 
refinements were included as the expanded scope of railway operations 
necessitated more detailed allocations and definitions of power and 
control. However, the sections referring to the appointment and 
dismissal of the Commissioner and staff, and to the Commissioners' 
powers to enter into contracts to buy and sell land, were not altered 
or amended by the incoming Labor government. They remained to 
correspond almost entirely with those governing the Commissioner and 
staff of the State Enterprises under "The State Enterprises Act of 
1918". Both the Railways Commissioner and the Commissioner for Trade 
were responsible to a specific Minister and were designated a 
"corporation". One difference was that, in its final form, the State 
Enterprises Act erased all departmental references whereas the 
Railways retained a formal departmental title and structure. 
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Wettenhall's study of early Victorian railway legislation 
concluded that: 
in most States, the relevant railway legislation set the 
precedent for other public corporations and in most of them 
the Victorian legislation was used as a model for their own 
railway commissions despite individual variations ... the 
Victorian model had attempted to secure managerial freedom 
for public enterprises operating within a democratic 
system. 
An important innovation in Railway administration was the attempt 
to define and limit the areas of ministerial control but what was 
significant for the administration of Queensland State Enterprises was 
the process involved in the decision to appoint a Railways 
Commissioner (and later three and four Commissioners) and to vest in 
him independent managerial powers. In both Victoria and New South 
Wales, this process went from administrative independence, political 
interference and "failure", to close Ministerial control and then back 
to an independence reinforced in legislation. The language of the 
process was at times remarkably similar to that used in the Queensland 
Parliamentary debates both at the time of the 1916 Commissioner for 
Trade Bill and later in 1918 with the State Enterprises Bill. Even in 
1916 the New South Wales Parliament debated the advantages of 
appointing a Commissioner who would relieve the Minister of some of 
the onerous duties of the Railways portfolio, who would be an expert 
in the field and who would promote business efficiency, against the 
dangers of creating an autocrat, a "Czar" who would be outside 
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Ministerial or Parliamentary control. In Western Australia where the 
trading ventures were governed by legislation whose purpose was to 
enable a proper system of financial accounting rather than to vary the 
existing system of Ministerial control, there was support for the 
appointment of a Commissioner to administer the "Trading Concerns" on 
the grounds that, as with the Western Australian Railways 
Commissioner, such an appointment would lighten the responsibility of 
the relevant ministers. 
"The State Enterprises Act of 1918" followed the railways 
legislation model in its provisions relating to the powers and duties 
of the Commissioner and staff, in the designation of the Commissioner 
as a corporation, in some of the machinery of a public corporation and 
in the separation of ministerial from managerial matters in some 
areas. However, there were variations and the most important of these 
were to do with financial arrangements. Contrary to the railways 
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legislation, the State Enterprises Act provided for a separation of 
the Enterprises' accounts from the Public Account. On the other hand, 
there was no 'recoup' provision for the State Enterprises. This 
provision, which allowed for compensation to be paid to the Railways 
in the event of loss of profit in conducting a service for the public 
benefit rather than on a business basis, had been a significant 
innovation in the Victorian Railways legislation. 
When the Commissioner for Trade Bill was proposed by the Labor 
government in 1916, two other Acts ("The Queensland Government Savings 
Bank Act" and "The Insurance Act") which concerned the government's 
involvement in business enterprises and which provided for the 
appointment of a Commissioner, were passed by Parliament. Their 
provisions demonstrated variations in legal identity, administrative 
designation and degree of independence from central control, yet there 
were parallels with both the proposed Commissioner for Trade Bill and 
the State Enterprises Act. The Insurance Act and its companion 
legislation, the "The Workers' Compensation Act of 1916", provided for 
the appointment by the Governor-in-Council of a Commissioner who was 
not a corporation but who could, in his official name, enter into 
contracts, buy, sell and lease land as an agent of the Crown and sue 
and be sued. At the same time it was provided that he could exercise 
all the powers, privileges, rights and remedies of the Crown. This 
legal position was the same as for the Commissioner for Trade except 
that the latter was designated a corporation sole. The Savings Bank 
Commissioner was a corporation sole but his degree of autonomy was 
more clearly defined than that of the Commissioner for Trade in that 
he was empowered to administer, govern and manage the Savings Bank. 
In the matter of staff appointments, the position of the 
Commissioner for Trade combined aspects of the other two Commiss-
ioners' powers. The Governor-in-Council appointed the Insurance 
Commissioner's staff whereas the staff of the Savings Bank were 
appointed by the Commissioner. However, while the staff of both 
establishments were subject to the Public Service Acts where the State 
Enterprises staff were mostly excluded, only the State Insurance 
Office was designated a government department. 
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the powers of the Savings 
Bank Commissioner was his capacity, subject to the approval of the 
Governor-in-Council, to obtain loans from any financial institution or 
corporation. This was the provision which had been included in every 
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statute put forward by Ryan to do with State Enterprises and which had 
aroused the effective hostility of the opposition. The Commissioner 
for Trade Bill had vested this power in the Commissioner, the State 
Produce Agency Bill and the State Enterprises Bill had vested it in 
the nominated Minister, but in each of the latter cases, the 
Legislative Council had been successful in having it removed entirely 
from the legislation that was eventually passed. The arrangements for 
raising loan funds for capital expenditure on the Queensland 
Enterprises owed more to those of Western Australia than to the public 
corporation or railway model. The Wilson Liberal government which had 
succeeded Scadden's government in office introduced "The State Trading 
Concerns Act" in 1916 as a means of rectifying the lack of financial 
control evident in the Labor government's 1912 "Trading Concerns Act". 
The 1912 Act had provided for capital funds to be obtained either from 
debenture issues or from Treasury appropriations for the purpose, with 
the Liberal opposition insisting on a total in each year not exceeding 
£500,000. A ceiling for annual capital expenditure had been rejected 
for the Queensland State Enterprises Bill but the limit imposed on 
preliminary expenditure for the State Iron and Steel Works had been an 
effective factor in halting its establishment. However, the 
Treasurer's dominant influence and control over the funding of the 
Western Australian enterprises established in this way, were 
reinforced by the 1916 Act which provided that funds appropriated by 
Parliament would be deposited to a separate account administered by 
the Treasury, through which each enterprise would conduct its 
business. In the case of an enterprise being overdrawn on its working 
account, the Treasurer could, at his discretion, make temporary 
advances. 
Provisions in the Western Australian Act of 1916 also covered the 
authority of the Auditor-General to audit the accounts of the 
Enterprises and to place them before Parliament, the power of the 
Treasurer to fix the interest rates which would be a charge against 
profit, to allow for renewals, depreciation and for sinking fund 
repayments of principal. In addition there was to be an annual profit 
and loss sheet, and surplus profits were to be placed to the credit of 
Consolidated Revenue. While the Treasurer, who was also the Premier, 
was apparently confirmed as controller of the enterprises' finances, 
and thus assumed a co-ordinating role, the Minister was responsible 
for the business of each enterprise and could be sued in law "in the 
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same way as an ordinary trader." The objective of the legislation 
was to place the State trading concerns on the same business footing 
as private trading companies. The provisions for its achievement thus 
followed many of the principles of private business corporations, 
particularly in financial matters. In turn, they were similar to the 
financial provisions set out in legislation for public corporations. 
But, despite representation by the Western Australian Minister for 
Public Works that it would otherwise be impossible to expect 
commercial success, there was no provision for the appointment of a 
Commissioner with corporate powers, nor was there any attempt to 
co-ordinate the administration of the enterprises except for the 
purposes of funding. Managers retained some independence in 
day-to-day business matters but the principle of the primacy of 
Ministerial control was never in doubt even if, as the debate on the 
1916 State Trading Concerns Act had demonstrated, the effectiveness of 
such control was often dependent on the competence and interest of the 
incumbent Minister. 
The Queensland State Enterprises Act of 1918 was similar to the 
Western Australian Acts in many of its financial provisions, notably 
those dealing with capital funding, capital repayments, and treatment 
of reserve funds and surplus "profits". Moreover, the specific 
aspects of the Queensland Auditor-General's demands in 1916 and again 
in 1917 for a proper system of accounting for the State Enterprises 
owed more to the Western Australian legislation than to the New South 
Wales "Special Deposits (Industrial Undertakings) Act of 1912", the 
latter being largely concerned with setting up a central Treasury fund 
for the New South Wales trading enterprises as a means of imposing on 
them some form of financial accountability. At the same time, the 
administrative structure established by the State Enterprises Act, as 
well as its financial, staffing and external control provisions, had 
points of similarity with those of the public corporations established 
in Victoria and New South Wales. 
The question of the influence of the public corporation 
administration developed early in this century in Victoria, New South 
Wales and the Commonwealth, has been addressed by Wettenhall. He 
found sufficient grounds to indicate their continued influence on the 
use and development of public corporations throughout Australia's 
history, but little to suggest that Britain's use of the public 
corporation in the administration of its nationalised industries was 
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in any way shaped by the early Australian experience. Despite this 
failure to establish a continuum of influence between Australia and 
Britain, the Queensland State Enterprises Act included provisions 
which found parallels in the principles of the public corporation 
enunciated by Morrison in 1933, and in the various legislation 
setting out the administration of nationalised industries. 
The Queensland Labor government in 1916 had followed Western 
Australia's example to a point but had then departed on a different 
course in proposing a Commissioner for Trade with a corporate identity 
and the establishment of a co-ordinating body, the State Trade Office. 
In 1918, it returned to the concept of placing corporate powers with a 
Minister for State Enterprises. 
Whether or not Ryan's government was influenced to change from 
vesting a large measure of independent control over the enterprises in 
a 'public official' in 1916 to placing all powers with the Minister in 
1918, by the difficulties experienced by the New South Wales 
government when the Railways Commissioners attempted to assert their 
independence or whether the change was to protect Labor's investment 
and thwart the 'blocking' tactics of the Legislative Council was not 
clear. The issue was further confused by Labor's endorsement during 
this period of Commissioners for Railways and the Government Savings 
Bank who both had the powers of a corporation while a third, the 
Insurance Commissioner, was not a corporation but had recourse to 
legal functions. However, although it appeared that Labor accepted 
government by commission and rejected the Victorian concept of 
autonomous public corporation, Theodore's plan for the establishment 
of a State Iron and Steel Works suggested that the possible beneficial 
use of public corporation administration for government business 
enterprises had not been overlooked. Theodore, who became Chief 
Secretary and Treasurer following Ryan's departure in 1919, proposed 
that a joint stock company should be floated to run the Works. It was 
to be called "The State Iron and Steel Works Company". It would be 
independent of the government, but the government would hold shares 
along with the public. The Labor Cabinet approved the proposal in 
1921, but it was halted by the refusal of Niemeyer, the Governor of 
12 
the Bank of England, to advance the necessary loan funds. 
Thus, the administration of the Queensland State Enterprises 
changed between their initial establishment in 1915 and the passing of 
the State Enterprises Act in 1918. There were a number of 
influences which were responsible to varying degrees for the changes. 
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There were, moreover, a number of examples on which Ryan and his 
Ministers drew in arriving at a method of administration for the 
Enterprises. There were no innovative arrangements per se to reflect 
the innovative nature of a policy of state-owned business enterprises. 
Nor did there appear to be one specific model of administrative 
arrangements followed. Indeed, the latter would have been impossible, 
given that nowhere had a diverse range of trading enterprises been 
co-ordinated under one controlling authority, whether it was a 
Minister or a public corporation. The overall impression of the 
genesis of the administration of the State Enterprises was political 
expediency. The government either used whatever administrative tools 
were available to secure the politically desirable or necessary 
objective, or it had failed to plan at all, and the form the 
administration of the Enterprises took and the changes that were made 
were ad hoc responses to the political demands of the moment. 
That Ryan's government admitted the Enterprises were an 
experiment yet Theodore as Treasurer and Hunter as Minister for Lands 
had sought advice from Western Australia and watched developments in 
public enterprise management in other States, tends to suggest a 
mixture of the above approaches to the issue of administrative 
arrangements. The result was that many of the features of the 
Queensland State Enterprises' administration were similar to those of 
public enterprises elsewhere, but the way in which they were combined 
was specific to that group of State business undertakings and, 
therefore, unique. 
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SECTION 2 
STATUTORY CORPORATION OR MINISTERIAL DEPARTMENT 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL FEATURES OF THE STATE ENTERPRISES EXAMINED 
Introduction 
Having looked at some of the possible sources from which the 
statutory provisions governing the State Enterprises were drawn up, it 
has become apparent that Labor's intention was to maintain close 
government supervision over their operations. Initially, the 
intention was to invest a Commissioner for Trade with the powers of a 
corporation to manage the State Enterprises along "business" lines. 
There was considerable administrative freedom implied in the 1916 
Commissioner for Trade Bill, while nowhere was it stated that the 
Labor government intended a departmental structure as the basis for 
administering the Enterprises. 
It has been suggested that elsewhere in Australia, if not in 
Queensland, Labor was hostile to the concept of Boards and Commissions 
which it saw as being a vehicle for Liberal economic domination. 
Whether the hostility of Labor throughout Australia to Liberal 
governments in general and their specific hostility towards the 
Liberals' use of non-departmental administration was the significant 
factor in the decision or whether there were other pressing local 
issues, by 1918 Labor had rejected administration of the State 
Enterprises by a quasi-autonomous Commissioner with corporate powers. 
Instead, it favoured an administrative form which followed the lines 
already established by both Labor and "Liberal" governments in 
Queensland for revenue-producing public enterprises: namely 
departmental administration with the Minister having the powers of a 
corporation. At the same time, however, there was no proposal to 
co-ordinate the State Enterprises. They were to remain as separate 
entities within the department. Labor also intended to persist with 
some of the aspects of administration initiated in the State 
Enterprises of Western Australia and New South Wales, so that the 
manager of each enterprise was to be responsible for day-to-day 
management and both managers and staff were to be exempted from Public 
Service rules and conditions. The Queensland State Enterprises 
arrangements differed from those of Western Australian and New South 
Wales trading ventures and from other Queensland public enterprises in 
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that Queensland proposed to invest the Minister with corporate powers 
and to maintain the State Enterprises accounts separate from the 
Public Account, 
That might have been the end of the matter except for the 
intervention of the Legislative Council, which successfully moved to 
amend the State Enterprises' Bill in a way which transferred the 
Minister's corporate identity to a Commissioner for Trade. Moreover, 
the capacity for the Minister to raise loans on the private market 
without further reference to Parliament, which had been a feature of 
many of the public corporations in Victoria and New South Wales, 
although not generally of the Railways, was omitted from the Bill. 
However, the Enterprises' accounts were to remain separate from the 
Public Account and the financial provisions of the Bill closely 
followed those proposed by the Auditor-General. These in turn were 
largely similar to the accounting provisions of the 1916 Trading 
Concerns Act of Western Australia, and although they followed the 
business practices of the public corporations, they differed in the 
extent to which the Auditor-General exercised control over them. 
Whatever measure of independence the final statutory provisions 
signalled for State Enterprises' administration, it was circumscribed 
by the inclusion of the Governor-in-Council's power of veto over 
staffing and financial arrangements, its power to make regulations, 
and the designation of the Minister as administering the State 
Enterprises. 
The administration of the Queensland State Enterprises did not 
follow a conventional departmental arrangement. It did not mirror 
those of the Western Australian and New South Wales trading ventures, 
nor the Victorian public corporations in their entirety. To misquote 
Chester, if the State Enterprises were not a government department, a 
local authority or a public corporation, in what way could their 
2 
administrative authority be described? 
Chester examined the various approaches to the problem and 
concluded that even if the "simple" solution was adopted of naming any 
government authority a public corporation that was not a government 
department or a local authority, it did not take account of the 
acknowledged and significant variations in the features of those 
3 
public corporations. Another approach was to distinguish differences 
in public corporations according to their functions. Thus public 
corporations in Britain were "managerial-social; managerial-economic 
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and regulatory-social bodies" or, as Friedmann proposed, the 
industrial or commercial corporation; the social service corporation; 
4 
or the supervisory corporation. According to this type of analysis, 
the commercial or industrial corporation would be granted greater 
5 
managerial independence in order to fulfil its functions. 
Wettenhall's opinion in relation to Australian statutory authorities 
was that the functional approach was hampered by difficulties in 
defining the boundaries of functions. He rejected an exclusive 
emphasis on variations in the public corporation in arguing that the 
variations in ministerial departments and the degree of overlap 
between the "conventional" categories of department, local authority 
and public corporation were sufficiently marked to question the 
definition of these categories. 
Kewley also noted that government business activities were often 
carried out by "ordinary" departments rather than statutory 
corporations. It has been generally recognised that the constant 
distinguishing feature between ministerial departments and statutory 
corporations has been the granting to statutory corporations of some 
measure of independence from full Ministerial or Parliamentary 
control. "In other words, to a greater or lesser extent, they have 
been placed outside the normal system of control and accountability 
g 
that has been developed in relation to the departments." As Spann 
has also commented, there would be little point in setting up a 
9 
statutory authority if it were not given some independence. 
The preferred approach to assessing the extent of statutory 
corporation autonomy and thus to proceeding towards a classification 
of statutory corporations has been to examine their constitutional 
features. The appointment and composition of the Board, staffing, 
finance, and Ministerial control - have been identified as the "key" 
points affecting a corporation's level of independence. 
Attempts to define the administration of the Queensland State 
Enterprises according to function suffer from the same 
inconclusiveness of boundaries that Wettenhall identified. The State 
Enterprises were set up as commercial activities. They were to enter 
into competitive trading with private enterprises. Apart from the 
functional difference in their activities from such public enterprises 
as the Railways and the State Government Insurance Office and the fact 
that they were not monopolistic, the Enterprises also had the function 
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of price regulation as well as regulation of industry conditions such 
as occurred with the State Fishery. The difficulty lay with 
identifying them as commercial or regulatory enterprises for they were 
a mixture of both. 
Consequently, to assess whether the administration of the State 
Enterprises had a greater or lesser degree of independence from the 
normal departmental system of control and accountability, the "key 
points" of potential control have been examined in the context of the 
public corporation model and the constitutional variations discussed 
in the literature on public corporation administration. 
The section on control of staff has departed from the 
conventional mode to include some discussion of mismanagement of the 
Enterprises. The commercial failure of the State Enterprises has been 
blamed on their managers and employees and in particular on their lack 
of competence and failure to exhibit any sense of working for the 
public benefit. It therefore seemed appropriate to examine this 
judgement following an assessment of the degree of managerial and 
staffing autonomy granted the State Enterprises. 
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(a) Appointment and Composition of the Board 
The board of a public corporation was, in Morrison's view, the 
epicentre of its operations. The Board and its officers were the 
"high custodians of the public interest." They worked for the public 
benefit, not for the capitalist objective of profits and dividends 
and the quality of the Board was seen as a crucial factor in the 
2 
success or failure of public enterprise. A number of important 
considerations flowed from the principle governing the character of 
the Board. The first involved public accountability. The appointment 
of Board members by the Minister rather than by nomination, election 
or other procedure, vested responsibility in an elected representative 
answerable to Parliament and to the public for the quality of his 
choice. On the other hand, any form of Ministerial control raised 
questions about the extent of the Board's independence from "issues of 
partisan politics." Eggleston believed that under a Labor government 
the spoils system would come into full flower with appointments to 
3 
public office. On the other hand, it was well recorded that Labor 
saw its Liberal opponents as making free with public corporation 
4 
appointments and argued for more control over them. 
The potential dangers of political influence in Ministerial 
appointments led Eggleston to support appointment or nomination of 
5 
Board members by outside bodies, although the general method in 
Australia has been for the Governor-in-Council to make appointments, 
on the recommendation of Cabinet. Appointments to the "Board" of the 
Queensland State Enterprises followed this method. Where there had 
been no Board before 1918, the manager of each enterprise was 
similarly appointed. 
Just as the method of appointment was important for the 
independence of the public corporation, so too were the tenure and 
dismissal provisions. Chester has observed that where Board members 
have a security of tenure which can be broken only by complicated 
procedures before Parliament rather than at the Minister's discretion, 
the independence of the corporation is enhanced. The State 
Enterprises Act contained numerous provisions relating to the 
conditions for removal of the Commissioner for Trade, which was an 
outcome of the concern expressed by members of Parliament from all 
parties across the years of debate on State Enterprises legislation. 
At one time or another, they argued that power should be vested in the 
Minister, rather than in a process of removal before both Houses of 
su 
Parliament in order to curtail any independence of action that the 
g 
latter might confer on the Commissioner. A corollary to this type of 
debate was found in a further provision of the Act which duplicated 
provisions of the Queensland "Insurance Act of 1916". In the event of 
the Commissioner's suspension from office, or his death, the Secretary 
of the State Trade Office was empowered to exercise all the powers and 
duties of the Commissioner, but under the direction of the Minister 
(S.14 and S.15). In general, the grounds on which the Commissioner 
could be suspended or removed followed the pattern established in 
other statutory authorities across Australia administered by a 
Commissioner. 
Arrangements regarding tenure were also similar to those of the 
majority of public corporations in Australia. It was generally 
accepted as a principle of the public corporation in Britain that 
fixed tenure was essential for the independence of the Board. Robson 
added that this did not imply the permanency of tenure of Civil 
Servants. Rather it was a means of protection against 'outside' 
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political interference. However, the variations that appeared in 
public corporation legislation ranged from tenure for life in the 
Victorian State Savings Bank, determination by Ministerial regulation 
in some British corporations or removal by the government without 
Parliamentary approval in the early Victorian Tramways Acts and Grain 
Elevator Board legislation. In some instances, a maximum period of 
appointment specified in preference to a fixed term of years was 
supposedly a means of increasing Ministerial control, since it 
afforded the opportunity to make a series of short-term appointments. 
This in fact occurred with the Commissioner for Trade's period of 
service. From the end of 1930 to March 1931, he was re-appointed for 
three short terms as "the Corporation of the Commissioner for Trade". 
Although it demonstrated the extent of Ministerial control over the 
Enterprises, it was apparently a legal necessity. Each time the Moore 
government had prepared to dismiss the Enterprises from their agenda 
and had terminated the appointments of all staff, problems had arisen, 
including those involving statutory provisions such as the sale of the 
Babinda State Hotel. Austin had to be re-appointed a Commissioner 
with corporate powers in order to comply with the legal requirements. 
As with most other public corporations, the Act made statutory 
provision for re-appointment. However, although Austin was appointed 
for a maximum term of five years from the end of 1918, no 
3X 
re-appointment was made until 1926 when he was appointed Under-
Secretary, Department of Labour and Industry and also re-appointed as 
Commissioner for Trade. 
What was relevant to the extent of Ministerial control and 
curtailment of the"Board's" independence from political influence was 
Austin's retention of Public Service status. Not only was his salary 
which was fixed by the Governor-in-Council below a statutorily defined 
limit of £2,500, paid out of Consolidated Revenue, but he also 
remained under the Public Service Act and was a contributor to the 
Public Service Superannuation Scheme. This was contrary to the 
principle of the public corporation that the Board chairman should not 
12 
come under Public Service and thus Treasury control, which echoed 
the substance of Cole's earlier warning against ceding control of 
13 public enterprises to the Civil Service. 
The composition of the Board has received considerable attention, 
for it was again one of the constitutional features of public 
corporations where the extent of corporation independence could be 
identified. In Australia, the boards of public corporations have 
taken one of three forms: 
(1) The corporation sole or single-member Board, usually a 
Commissioner. 
(2) The wholly part-time Board with the general manager as executive 
head. 
(3) The part-time Board with a full-time chairman as executive 
head.-^^ 
The Commissioner for Trade came into the category of the single member 
Board, a form not used in Britain but long established in Australia. 
Queensland governments of all political parties have appointed single 
commissioners to manage government functions including Health, 
Railways, Main Roads, Electricity and Immigration. A single 
commissioner was said to be preferred by them because it concentrated 
the line of accountability in one official and facilitated Ministerial 
control of the particular function. The early experience of many 
State governments with Railways Commissioners had provided a salutary 
lesson in attempting to control a multi-member management structure 
granted some measure of independence. 
A major issue in multi-member boards, which had some relevance to 
the single member board was the nature of its composition: in other 
words, who should be represented on the board and what were desirable 
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qualifications for appointment? The exclusion of "vested interests" 
was a first consideration in both Britain and Australia but was the 
Board to be representative of the industry in which it functioned and 
the "clients" it served? The question of consumer interest and 
consumer representation tended to be side-tracked by reference to the 
public corporation principle of service in the public interest, but in 
Britain the machinery of consumer councils was seen to meet in part 
15 the demands for representation. 
The Board "as the meeting place for representatives of interests" 
was rejected in Britain because the nature of the public corporation 
objective required members to be suitably competent and loyal in their 
16 
responsibility to the public interest. The concept of worker 
representation promoted by the unions in Britain was dismissed for the 
same reason. It would be better, Morrison argued, if a worker was 
appointed to the Board on the grounds of competence and suitability 
than as a representative of labour and the trade unions. Moreover, 
there was the danger that catering to one sectional interest would 
increase the demands for other sectional representation. Worker 
representation has not been such an issue in Australia largely because 
18 few demands of this kind have been made. Another perspective of 
representative Boards was advanced by Bland who saw them as the means 
of removing the management of government commercial enterprises from 
19 the "incompetence" of Ministers and Parliament. In Queensland a 
representative approach was evident in the composition of the Primary 
Produce Marketing Boards developed by the Labor government from 1922 
on, but the question of representation never arose for the State 
Enterprises, although many of the issues were relevant to them. 
For example, the capacity to appoint skilled and efficient 
managers with business experience was one of the reasons given for 
establishing the State Enterprises in its particular form. Sawer 
referred to the ability to emphasise technical and managerial 
efficiency as one of the perceived advantages of the early Australian 
public corporations but, unlike Britain, specific qualifications for 
Board members have generally not been written into Australian 
legislation. 
This was the case with the State Enterprises legislation. In 
contrast to "The Queensland Government Savings Bank Act of 1916" which 
provided that the Commissioner should have extensive banking or Public 
Service financial experience, the Act made no provision for specialist 
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qualifications, not even the vague "fit and proper person" directive 
20 included in some Australian public corporation legislation. The 
Royal Commission on the State Iron and Steel Works, in their report to 
the Queensland Parliament in 1918, drew up a list of qualifications 
considered to be essential for the appointment of general manager for 
the Works. None of the applicants, among whom was the Government 
Geologist, fulfilled all the requirements which spanned both technical 
and administrative fields. The eventual appointee, Brophy, was not 
competent in either field and what this tended to confirm was the lack 
of candidates possessing the high degree of skills needed to run the 
complex operations of the State Enterprises. 
The Commissioner for Trade did not have business experience and 
was not drawn from the private sector. He was a permanent officer in 
the Queensland Public Service with specialist financial 
qualifications. He had been an audit inspector for the State 
Enterprises since 1917 and immediately prior to his appointment as 
Commissioner had been promoted to Deputy Auditor-General and Chief 
21 Audit Inspector. 
While it has been stressed that stipulating specialist 
qualifications was a device for preventing outright political 
appointments, that was not the issue of Austin's appointment. The 
issue was summed up in Morrison's opinion that "the technical expert 
22 
is by no means a good administrator." Whether Austin's Public 
Service accounting experience fitted him to administer trading 
enterprises which were experimental but which the government expected 
to be operated in accordance with commercial practice, remained 
debatable throughout the chequered performance of the State 
Enterprises. What his appointment did confirm was the importance 
Labor attached to the financial management of the Enterprises and the 
intention of keeping control of them despite the Legislative Council's 
insistence on devolving some of the proposed Ministerial powers on to 
a Commissioner. 
It also raised the question of the desirability of appointing 
Public Service officials to the management of semi-independent or 
independent authorities. This practice was unknown in British 
corporations but in Australia it was widely criticised for promoting a 
conflict of loyalties between responsibility to the Minister and 
responsibility to the corporation. As the Public Accounts Committee 
Inquiry into the failure of the Tasmanian Aluminium Production 
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Commission found, the effect on the corporation was often 
23 disastrous. The Commissioner for Trade appeared to be caught in a 
similar conflict for, on the one hand, he had to support the policy of 
the government while on the other hand he had to defend the 
Enterprises' staff against some of its consequences. This dilemma was 
particularly marked in relation to the government's pricing policy for 
the Enterprises (see Section 3, Page 143). Given the circumstances of 
his appointment as Commissioner and his subsequent appointment as 
Under-Secretary of the Department of Labour and Industry, he might 
well have considered his responsibility to the Minister as having 
priority, but his annual public reports were conspicuously supportive 
of his Enterprises' staff and the concept of the State Enterprises. 
The Auditor-General and the Under-Secretary, Treasury were public 
officials who, although not formally part of the Enterprises' 
management, were given substantial statutory control over financial 
matters. Their membership, with the Commissioner for Trade, of an 
Enterprises' Finance Committee, which used these statutory powers on a 
number of occasions, again emphasised the importance of the 
Enterprises' financial objectives and the presence of controls on 
financial autonomy. Their relationship with the Enterprises would 
have been characterised by loyalty to their own departments and to the 
government's objectives. The Auditor-General was noticeably critical 
of the Enterprises although on at least one occasion he was supportive 
24 
of the State Cannery and defended its financial performance. 
Whether members of the Board should have policy responsibilities 
only or whether they should be responsible for the various functions 
of a public enterprise on the basis of their qualification has been a 
further area of contention in the composition of a public corporation 
Board. Committees such as the Burrows and Fleck Committees in Britain 
reported on the efficacy of the different approaches to the 
25 
appointment of the National Coal Board. Eggleston, without further 
qualification, equated the managers of the Victorian public 
corporations with members of their Boards which presumably designated 
?fi 
them as functional boards. Morrison refused to be drawn into the 
debate except to reject the substance of the Bridgman Report on the 
re-organisation of the British Post Office. The Report recommended 
that the management of the Post Office be vested in the 
Postmaster-General assisted by a Board of departmental officers. 
Morrison saw this arrangement as no different from the conventional 
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departmental meetings between Minister and his officials. Moreover, 
it did nothing to encourage administrative independence and the 
potential capacity for greater efficiency in the operations of the 
Post Office.^^ 
The single-member nature of the Board of the Queensland State 
Enterprises precluded any debate on whether it was a functional or 
policy Board as occurred with multi-member Boards. The meetings of 
the Commissioner with the managers of the Enterprises, particularly 
after the Enterprises were grouped together under the one statute in 
1918, might have cast them as a de facto Board, a Board in practice 
but lacking a legislative base. However, in the light of the first 
draft of the 1918 State Enterprises Act where the Labor government 
proposed to vest the management of the Enterprises in the Minister 
while retaining managers for each of the Enterprises under the 
jurisdiction of the Act, the composition of the Enterprises' 
management was apparently intended to be along the same lines as the 
Bridgman recommendations. In turn, as Morrison pointed out, such a 
course negated the concept of independence and flexibility to be 
gained by using a public corporation in place of a departmental model. 
In his view, the Bridgman Report adhered to the old assumption 
supported largely by anti-socialists that socialisation of industry 
had to take place within a State department with the Minister 
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responsible for management. With the Queensland State Enterprises, 
this was the government's preferred form of management for them in 
1918. 
The removal of some powers of management from the Minister to a 
Commissioner with corporate powers which the amendments negotiated by 
the Legislative Council effected, gave the State Enterprises some 
measure of management independence but the Council's objective was to 
restrict Labor's power rather than to promote public enterprise 
efficiency. 
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(b) Appointment and Control of Staff 
Freedom from political influence in staff appointments was seen 
to be one of the advantages of removing the management of public 
enterprises from a Ministerial department to a statutory authority and 
specifically to a public corporation. Morrison confirmed the 
positive steps taken by the British Civil Service to eliminate 
patronage but believed it was inevitable that politicians would try to 
2 
win votes with promises of employment. From another perspective, 
control of staff appointments was considered a significant test of 
managerial autonomy, as well as being essential for the functional 
efficiency of the public corporation. Freedom from control by central 
personnel agencies allowed for a 'commercial' response to operating 
conditions, enabling flexibility both in staff numbers and functions 
and in their remuneration and conditions of service. 
One of the leading principles of British public corporation 
theory was that personnel did not form part of the Civil Service and 
3 
were thus not subject to Treasury control. It should have marked a 
distinct difference between ministerial departments and public 
corporations. However, public corporations have not usually had a 
completely free hand. Chester concluded that "freedom from normal 
Civil Service arrangements is not an inevitable or inescapable 
4 
characteristic of these bodies," while in Australia it has been 
evident that some commercial corporations lacked freedom of control 
5 
over their staff. Referring to Queensland, Kewley stated that it was 
the one "notable exception" to a general situation of public 
corporation staff being exempt from Public Service Acts. However, 
the source of this information, C J . Hayes, was referring to 
corporations operating within departments, such as the Main Roads 
Commission and the State Electricity Commission. The State 
Enterprises were not included in Hayes's survey, but, in fact. State 
Enterprises' staff were exempted from the Public Service Act. 
Before 1918, appointments to the separate State Enterprises were 
made under the authority of the Governor-in-Council. After 1918, the 
provisions of The State Enterprises Act vested this authority in the 
Commissioner for Trade but both the Governor-in-Council and Parliament 
were given a form of control over staffing matters (S.16 [2], [3], 
[5]). The Governor-in-Council held a veto over all staff appointments 
while Parliament appropriated a sum of money which the Commissioner 
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was empowered to use for salaries and wages. As such the provisions 
came within the range of the variations in statutory provisions and in 
the practice of Australian public enterprises. In effect, the 
Commissioner proposed the size of his staff, had responsibility for 
estimating and securing the required numbers, and for overall staff 
management. He had a considerably higher level of managerial freedom 
than the controls instituted by the Act appeared to confer. It was 
therefore more likely to have been the cost factor of wages and 
salaries in relation to the enterprises' objective of cheaper prices 
than external staffing controls, which dictated staff numbers and how 
they were deployed. 
Employment provided a ready issue for the opposition in 
Parliament. At Question Time and in the debates on supply they 
repeatedly argued that staffing levels, salaries and wages were too 
high. In reply, Austin emphasised the primary goal of the enterprises 
which was to serve the public efficiently and effectively within the 
limits dictated by the government's pricing policy. At the same time 
he made specific mention in his annual reports of the wages/turnover 
ratio of those Enterprises such as the Butchery where it compared 
g 
favourably with private business standards. 
Despite the less than profitable outcome of trading and the 
necessity of reducing staff numbers to effect cost savings, as 
occurred in the State Stations and the State Fishery, the overall 
9 
employment figure did not vary much from around a total of 1,000. 
This uniformity could largely be explained by the fact that while some 
trading units were closed or had their services cut back, others 
continued to expand. The State Cannery increased its staff in order 
to process the expanding crops from the Beerburrum Soldiers' 
Settlement even as the trading losses continued. The Railway 
Refreshment Rooms added more units and therefore more staff to its 
operations until 1928, whereas the State Butchery gradually reduced 
its staff from a high point of 387 in 1923 as many of its country 
outlets closed down. Probably the least responsive to staff cuts, as 
a reflection of adverse trading conditions and curtailed operations, 
was the State Stations enterprise. The amalgamation of several 
stations as a cost-saving measure in 1924 saw some reduction of staff 
but there was only a slow decrease throughout the period to 1928 
despite a lower rate of sales and several unstocked and unworked 
stations. 
other external influences or controls on staffing of the 
Enterprises including the judicial process of arbitration, union 
activism and an increasing tendency for the Cabinet and the Public 
Service Board to exercise a more overt role in staff management, were 
similar to those experienced by public enterprises generally. 
Industrial relations in Queensland at the time the Labor Party 
came to power in 1915 were governed by the attempts made by the 
previous Denham government to secure industrial peace through the 
provisions of "The Industrial Peace Act of 1912" which allowed for 
wages and conditions to be set by Industrial Boards representing the 
various sections of industry. Trade unions had been recognised and 
both employer and employee interests could be registered under "The 
Trade Union Act of 1895", although there was little encouragement by 
the Liberal-Conservative governments to do so. 
In 1916 the Labor government established a judicial process of 
arbitration in industrial matters with the passing of "The Industrial 
Arbitration Act". The Boards were gradually superseded by the 
registering of agreements between employers and unions representing 
employees with an Industrial Registrar. This was then the basis for 
the granting of awards fixing wage levels and working conditions. 
Minor disputes were settled by an Industrial Magistrate while 
applications for new awards, variations to them and appeals against 
them came before the Arbitration Court established under the Act. 
There was also provision for the presiding judge to call for a 
compulsory conference between adversary parties to discuss competing 
claims, with the Court having the power to adjudicate and, if 
necessary, to resolve the matter. 
The Arbitration Act encouraged the registration of unions and 
addressed, although not conclusively, the question of preferment for 
union members as a condition of the various awards. In 1917, 
government employees were granted access to the tribunal for the 
fixing of awards and the right to appeal against them. The Queensland 
Railways Union, who were at the time fighting against the encroachment 
of the Australian Workers' Union, particularly in the northern and 
western regions of the State, applied for an award as did the 
Teachers' Union. (Both of these categories of government employees 
had been exempted from the operation of the Public Service Act for 
many years.) In a battle fought at Federal level, the Public Service 
Unions had won a major victory in the Court decision that their 
members were engaged in industry not in administration, and 
consequently had the right of appeal to the Arbitration Court. In May 
1917, the Public Service General Officers Association (later the State 
Service Union) applied for an award before the Queensland Arbitration 
Court, followed in November the same year by the Public Service 
Professional Officers Association. 
Common to these awards and most of the awards covering private 
employees was the concept of variation in rates of pay and working 
conditions according to geographical divisions. Usually these were 
the Northern, Central and Southern divisions with some provisions for 
sub-districts. In the meat and sawmilling industries, separate awards 
were fixed for five separate divisions, whereas for the Public Service 
General Officers' Association three divisions were used to determine 
the rate of special allowances to be paid. 
For the first time, all awards fixed a minimum and maximum wage 
which varied according to the industry. For many employees, however, 
this bore only a tenuous relationship with what they considered to be 
a living wage. By 1918, access to the arbitration process was seen by 
some to be of dubious value. There was a strong movement among 
unionists representing government employees to boycott the Court and 
employ direct strike action to secure improved conditions. A delegate 
to the 1919 Queensland Railway Union Conference, Mr Lloyd, spoke for 
many of them in claiming that "Arbitration might be of benefit to the 
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outside worker but it was of no use to the Government employee." 
Clerks in particular were having difficulty in obtaining pay rates 
that reflected the different levels of their duties, and although 
these difficulties were not confined to public employees, they were 
exacerbated by the government embargo on pay increases for government 
employees in force at the time. 
The basic wage introduced in 1921 and its subsequent reduction 
the following year in the face of growing economic problems did little 
to promote harmonious industrial relations between employers and 
employees. Indeed, the overall industrial relations 'scene' appeared 
to be as much in turmoil under a Labor government as with previous 
regimes, although the issues in dispute may themselves have altered. 
Against this background, what was the position of the employees 
of the State Business Enterprises? 
Theories of public enterprise, developed mainly after the advent 
of the Queensland enterprises, postulate two related factors governing 
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their industrial relations: firstly, that public enterprise 
representing public ownership develops an esprit de corps not possible 
amidst 'the red tape and bureaucracy' of a ministerial department, and 
secondly, that employment for the public benefit ensures harmonious 
industrial relations. 
The role of public enterprise as beneficial to the public 
interest and the concomitant growth of an esprit de corps appeared to 
be of comparatively modern origin. According to Goodman, Liberal 
politicians of nineteenth century England legislated for an extension 
of state intervention in economic affairs to secure the welfare of the 
individual. As such, public enterprise was seen to have a moral 
purpose. By the twentieth century, public enterprise had become an 
expedient tool of politics and there were numerous motives for its 
use. One of these motives Goodman describes as the substitution of a 
13 
'service motive' for the financial incentives of entrepreneurship. 
In other words, public ownership of business enterprises would mean 
work for the public benefit rather than for profit. 
Much of the argument about the desirable extent of public 
ownership which developed with the spread of socialist principles late 
in the nineteenth century and which covered the spectrum from the 'gas 
and water' Fabians to the fundamental socialists who perceived in it 
the means of widespread economic redistribution, focused on the 
14 
elimination of the profit motive. For the Fabians, the public 
benefit of government business enterprises not required to make the 
surplus profits of private enterprise lay in reduced consumer charges. 
Another important factor in the elimination of the profit motive was 
seen to be its potential capacity for improving the wage levels and 
working conditions of public employees whose number would increase as 
the extent of public ownership increased and industrial peace would 
follow. 
The concept of the public benefit surfaced officially with the 
new wave of public bodies established after World War 1 in Britain 
when, for instance, the 1926 Crawford Committee Report on Broadcasting 
recommended that broadcasting be administered by "a public corporation 
15 
acting as Trustee for the national interest." Herbert Morrison took 
up the theme of the state controlled business enterprises 'trading for 
the public interest' not for profit, in his parliamentary speeches 
advocating the establishment of a London Transport Board which became 
a reality in 1933. To this he added the notion of an esprit de corps 
S3 
which his years as Minister for Transport had convinced him was 
lacking in government departments. While he did not advocate worker 
control of public enterprise, to him the binding together of state 
employees in a common purpose of serving the public was essential to 
efficient public enterprise management and could only be secured away 
from the confines of political interference and bureaucratic red 
15 tape. 
Robson supported the "Morrison concept" of the primacy of an 
esprit de corps developed within an independent public enterprise, 
seeing in it also the possibility for harmonious industrial relations 
if public ownership of resources became extensive and of direct public 
concern. These views were shared by Eggleston who had initially 
praised the public enterprises established in Victoria under 
Sir William Irvines's Liberal government. Following his years as 
Minister for Railways, however, he conceded his difficulties with 
union leaders and became disillusioned at the lack of industrial 
co-operation and the selfishness of the employees of the state 
18 
enterprises which had, in effect, demonstrated to him the complete 
absence of an esprit de corps and any sense of working for the public 
benefit, however unrealistic such a goal may have been. 
Although criticised by many writers as having a romantic, 
19 idealised view of public ownership Robson, from his vantage point of 
30 years' experience in British public enterprises, was not unaware of 
the problems for labour relations that public ownership incurred. He 
saw that the transfer of industries from private to public ownership 
had led employees, individually and as members of powerful trade 
unions, to expect an ideological change favouring "greater plenty and 
less hardship for the toiling masses." As a result they would have 
material gains in the shape of pay increases and better working 
20 
conditions when the profit motive was eliminated. He warned against 
expecting socialist doctrines alone "to change the incentives and 
21 transform the motivation of the workers" to the extent that they 
would work more responsibly in the public interest than they would for 
private enterprise. 
The early New South Wales state enterprises had fulfilled this 
type of expectation of improved working conditions with the granting 
of paid holidays, good conduct awards and superannuation provisions 
well before the same conditions applied to private enterprise 
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employees. In his review of the enterprises Parker discounted any 
socialist connotation attaching to these benefits and made no attempt 
to link them with either a government move to set standards for 
private enterprise to follow, or with a higher level of worker 
22 
efficiency or public responsibility. More generally, the Australian 
experience has been that the business connotations of the statutory 
corporation have earned for it the distrust of employees, little 
expectation of improvement in their working conditions and rejection 
23 
of the notion of working for the public benefit. 
In Queensland, with its first Labor government committed to an 
extensive program of economic reform, a major part of which comprised 
improved worker conditions, there were public assumptions about the 
role to be played by the State Enterprises in achieving that 
objective. One correspondent to "The Worker", for example, applauded 
the industrial conditions obtaining in the new State Butcher Shop at 
Rockhampton where, he wrote, "Men are employed at a living wage and 
24 human hours." At the same time, opposition members kept up a 
continual barrage in Parliament against the false position in which 
the government had placed the workers through its promises of higher 
wages and lower prices, a promise the opposition believed could not be 
sustained by the State's economy. The Country-National member for 
Murilla, Mr Morgan, objected that despite widespread drought 
conditions. Labor was spending more to provide increased wages for 
those who had responded to the election promises and had voted Labor 
into office. The government was obliged to range the world seeking 
loan funds as a result. The continuing theme that he and other 
non-Labor politicians pursued over the years when Labor carried 
through its program of industrial reform and the expansion of State 
Enterprises was the undue influence on Labor's decisions of "Trades 
25 
Hall and the extreme 'red-raggers'." 
Although the unions and Labor 'hard-liners' pressured the 
government to advance the cause of socialism by direct action against 
capitalism, an issue that would split the Labor Party ranks for many 
?fi 
years, Ryan had no intention of pursuing the establishment of a 
workers' Utopia. His stance was more in keeping with Fisher's early 
27 
endeavours to gain "fair conditions of life" for the worker within 
the existing though potentially changeable machinery. Ryan was not 
about to overthrow capitalism. As many commentators on this period of 
28 
Labor in power have determined, it was clear that Labor needed to 
€5 
adopt a pragmatic approach to its relations with capitalism if it was 
to stay afloat financially and be in any position to assist the 
worker. 
That the unions did not share this view was equally clear, and as 
the judgment of the Arbitration Court handed down in the State Butcher 
Shops Employees' Awards in 1919 demonstrated, all parties to the 
dispute were aware of the potential implications of the industrial 
conditions of State Enterprise employees. On the one hand, the 
Commissioner for Trade, Austin, supported the payment of higher rates 
as a means of attracting a more reliable and responsible type of 
29 
worker to the enterprises. On the other hand, the unions 
representing the employees of the Butcher Shops, notably the 
Australian Workers' Union (A.W.U.) and the Amalgamated Meat Industry 
Employees' Union (A.M.I.E.U.), skirted the main issue of the worker 
benefits to flow from public ownership to argue in the Arbitration 
Court that higher wages were due to the employees in recognition of 
the heavier work they were obliged to do. Judge McCawley conceded 
this point at the time but refused to accept it as a general 
proposition in determining wage levels. 
McCawley agreed with Austin in stating that the higher wages 
awarded in the 1919 Meat Industry-Government Retail Employees' Award 
"should give the employees an interest over and above what they have 
as members of the community in maintaining the efficient working of 
the State shops, and should moreover enable the State to obtain the 
30 
services of the most competent worker." He did not agree that the 
State enterprises should set industrial standards for private 
31 
enterprise to follow. In contrast, there was a definite move in 
relation to the employees of the State Fisheries and the State 
Sawmills to rectify the working conditions that had existed before the 
32 
State entered the field, with up to 40% pay increases in the former 
and in the latter, provision for holiday and sick pay as early as 
1916, well before the private sawmills. 
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(c) Labour Relations and State Enterprise Employees 
Working conditions for State Enterprise employees were, at the 
time the Enterprises were still administered by separate departments, 
settled through negotiations between the manager of each Enterprise 
and their employees. As the area of operations for the Enterprises 
expanded, specialisation of functions and duties needed to be 
identified and reflected in differing rates of pay. With access to 
the Arbitration Court granted in 1917 for all government employees, 
the question of wage relativities with employees in similar private 
enterprises and in the Public Service became increasingly important. 
Some special and separate awards were made for Enterprise employees 
but these were generally followed by a gradual shift towards 
comprehensive awards covering both private and public enterprises at 
the same rates and conditions. By the middle 1920s, industrial 
relations as a facet of State Enterprise operations had ceased to be a 
public issue. Any notion of their potentially active role in 
improving the lot of the worker under a Labor government had become 
submerged in the general economic difficulties that characterised the 
years leading up to the Great Depression. 
There were different categories of staff employed in the 
Enterprises, subject to different groups of controls. Parker draws 
the distinction between the conditions for employees and managers in 
the New South Wales State Enterprises and the same distinction is 
appropriate for the Queensland Enterprises. 
The employees of the Enterprises were apparently recruited in a 
number of ways. In some instances, as with the Brisbane Sawmills and 
some of the Butcher Shops and Stations, employees simply transferred 
2 
with the business to its new public ownership. Some vacancies were 
advertised in the Queensland Government Gazette, mostly for staff for 
the State Produce Agency which until 1918 was governed by its own Act 
of Parliament, but all Gazette advertisements ceased after 1918. It 
is probable that a further source of labour was found in the 
government Labour Exchanges established under "The Labour Exchanges 
Act of 1915". 
In view of the rapid expansion of the State-owned business 
undertakings, and the demands of the War on the available labour pool 
in Queensland, the difficulties of providing the required numbers of 
employees with the necessary trade skills may have been an important 
^ 
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factor in the initial higher wages offered to Enterprise employees. 
Before 1918, the manager of each Enterprise was free to engage labour 
and set wage rates in keeping with the business orientation favoured 
by the government for its commercial activities. Because only 
one member of the Cabinet, Mr Hunter, had had business experience, the 
government had to be guided by the managers in questions of numbers of 
staff required and the identification of functions and processes they 
should carry out in each business unit. There seemed to be little 
planning; expansion was mostly on an ad hoc basis in response to 
public and/or political demands and the experimental nature of the 
exercise was emphasised by the rather flexible way Parliamentary 
appropriations were made to cover wages and expenses during this 
3 
establishment period (see also Table 7, Page 124). 
The granting of access to the Arbitration Court in 1917 and the 
grouping together of the Enterprises under a Commissioner for Trade in 
1918 brought a considerable reduction in the autonomy of individual 
managers over staffing. The Act vested power in the Commissioner to 
appoint and dismiss all staff (S.16). In the initial draft of the 
Bill, this power was to have been vested in the Governor-in-Council, 
with the Minister given a similar power in the case of temporary 
employees. A further provision allowed that each employee should hold 
office "during pleasure only" except as the Governor-in-Council 
4 
directed. Under the pressure of the opposition, instead of 
concentrating control in the Minister, these clauses were changed in 
favour of the Commissioner. The 'holding of office during pleasure 
only' clause was retained. It was a common clause in public service 
employment provisions, but as the Honourable A. Hawthorn pointed out 
in the Legislative Council debate on amendments to the Bill: 
Under an award made by the Arbitration Court, dismissal in 
such a manner is not allowed; but under the clause that I 
have referred to an employee may be dismissed at a moment's 
notice without any reason. 
Access for State Enterprises' employees to the Arbitration Court 
thus allowed a challenge to the statutory powers conferred on the 
Commissioner and the Governor-in-Council in industrial matters. 
Union representatives became increasingly active on behalf of the 
employees and with the gradual entrenchment of the preference clause 
in awards, it was the local union branch secretary who had the 
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responsibility of supplying much of the labour for the State 
Enterprises. In both the State Butcher Shop Employees' Awards and the 
State Fisheries Awards of 1920, preference was given to union members. 
However, it was agreed by the parties to these awards that such 
employees would be "Competent workmen and do their work to the 
satisfaction of the management" - a proviso also found at the time in 
the conditions governing promotions in the Public Service. Where the 
unions were unable to supply labour, they permitted the managers to do 
so. 
The number of industrial disputes in the State Enterprises 
overall was relatively small. In all but the State Butcher Shops, 
there appeared to be a satisfactory system of wage negotiations which, 
for the most part, pre-empted strike action. The locus of industrial 
disputes remained with the Butcher Shop employees, whose actions 
reflected the militant activism of the unions for the meat industry as 
a whole. In tandem with the employees at the privately-owned Lakes 
Creek Meatworks in Townsville, the employees of a number of State 
Butcher Shops engaged in strike action for the three consecutive 
summers between 1919 and 1921 when the annual seasonal lay-off in the 
industry closed most of the private meatworks. Each year, this meant 
that the Townsville shops were closed for trading for much of the 
December to March period. 
For State employees, claims for wages, sick pay and appeals 
against transfers were at the heart of the dispute which closed 
20 butcher shops in Brisbane, Townsville, Charters Towers, 
Mount Morgan and Rockhampton intermittently between October 1918 and 
April 1919. The matter of transferring employees from one shop to 
another had assumed an increasing importance since it was one method 
Charles Ross, the supervisor of the State Butchery, had used to stamp 
out petty theft and inefficiency without adding to the public debate 
about the viability of the enterprises. It also tended to undermine 
the local 'closed-shop' hold of the unions over the staffing of the 
Enterprises. 
The Commissioner for Trade now represented the State as employer 
in all matters before the Arbitration Court concerning State 
Enterprise employees, and had assumed closer control over internal 
negotiations. In the Butcher Shops' dispute he reached some 
accommodation with representatives of the Amalgamated Meat Industry 
Employees' Union (A.M.I.E.U.) acting for the employees, but the matter 
of wage increases went to arbitration. 
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The price of industrial peace was not cheap but as the star 
enterprise in the government's public promotion of the benefits of its 
commercial undertakings, it was obviously essential for the Butcher 
Shops to continue trading and for industrial harmony to be achieved. 
The actions of employees did not accord with the ideal notion of 
working for the public interest, owing more to moves to gain for 
themselves a share of the surplus of what was a successful public 
undertaking at this time. At best, it was in keeping with the 
socialist doctrine that such surplus in a public enterprise which 
eschewed the profit motive should be channelled towards improved 
g 
workers' conditions. 
On 27.2.1919, the Meat Industry - Government Retail Employees -
State Award was gazetted. It granted an all-round increase of 10/-
per week for all State Butcher Shop employees, setting separate 
minimum rates of pay according to "job classification and to 
geographical division, for an overall 48-hour week" (see Table 2). 
In addition, S.5 of the award formalised a chain of command in 
each shop, giving responsibility for the proper carrying out of the 
work of his department to the head shopman or equivalent, under the 
direction of the manager. Although overtime pay could be claimed, 
there was no provision for holiday or sick pay, a notable omission in 
an industry where the unions had consistently demanded up to three 
weeks' paid overtime. 
By the following year, when a succession of events had undermined 
the profitability of the State Butcher Shops, Austin drew attention to 
the need for the Arbitration Court to recognise that the Enterprises 
were run on business lines in direct competition with private 
enterprise and would be disadvantaged by the costs incurred in the 
granting of higher wage rates in State enterprises. In his opinion, 
there should be no difference in the awards granted to public 
9 
enterprise employees and those in similar private concerns. On the 
other hand, private enterprise had been disadvantaged by the specific 
action of State Butchery employees who had demanded four days' holiday 
at Easter. Both in 1919 and 1920 the Commissioner gave in and the 
private shops had to follow suit, in order to prevent further 
strikes. 
Parity in wages came about in March 1920 when the State Butcher 
Shops Employees' Award and the Retail Butchers' Award were 
amalgamated. Under the new award which had followed another round of 
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TABLE 2 
MEAT INDUSTRY - GOVERNMENT RETAIL EMPLOYEES - STATE AWARD 1919 
The minimum rates of wages payable to the following persons shall 
be: 
Northern Division 
Southern Central 
Division Division No. 1 No. 2 No. 3 Sub- Sub- Sub-
division division division 
Head shopman 
Branch shopman 
Shopmen, general 
butchers, salters, 
scalders, meat 
cutters, small-
goodsmen, chill-
ing-room men 
Head Salter 
Head SmalIgoodsman 
Head Chi 11ing-room 
man 
General labourers 
(meaning other 
persons not 
specified but not 
to cut any meat) 
Cash carters 
Casual hands per day 
or fraction thereof 
Friday and Saturday 
hands 
Saturday hands 
Meat carters when in 
charge of 1 horse 
Meat carters when in 
charge of 2 horses 
Clerks or cashiers: 
Male 
Female 
Per week 
£ s . d. 
4 7 5 
4 7 5 
Per week Per week Per week Per week 
£ s . d. £ s . d. £ s . d. £ s . d. 
5 0 0 5 4 0 5 5 5 5 12 0 
4 10 0 5 4 0 5 5 5 5 12 0 
4 2 5 
4 7 6 
4 7 5 
4 2 6 4 14 0 4 16 6 5 1 0 
4 7 6 5 0 0 5 2 6 5 7 0 
5 0 0 5 4 0 5 6 6 5 12 0 
4 7 5 4 7 5 4 14 0 4 16 6 5 1 0 
3 12 5 3 17 6 4 5 0 4 7 6 4 12 6 
4 2 6 5 0 0 5 0 0 5 2 6 5 7 6 
Per day Per day Per hour Per hour Per hour 
0 16 5 0 19 0 0 3 0 0 3 3 0 3 5 
1 1 5 0 2 0 0 0 3 0 0 3 3 0 3 6 
0 19 0 1 1 5 0 3 0 0 3 3 0 3 5 
Per week Per week Per week Per week Per week 
3 12 6 4 5 0 4 6 6 4 9 0 4 11 5 
3 15 0 4 5 0 4 6 6 4 9 0 4 11 5 
3 12 6 3 15 0 4 5 0 
2 10 0 2 10 0 3 5 0 
Source: Queensland Industrial Gazette, 10.3.1919, p.196, 
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strike action during the summer lay-off in the industry, wage rates 
were again increased. After protracted negotiations between the 
Commissioner and the unions involved, all State Enterprise employees 
gained further ground when they were granted a uniform system of paid 
11 holiday and sick leave. 
Throughout this industrial action, Austin had maintained that a 
state of harmonious relations existed between management and employees 
in the enterprises and that he supported the arbitration process. So 
he was understandably critical of the decision of the Townsville 
butcher shop employees to strike again in the summer of 1920-21 which 
saw the shops closed for three months. In his view, "there should 
never have been any stoppage of work in this instance, seeing that our 
Awards all provide for the settlement of any dispute by arbitration, 
12 
which can become operative almost immediately." As the unions again 
pressed for the four-day Easter break, the Commissioner and the Master 
Butchers' Association successfully combined to insist on Easter 
13 Saturday trading as provided for in the award. 
A further element in the industrial disharmony of the State 
Butcher Shops lay in the position of the clerks employed there. They 
had consistently missed out on the advantages gained through strike 
action. Judge McCawley had stated, in refusing to grant increases to 
clerks under the provisions of the 1919 award, that if clerks were 
dissatisfied they should seek employment outside the State 
Enterprises. They should not be singled out for pay rises because 
14 they were State Enterprise employees. The setting of award rates 
for clerks which reflected the differing types of work and levels of 
responsibility was a problem that had not been settled by the general 
Clerks' Classification system outlined in 1918 and it pervaded the 
Public Service and the private sector as well. In a separate move 
which did not go to arbitration the State Trade Office granted clerks 
working in State Enterprises an increase of a minimum of 5/- per week 
according to job classification. By the following year, Austin had 
adopted McCawley's view that State Enterprise clerks could apply for 
increases through the various clerks' awards registered with the 
Court. Cabinet approved his recommendation to this effect, so that by 
the end of 1920 all employees of the State Butchery came under outside 
awards and were therefore subject to the same wages and conditions as 
15 
employees in private meat industry enterprises. The considerable 
variations in special and divisional allowances which had applied to 
/4 
Butchery employees were also brought into line with private 
enterprise. 
The history of the industrial relations of the State Butcheries 
up to 1920 was the most turbulent of all the enterprises and had a 
special significance because of the size of the undertaking and its 
commercial success up to this time. Most of the other enterprises 
under the management of the State Trade Office had been virtually free 
of strike action but had followed a similar pattern of moving from 
separate awards for State employees to comprehensive awards covering 
all employees in both public and private sectors by the end of 1920. 
According to evidence given by McGugan, the manager of the State 
Stations, to the Legislative Council Select Committee of Inquiry on 
the Industrial Enterprises in 1917, wages and rations for the hands 
were under his control. The head stockman received 50/- a week all 
found and station hands from 30/- to £2. McGugan agreed that these 
wages were below the levels set in the Federal Arbitration Award, but 
pointed out that the Award would not come into force until January 
1918.^^ 
Although McGugan admitted that he paid below-award wages for 
State station hands, no mention was made of the working conditions of 
State station employees in the Annual Reports prepared by the 
Commissioner for Trade. They could be gauged to some extent by the 
absence of a State award before 1919, the frequent applications by the 
Australian Workers' Union (A.W.U.) to the Court for increases in the 
general Station Hands Award and divisional allowances, and the 
struggle station hands had to retain comparative minimum wage levels 
which, with the decline in the fortunes of the pastoral industry, fell 
to well below other industries by 1922. It is interesting to note 
that the decision of the Arbitration Court in relation to the Station 
Hands Award of 1918 was that neither the Dickson nor McCawley awards 
previously granted fixed any rates for Aboriginal station hands. 
Apparently the opinion was that there were too few of them employed 
overall on stations to matter in industrial awards and their wage 
rates and conditions continued to be governed by the Office of the 
Chief Protector of Aborigines. In fact, there were 67 Aborigines 
employed in 1919 on the State Stations out of a total workforce of 
325.^^ 
The State Produce Agency was cited by Austin in his report of 
1919 as one of the examples of awards granted by the Court 
/ & • 
contributing to an increase of almost 100% in wages paid to its 
employees. Apart from that, there is no record of industrial action 
for the Enterprise and it can only be presumed that the employees of 
the Agency and those of the State Cannery worked under conditions set 
by awards for their industry in general. For Agency employees, this 
may have been the Farm Produce and Fruit Agents Employees, Brisbane, 
gazetted in May 1918, or the Agricultural Produce Stores, Brisbane, 
Employees' Award of 4.10.1920. State Cannery Employees may have come 
under the Jam and Preserved Fruit Manufacturing Award first gazetted 
in 1919 for the south-eastern district only. 
In contrast with the general trend towards universal pay scales 
for private and State Enterprise employees by 1920, separate awards 
were set for employees of the State Fisheries and the Railway 
Refreshment Rooms which were in force well after that date. During 
1918, wage agreements had been entered into by representatives of the 
A.W.U. and the Federated Shore Engine Drivers' Association with the 
manager of the State Fisheries Department, which applied to employees 
of the South Brisbane Market, the Retail Shops and the Wynnum Depot, 
and which entailed up to 40% in wage increases. Wages had been well 
below the ruling rate in private industry and in the Commissioner's 
view, "considering wages ruling in similar work, the rates now paid 
19 
were not excessive." If by this action he had hoped to forestall 
further claims for wage increases, he was to be disappointed. 
Beginning with the Agreement filed with the Registrar of Industrial 
Agreements in May 1919, employees continually sought wage increases 
and improvements in working conditions. Even with the reduction by 
variation of the award sought by the Commissioner in July 1922 to 
20 bring employees into line with the Co-operative Fishery Company, it 
was not long before this lost ground was made up and by 1925 increases 
21 
of up to 20/- per week had been granted in a series of new awards. 
Similarly, Railway Refreshment Rooms employees benefitted from 
the application of a separate award. Their initial award had been set 
following an application by the Commissioner for Railways in 1917 when 
the Refreshment Rooms were still under his control. It was maintained 
after 1918 with the substitution of the Commissioner for Trade as 
representative of the employer. Wage rates under a new award gazetted 
on 1.10.1919 were based on, but higher than, rates operating in 
similar private enterprise. The net result was an increased wages 
bill for the Enterprise of £6,000 for 1919 and a further £4,000 from 
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an application from the Queensland Railways Union (Q.R.U.) for 
increases in 1920. Wages were reduced by 5/- for males and 2/- for 
females under an application by the Commissioner in 1922, but because 
the divisional allowances of up to 10/- for the central and northern 
divisions were not cancelled. Railway Refreshment Rooms employees 
stayed ahead of those in private employment and these losses were made 
up under the industrial agreement of July 1924. However, in the 1922 
award, a discretionary power was vested in the general manager to 
dismiss staff, not only for disciplinary reasons, but also "when 
22 
rendered necessary by the exigencies of the business." It was an 
important formalisation of provisions in an area that had been 
contentious since the Cabinet decision of 1917 regarding the general 
manager's right to hire and fire, and the staff's right of appeal. As 
the Brisbane Courier had reported in December 1917, "Cabinet had 
decided that as the Railway Refreshment Rooms was a separate branch of 
the Railway department under the control of the Commissioner that the 
employees engaged in this branch were employees of the Commissioner 
and as such cannot legally be dismissed except by the head of the 
23 Branch." Through the 1922 award, this provision was formally 
transferred to the Commissioner and the General Manager of the Railway 
Refreshment Rooms as his agent. In addition, the trading nature of 
the Railway Refreshment Rooms had been recognised, with consequent 
implications for retaining a responsiveness in staff numbers to the 
prevailing economic climate. 
A separate award was also established for the employees of the 
State Sawmills which, although passing into the control of the 
Department of Lands after 1920, had apparently retained some 
industrial relations aspects of a business enterprise. On this basis, 
the Court granted variations of awards and a new award during 1921 and 
variations again following the basic wage reduction of 1922. 
Whereas 1921 represented a period of comparative industrial calm, 
the storms ahead were heralded by the refusal of the Arbitration Court 
to increase the basic wage set for the first time in that year. In 
March 1922, in the face of growing economic problems, the Full Bench 
of the Arbitration Court determined a basic wage reduction of 5/- per 
week, thereby sparking off intense worker opposition and a concurrent 
round of industrial action. Cabinet's decision in respect of State 
Enterprise employees was to reduce the rates paid to all employees 
covered by an outside award, "where there had been a reduction by 
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variation of an award of the Court. The wages of Railway Refreshment 
Rooms and State Fishery Department employees were to be reduced by 
25 
awards of the Court." The decision followed the successful 
application by the various Ministers in charge of Public Service 
Departments and the heads of statutory bodies for a reduction by 
variation of the awards governing all Public Service employees which 
had been lodged with the Arbitration Court in July 1922. 
Another important influence on industrial matters concerning 
State Enterprise employees also became evident in 1922 when the new 
"Public Service Act" confirmed the appointment of a single Public 
Service Commissioner, J.D. Story, in place of the three-member Board 
of Cabinet Ministers. The provisions of the Act excluded large 
numbers of wages employees. "Notwithstanding these exclusions, 
however," as D.W. Fraser explained, "a number of matters respecting 
the employees - mainly industrial ones and ones of remuneration - are 
referred to the Public Service Commissioner for advice or 
recommendation. In actual practice, the co-ordination of industrial 
work with respect to all Crown employees (with the exception of the 
Pfi 
Railway Department) is vested in the Public Service Commissioner." 
Industrial matters were thus subject to consultation with the 
Public Service Commissioner from that date. Apart from the awards 
relating to the State Fisheries and Railway Refreshment Rooms, all 
State Enterprise employees were now subject to outside awards and 
there appeared to be no further incidence of industrial action. The 
local newspapers had ceased to report on this aspect of State 
Enterprises' operation, and even as the Commissioner for Trade was 
stating that a situation of industrial harmony had been reached in the 
Enterprises, it had ceased to be a matter of public importance. The 
capacity for the Enterprises to spearhead economic reform had 
diminished and, after 1925, industrial matters we no longer an item in 
the Annual Reports. By 1926 the gradual selling-off of the 
Enterprises had begun and by the time the Moore government had passed 
the State Enterprises Repeal Act in 1931, most of the employees had 
been dismissed or had once again returned to private employment. 
Before 1918, the managers of the Enterprises enjoyed considerable 
independence in industrial matters subject only to budgetary 
constraints. Thereafter, the number of controls grew. The 
institution of the arbitration process gave increased dominance to the 
unions, and the 1918 State Enterprises Act shifted authority to the 
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Commissioner for Trade who in turn was subject to the constraints of 
the Arbitration Court and the over-riding authority vested by the Act 
in the Governor-in-Council. In 1922, this authority was deemed to be 
exercised through the legal process of the Arbitration Court, as 
stated in the Court's judgment on the Public Service Employees Case, 
namely that "the Legislature has entrusted the Court with the duty of 
27 fixing the wages of employees of the State." In the final count, 
the Commissioner for Trade ran a long way behind the unions, the 
Arbitration Court and Public Service influences in determining the 
industrial conditions of his Enterprise employees. 
Eggleston had stated that in the Victorian State Enterprises, the 
managers and Commissioners controlled, with certain qualifications, 
staff salaries, promotions, recruitments and dismissals and that the 
results had been satisfactory. "Though there are practically no 
safeguards for the employees, the services are content," he explained, 
"because the Commissioners treated them properly and promoted on 
28 
merit." Yet he had later become disillusioned with the demands of 
State employees and their unions and admitted a lack of industrial 
harmony. 
Greaves's critical assessment in 1945 of Britain's nationalised 
industries challenged the assumption, implicit in Morrison's principle 
of independent control of staff by public corporation management, that 
there existed a difference between the administrative needs and 
29 functions of corporation employees and those of civil servants. He 
argued that any such dichotomy would be an artificial one since 
"There is greater similarity between the duties and qualifications of 
many civil servants and their counterparts in the service of public 
boards than there is among the whole body of civil servants 
30 themselves." Further support for the case against independent 
staffing control lay in the possible lack of protection for 
corporation officials against managerial exploitation. In Greaves's 
opinion, the way was open for the exercise of patronage and variations 
in methods of recruitment and promotion. Strong trade unions and the 
protection of judicious Ministerial intervention or control were the 
31 
only means of providing safeguards where statutory ones were absent. 
Morrison believed, as had Eggleston, that the responsibility for 
staff efficiency lay solely with the management. Therefore it was the 
32 
Board, not the Minister, who should make appointments. Morrison 
also saw a place for what he called "legitimate personal 
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representations" if the most capable technical and commercial staff 
were to be found, but was aware of the dangers of influence and 
33 favouritism. 
The same possibilities as Greaves raised had been noted in 
34 Australia. For instance, in the case of the Cockatoo Island 
Dockyard in 1903, employees made representation directly to the 
Minister to overcome the managers' "unscrupulous and inequitable" 
35 treatment of them. Together with the early introduction of Appeals 
Tribunals for Railways employees, it introduced the notion of the 
right of appeal for public enterprise employees, so that not only was 
the debate on public corporations to do with accountability and 
autonomy in matters of policy, but it also included the rights of 
employees. 
In Australia, the right of access to the Arbitration Court 
fulfilled the protective function for government employees but even 
that was contingent on union strength and competence. The development 
of rewards for efficiency, not seniority, and the adoption of 
classifications "suitable to the technique of the activity" as the 
early Victorian politicians had described some of the benefits of the 
public corporation over those of a Ministerial department, did not 
occur in the Queensland State Enterprises. For the employees, 
seniority prevailed and classifications of work differentials and 
relevant pay scales were won largely by union action before the 
Arbitration Court. 
Patronage in staff appointments was not excluded. Opposition 
members made much of the appointment of failed Labor candidates to 
government enterprises, although examples relating to the State 
enterprises were not recorded. Trade unions had their own type of 
patronage appointments which, in some cases, may have accorded with 
Morrison's "legitimate" form, particularly when skilled tradesmen were 
needed. 
In Britain, Morrison had supported trade union organisations in 
all industrial undertakings. He believed that the Board of a public 
corporation should recognise trade union agreements and the principle 
of collective bargaining. He affirmed the right of employees to 
strike, so long as it was a strike against the public corporation and 
37 
not against the State. At the same time, he proposed that under a 
policy of socialisation, the relationship between the "workmen and the 
administration" would be one of "partnership and mutual 
self-esteem." 
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(d) The Managers of the State Enterprises 
Employees comprised one group of the staff of the State 
Enterprises. Managers were a separate group working under different 
conditions of employment. Following an Order-in-Council of 12.7.1917 
which declared all State employees, whether exempted or under the 
Public Service Act, to be exempt from the Arbitration Act if earning 
above £300 per annum or an aggregate of £300 per annum, they were 
exempted from "The Arbitration Act of 1915". The latter was seen to 
give them an unfair advantage by at least one section of government 
employees - the Railway workers - in that "higher officials in some 
instances could secure substantial increases without going to the 
Arbitration Court, yet the workers were forced to the Arbitration 
Court for any increase they required. Because of the absence of any 
formal wage-setting machinery, managers in the Enterprises may have 
been in the same position as managers in private enterprise but at the 
same time, had the disadvantage of being subject to the political 
controls exerted over the Enterprises as a whole. There appeared to 
be no employment security, such as an employment contract might 
provide, and there was no right of appeal against salary levels or 
dismissal to an outside body such as the Arbitration Court or even an 
internal body such as the Railways Department had established with the 
Railways Tribunal. 
Before 1918, the appointment and employment conditions of the 
managers followed the lines established in New South Wales and Western 
Australia. They were appointed by the Governor-in-Council on the 
recommendation of the Minister within whose Department the Enterprise 
was established. Salaries and conditions of employment were 
negotiated between the manager and the Minister, subject to Cabinet 
approval. Initially, funds for salaries were made available by 
executive minute and then included in the relevant department's 
Supplementary or Unforeseen Trust Fund expenditure (see Table 7) but 
as the Enterprise became revenue-earning, salaries were paid from the 
Enterprise's separate working fund established in the Treasury. 
Although during this time, some of the appointments and salary levels 
of the managers were published in the Government Gazette and recorded 
in the Public Service List, managers were excluded from the operation 
of "The Public Service Act, 1896-1901", even before the proclamation 
2 
to that effect was gazetted in August 1918. However, they retained 
the right to contribute voluntarily to the Public Service 
Superannuation Fund under the provisions of "The Public Service 
Superannuation Act of 1912". 
After the State Trade Office was established to co-ordinate the 
Enterprises under the corporation of the Commissioner for Trade, 
managers' salaries and employment tenure were, according to the 
provisions of the Act, subject to the authority of the Commissioner 
with a power of veto vested in the Governor-in-Council (S.16 [4]). 
Also included in the Act was the provision that managers and employees 
held office during pleasure only (S.16 [3]), but when officers of the 
State Butchery were dismissed for fraud in 1919, it was the 
Commissioner exercising his authority under S.15 (4) who ordered their 
3 
dismissal. Particularly in the Enterprises where there were a number 
of retail outlets, such as the Butchery and the Fishery, managers' 
salaries and employment were largely governed by proof of efficiency, 
level of performance and degree of responsibility. The wages paid to 
State Station managers also reflected the difference in operational 
scope of each station. 
None of the managers had previously been employed in the Public 
Service. It is evident that some were appointed on the basis of their 
specialist knowledge and experience in a particular area. 
Charles Ross, who had been and remained the Imperial Meat Supply 
Officer, was appointed Manager or Supervisor of the State Butchery 
Department, while Alexander McGugan had had some years' experience in 
managing pastoral properties and buying and selling livestock prior to 
4 
becoming Manager of the State Stations. James Brophy's appointment 
as Manager of the proposed State Iron and Steel Works came as a result 
of recommendations made by the 1918 Royal Commission into the 
establishment of the State Iron and Steel Works, although his 
qualifications as foreman at B.H.P.'s Newcastle Works fell far short 
of the standard required by the Commissioners. 
Recognition of specialist skills was reflected in their salary 
levels which, to begin with, were generous by private enterprise 
standards. McGugan's starting salary, for example, was £700 per annum 
in contrast to his previous pay of £300. Brophy's salary of £1,500 
was very low compared with the £10,000 paid to the manager of BHP's 
5 
Newcastle Steel Works, but was well above salaries paid to 
departmental heads and the Railways and State Insurance Commissioners. 
In general, salaries were on a level with those of the heads of 
Branches of Public Service Departments such as the Director of Forests 
and the Deputy Heads of statutory bodies such as the Deputy 
Commissioner and the Deputy Public Curator. Managers of State 
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Stations were paid a salary, whereas the managers of the retail 
butcher shops and fish shops were on wages, but both methods reflected 
the individual level of responsibility and performance. The level of 
salaries may also have owed something to an inducement factor in the 
same way as employees' wages were initially quite high in order to 
attract competent staff from private enterprise. 
However, with the passage of time, the initially large salaries 
were eroded by the absence of pay increases. Newly appointed managers 
received the same rate as the previous incumbents even though, in many 
c 
cases, the level of turnover or number of outlets had increased. 
Some managers were reported to be untrustworthy or incompetent and 
perhaps the instances of petty thieving among managers in the early 
years reflected a dissatisfaction with pay conditions that had no 
avenue of appeal but, whatever the reason, there was no official 
report of managerial unrest. In 1922 there may well have been a 
reaction against the general pay reductions because the Commissioner 
made urgent application in September 1923 to the Treasury through the 
Public Service Board for salary increases for his managers. None of 
the positions had been classified in the Public Service sense and 
Austin had to estimate their value in 1922 terms in order to establish 
appropriate salary ranges. The application was immediately supported 
by Treasury and approved by Cabinet, the salary to be paid being the 
lower value estimated for each position. Austin's move had been 
prompted by the Premier's announcement in August 1922 that "The 5% 
reduction was to continue but that scale increases would be allowed 
classified officers and would operate in regard to salaries up to 
£400." The increase granted for the State enterprise managers was 
neither universal nor based entirely on the criteria outlined by the 
Premier. Not all the managers received increases, and as far as 
complete records were available, they showed that none of the managers 
g 
improved their salary level over that established by 1921 (see 
Table 28, Appendix A). 
The status of managers was thus less than clearly defined. The 
terms of employment suggested they were outside departmental staffing 
procedures and retained some degree of independence in staffing their 
sections of the Enterprises, as well as in negotiating conditions of 
service. Yet the examples of political and Public Service controls 
over them suggested that they remained linked to the central personnel 
structures. The Public Service Commissioner appointed under "The 
Public Service Act of 1922", J.D. Story, had intimated that his 
influence was not restricted to government officers operating under 
that Act. In the report following his inquiry into the Classification 
System of the Public Service in 1918-19, he recommended that: 
Heads of sub-departments should be consulted freely in the 
selection of officers for their sub-departments. They are 
held responsible for the efficient administration of their 
sections and they should have a voice in the selection of 
their staffs. 
Particularly should this be so in the commercial and 
revenue-producing departments. Many of these departments 
are in competition with private concerns, and the success of 
the State institutions will depend largely on the extent to 
which they can win and hold public confidence. 
Although he might have been referring to formalised sub-departments 
such as Forestry in the Lands Department, by 1923 it was clear that 
industrial matters relating to managers, and to employees, of the 
State Enterprises were subject to his recommendation and approval. 
Among the staff of the Enterprises, there was a third group which 
did not fit into either the employee or manager groups. They were 
Public Service officers who had been seconded to the State Trade 
Office by an Order-in-Council of October 1919 issued under the 
provisions of the State Enterprises Act. Daniel O'Neill, formerly 
Inspector of Accounts in the Audit Office, was appointed Secretary of 
the State Trade Office in 1921. R.F. Thompson, Senior Clerk, 
Department of Public Works, was transferred to the position of 
Correspondence and Record Clerk at the State Trade Office and promoted 
to Chief Accountant. Both retained their Public Service status under 
"The Public Service Act 1896-1901", but the substance of this 
provision was not clearly determined. O'Neill's salary, for example, 
was not affected by Public Service salary increases or reductions. It 
remained on the same level until 1923 when Austin's recommendations to 
the Public Service Board resulted in its being increased from £250 to 
£300 per annum (see Table 28, Appendix A). While it appeared they 
were protected by the Public Service Act from loss of status, a type 
of 'double indemnity' was provided by "The State Enterprises Repeal 
Act" passed in 1931, which specifically directed that the Secretary 
and the Accountant of the State Trade Office would be appointed 
without delay to similar positions in the Department of Labour and 
Industry (S.3 [7], "The State Enterprises Repeal and "Under-Secretary, 
Department of Labour and Industry" Corporation Act of 1931"). 
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The State Trade Office had come under the responsibility of the 
Department of Labour and Industry in 1926 when the department was 
created, and Austin filled two separate positions as Commissioner for 
Trade and Under-Secretary of the Department. The special provision 
relating to the Secretary and Accountant might have provided them with 
a guarantee that once the State Enterprises were dispersed they would 
not become 'supernumeraries' in that although they retained their 
status, there would be no equivalent positions available for them. 
Alternatively, Austin may have wanted to keep his 'team' together, to 
maintain a cohesive and effective working arrangement, particularly in 
view of the increasing number of problems the economic Depression and 
its effect on employment and industry had begun to pose for his 
department. In the event, Thompson, the former State Trade Office 
accountant, was promoted to Acting Under-Secretary of the Department, 
being beaten for the position of Under-Secretary by the then Director 
11 
of the Bureau of Industry, Colin Clark. 
Thus, three stages could be identified in the appointment and 
control of the Enterprises' staff. Before 1918, managers were 
responsible for staff matters, which were outside the ambit of the 
Public Service Acts but linked to the central personnel agencies 
through funding requirements. Managers themselves were responsible to 
their departmental Minister but were outside formal departmental 
staffing procedures. After 1918, responsibility for staff 
appointments and conditions of service was formally transferred to the 
Commissioner. His independence in staffing matters was, however, 
tempered by the statutory controls given the Governor-in-Council and 
Parliament. A further control over any such independence was exerted 
by the operation of the Arbitration Court which in turn permitted the 
trade unions to intervene in and, to some extent, control the 
conditions under which Enterprises' employees worked. The third 
stage, 1922, represented something of a watershed for both employee 
and manager groups alike. The events of that year highlighted their 
vulnerability to changes in the economic climate. Moreover, in 
reinforcing their status as employees of the Crown and therefore 
subject to political and public service controls, they identified a 
universal trend towards standardisation of employment conditions 
across all sectors of the workforce. 
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(e) Mismanagement 
It was one thing to note the absence of any concept of public 
service or of loyalty to the cause of public enterprise which the 
instances of industrial action among by employees had served to 
confirm. A more serious argument against State Enterprises developed 
by Labor's opponents focused on the positive abuse of public trust by 
managers and employees alike. 
Undoubtedly, the State Enterprises were adversely affected by the 
impact of the 'Mungana' Affair. In 1930 a Royal Commission had been 
set up to investigate the government's purchase and operation of the 
Mungana Mines in North Queensland during the 1920s, and the allegedly 
fraudulent dealings of the manager, Goddard. Before the inquiry was 
completed, the Secretary for Mines, the Auditor-General, the 
Government Geologist, and Theodore who was Premier of Queensland at 
the time, had all been shown in a less than favourable light. Their 
credibility was undermined and the public perception of government-
owned and administered enterprises was one of mismanagement and 
outright fraud. 
There were a number of cases of proven fraud and theft in the 
operations of the Enterprises, particularly in the early years, which 
non-Labor politicians lost no time in emphasising. However, the cases 
were relatively few, given the fact that 60% of the Enterprises' 
business was conducted in cash and given the decentralised locations 
of the various business units. 
In 1917, the Manager and entire staff of the Railway Refreshment 
2 
Rooms at WaUangarra were dismissed for theft. When the liquor 
suppliers for the Rooms agreed on a new low price, the staff failed to 
notify the General Manager of the reduction, charged the same price 
3 
for drinks as before and pocketed the difference. In the following 
year the accountant and one of the salesmen were dismissed from the 
4 
State Produce Agency for irregularities in their accounts. However, 
the most serious instance of proven theft occurred within the State 
Butchery in 1919. Following a 'departmental inquiry' which the 
opposition complained had not been made open to the press or public, 
it was found that employees of the Country Order section of the Roma 
Street Butchery had colluded with a customer to defraud the business. 
The police were called in and two officers were summarily dismissed. 
While a very detailed report on this incident, and the fact that other 
irregularities had also been discovered, was included in the 
Commissioner's annual report, he took the opportunity to defend the 
employees of the Enterprises in general against what he considered to 
be 'unjustifiable' slander: 
there is no justification for the imputation that I have 
seen expressed or heard from time to time, that 
irregularities are more prevalent therein than in private 
businesses. 
In fairness to the employees under this Department, such a 
statement is, in my opinion, as unjustifiable as it is 
incorrect. 
The Auditor-General took a less sanguine view of the Enterprises' 
employees. He cited the improved trading situation which had resulted 
from introducing monthly audits of the Railway Refreshment Rooms' 
accounts to reinforce the necessity for control. His view was that 
"such a check is absolutely essential in a business of this kind when 
it is remembered that the commercial success of the Enterprise 
c 
entirely depends on the branch manager and their employees". 
The audit inspections which began with the Railway Refreshment 
Rooms and gradually involved all the Enterprises confirmed the 
inadequacy of their accounting procedures. In some enterprises, they 
were so rudimentary as to be virtually non-existent. This situation 
was particularly evident before 1918 when, for example, members of the 
Legislative Council had been quick to point up the discrepancy between 
the net profit claimed in the Treasurer's financial statement for the 
Enterprises in 1916-17 and the Auditor-General's figures for that 
year. The Auditor-General had also had continual difficulty 
obtaining trading figures from some of the Enterprises to compile his 
annual reports and even when they were obtainable, he queried their 
8 
accuracy. 
Evidence given before the Select Committee convened by the 
Legislative Council in 1917 to investigate government expenditure on 
the Industrial Enterprises and the Royal Commission the same year on 
the government's purchase of Wando Vale cattle station contributed to 
a picture of businesses set up or taken over by the State without any 
detailed plan of financial management. Whether governments were 
sophisticated enough at this stage to engage in the necessary 
financial planning was debatable. In nineteenth-century Britain, it 
had been found that while records of input and output could result in 
measures of performance, more was needed than the accounting of 
invoices and receipts. By the early twentieth century, fairly 
advanced methods of cost estimating were used, but what was not well 
developed was ex post facto accounting - 'keeping track of what 
yi 
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actually happened'. Presumably managers engaged for each Enterprise 
were expected to possess the necessary expertise to oversee accounts 
in accordance with commercial practice, but it fell to the 
Auditor-General to insist on a formal system of accounting which would 
satisfy both commercial procedures and public accountability. 
Similar problems of lack of financial planning and accountability 
had occurred with the trading ventures in New South Wales and Western 
Australia and the Auditor-General's proposals followed the course 
these States had taken in an attempt to rectify them. In New South 
Wales "The State Deposits (Industrial Undertakings) Act of 1912" was 
an attempt by the Labor government there to allay public criticism 
about the lack of financial accountability of public enterprises. 
Although the criticism was directed at the four major public 
enterprises - the Sydney Harbour Trust, the Metropolitan Water and 
Sewerage Board, the Railways and Tramways and the Hunter District 
Water Board, the Act only applied to the State's trading 
enterprises. In Western Australia, the State Trading Concerns Acts 
of 1912 and 1916 attempted to impose a formal accounting system on the 
trading enterprises which owed much to a public corporation 
12 
configuration, while retaining many elements of centralised 
financial control. However, in all three States the purpose was to 
institute some method of measuring the commercial performance of the 
State-owned businesses and the preferred method was commercial profit 
and loss accounting. 
McGugan, the manager of the State Stations, had been the special 
object of the Auditor-General's attack on the financial management of 
the State Enterprises, because of his failure to lodge an annual 
balance sheet for the State Stations. He defended his particular 
accounting method, at the same time challenging the usefulness of a 
balance sheet in measuring the enterprise's performance: 
[There was] nothing to justify a Balance Sheet for such a 
short period - not enough time for realisation of any of the 
revenue which properties are capable of returning. The 
financial position of the properties could have been 
correctly defined by the establishment of an Expenditure and 
Revenue Account ... 
Under the so-called Balance Sheet as described in the 
Auditor-General's report, the ordinary working expenditure 
of many of the properties for the period under review are 
described under the heading of loss merely for the reason 
that the working expenses. Rent and Interest charges were 
not [covered] by profits from sales - since in the time no 
sales had been effected and no credit was taken for the 
increased value of the herd in that period. 
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McGugan's situation could be seen as an example of what Morrison 
and Attlee among others in Britain were arguing for in the financial 
management of the nationalised industries. They rejected the 
"inefficiency" of centralised financial control with its annual 
budgeting and performance tests in favour of an independence 
characterised by the concept of "taking one year with another." For 
them, the annual line accounting and profit and loss test militated 
against the commercial flexibility so necessary to the viability of 
the nationalised industries. 
Nearly 40 years later, one analysis of the reasons for the 
failure of the Aluminium Production Commission in Tasmania was to 
conclude: 
in all countries which have adopted the British 
parliamentary system, the public account, in conformity with 
the device of parliamentary appropriation, is on a cash 
basis, and the prime function of the government audit is to 
ensure that every act of public expenditure has 
parliamentary sanction. It is obvious that accounts in this 
form are highly inappropriate to commercial or industrial 
enterprises. 
Nevertheless, there was no escaping the fact that no centralised 
accounting system existed within the State Stations enterprise itself. 
Each station's books were kept separately at the station and were 
periodically reported on by the local managers. This arrangement was 
open to abuse because of the relative inaccessibility of some of the 
stations, and even though a pastoral inspector had been one of the 
first appointments to the enterprise in 1916, the inadequacy of this 
type of check became apparent during the new General Manager's tour in 
1 c 
1921 when he was obliged to dismiss station staff for fraud. The 
Auditor-General had been unable to complete his report on the State 
Stations financial situation in 1917, but by the end of 1918, when the 
State Enterprises Act was passed, he had overcome McGugan's resistance 
and instituted a formal, if not foolproof, accounting procedure for 
the enterprise. 
In contrast to McGugan's approach, Charles Ross, the supervisor 
of the State Butchery, had been aware of the potential accounting 
problems of a rapidly expanding cash business as he was called on to 
supervise the establishment of State butcher shops in towns as far 
apart as Normanton on the Gulf of Carpentaria, Charleville in the west 
of Queensland and Townsville on the coast, six hundred miles north of 
Brisbane. Giving evidence before the Interstate Meat Commission 
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sitting in Brisbane in October 1917, Ross insisted that despite the 
obvious difficulties, a complete system of financial accounting was by 
then in place. With the help of Ramsay, the State Butchery's 
accountant, he devised a system for calculating exact costs and 
returns for each retail unit and thus minimising the opportunity for 
cash "leakages", especially in areas too remote for his direct 
supervision. With each new butcher's shop an account was opened at a 
local branch of the Queensland Government Savings Bank and named the 
Queensland State Butcher Shops Account. A typical example was the 
system under which the Rockhampton shops operated. Ross's 
instructions to the local Bank Manager were: 
(1) The account was to be operated by Ross as Supervisor. 
(2) All cash receipts were to be lodged each day - bank 
staff to do so at the Head Shop each day and receipt 
the Manager. 
(3) On Friday or Saturday, honour withdrawal slips for 
wages signed on Ross's behalf by the Manager, according 
to the Manager's wages sheet. 
(4) Forward by each Saturday's mail a statement of receipts 
and withdrawals. 
(5) Until further notice, account to be operated, except 
for wages, by cheque. 
Ross's instructions to the Butcher Shop Manager were equally detailed. 
(1) Beef and mutton to be ordered and collected from Lakes 
Creek Meatworks - to be invoiced to the manager but 
paid by Ross after invoices checked and sent on each 
weekend. 
With the invoices were to be sent: 
(a) Invoices for all stores such as salt, newspaper. 
(b) Returns showing number of carcasses and weight. 
(c) What stores were supplied to each branch by the Head 
Shop as well as the 'carry-over' left each Saturday -
to gauge the exact financial position and to charge 
branches for all meat supplies and stores. 
(d) Copy of Cash Book showing cash and number of customers 
at each branch. 
(e) Copy of the Wages Sheet which was to include the name 
of the employee, the branch, his duties, rate per day 
and total paid. 
18 
All employees had to sign a receipt for wages. 
94 
Ross had separated the butcher shops into regions and had graded 
them according to costs and turnover to arrive at an estimated 
performance level. The results were used to determine salary levels 
of individual managers and to pinpoint potential trouble spots (see 
Table 3 below). For instance, it was found that the wages for the 
Head Butcher Shops in Townsville, at 22% of the working expenses, were 
out of all proportion to the volume of business done and steps were 
19 taken to rectify the situation. In Rockhampton, despite 
considerable care taken to train the new manager of the butcher shops 
there, profit levels and costs had begun to cause concern by the end 
of 1916. Ramsay was sent to investigate. After conducting a thorough 
examination of procedures, he reported some problems with monitoring 
the cash takings, which were simi-ar to those experienced in other 
shops at the time. Overall, although he cited several reasons for the 
adverse financial situation of the shops, he concluded "there is no 
carelessness in the management ... the shops are doing as well as 
20 possible under the circumstances." 
The State Butchery's accounting system failed to prevent theft by 
staff on a number of occasions before 1918 and again in 1919, but it 
instituted a check procedure which led to the early detection of any 
irregularities in the accounts. 
The Auditor-General had also determined that the losses 
incurred by the State Sawmills in its first year of trading were 
21 directly attributable to the lack of a costing system. Armed 
TABLE 3 
TRADING RESULTS OF STATE BUTCHER SHOPS 1918 
Gross Working Rent and Nett 
Profits Expenses Depreciation Profits 
Per Cent. Per Cent. Per Cent. Per Cent. 
Brisbane Shops 
North Coast Shops 
Rockhampton-Mount 
Morgan Shops 
Townsville Shops 
Charters Towers Shop 
Total Average 19.5 10.0 3.1 6.4 
Source: Annual Report of the Commissioner for Trade, 1919, Q.P.P., 
p.1783. 
18.1 
22.6 
21.5 
22.0 
21.9 
8.5 
10.5 
10.9 
18.1 
16.8 
2.4 
3.5 
2.3 
9.7 
2.5 
7.2 
8.6 
8.4 
Loss 
2.6 

TABLE 4 
STATE PRODUCE AGENCY OPERATIONS: CONSIGNMENTS AND PURCHASES 
1918-19 1919-20 
£ £ 
Consignments 37,411 39,223 
Local Purchases 42,094 50,517 
Southern Purchases 25,952 77,570* 
105,458 155,310 
*In all tables and figures, shillings and pence disregarded. 
Source: Annual Report of the Commissioner for Trade, 1920, Q.P.P., p.689. 
distribution to farmers in the drought-affected west of Queensland. 
Unexpectedly, the drought broke. Farmers no longer required relief 
fodder and local produce became plentiful. Howes's gamble had failed. 
He was left with stock he was now unable to unload on the local 
market. In attempting to arrange for its shipment for sale in England 
through the Department of Agriculture, he was found out and dismissed. 
After inexplicable delays the Australian Wheat Board finally approved 
the shipment but as its condition had deteriorated by the time it 
reached its destination, it failed to attract any buyers. The 
Agency's loss was in excess of £30,000 on the whole transaction, a 
25 loss from which the enterprise never recovered. 
Austin defended the spirit of the manager's actions in referring 
to similar problems faced by private buyers at the time, but he was 
emphatic that the purchases were wholly unauthorised and wholly 
pc 
unnecessary. The fact remained that it had gone undetected for some 
time, and was only discovered through an outside agency. The incident 
highlighted the existence of a considerable degree of independence in 
day-to-day management of the enterprises, that was in keeping with 
business practices but was at odds with the close internal control 
implied by the detailed accounting system. Thus, one problem in 
administering the enterprises arose not so much from questions of 
external controls to satisfy the demands of public accountability but 
from questions about what were appropriate internal controls to 
achieve efficiency and, specifically, absence of malpractice. As 
Mason Allard, the New South Wales Royal Commissioner, had remarked in 
concluding his investigations into the apparent failure of several of 
the New South Wales State Enterprises, "one cannot but be struck by 
the fact that large ventures have been entered upon without that 
w 
preliminary detailed examination into ways and means." Brigden, among 
others, used Allard's judgment to emphasise the lack of suitable 
financial "ways and means" common to all State enterprises across 
Australia and the part such a lack of planning played in their 
27 
commercial failure. 
What the actions of the manager of the State Produce Agency 
highlighted was not only the difficulty of marrying financial 
accountability with commercial decision-making, but also the question 
of the prevalence of mismanagement in the Enterprise. Apart from the 
declamations of the opposition at that time, it has been the 
historical view that Enterprise managers were inexperienced, 
incompetent or downright "poor". Gough et al. for instance, in 
considering the state of manufacturing in Queensland, commented that 
the State Enterprises "began to fail badly because they had been badly 
28 
managed" and even Gray, the Labor M.H.R., writing for the A.L.P. 
Federal Secretariat in 1965 declared that "there was a lamentable lack 
of trained and dedicated managers, that there was dishonesty and 
maladministration in some instances. It was, in fact, remarkable that 
29 
any success was achieved at all." 
Whether or not the performance of the managers was the deciding 
factor in the failure of the enterprises was another and complex 
matter intertwined with questions of finance and political control. 
Across the range of enterprises and over the years of their 
operations, there were, however, enough examples to support the 
proposition that managers at the very least frequently failed to 
display the business expertise and experience for which they had been 
employed. On occasions they set out to defraud the State, on others 
they appeared to be 'out of their depth', overwhelmed by the 
circumstances thrown up by the political and economic environment in 
which they operated. The State Fishery Business provided one such 
example. 
"The Fish Supply Act of 1915" enabled the government to take 
control of the fish supply for south-east Queensland through the 
establishment of the State Fishery Business. With headquarters in 
expensive new markets built on the river at South Brisbane, the 
enterprise was responsible for issuing licences to fish traders, for 
inspecting fish to be sold at the market and ordering the dumping of 
sub-standard supplies. Its most important function in terms of the 
objective of the State Enterprises was the buying and selling of the 
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fishermen's total catch on a wholesale basis. It replaced the 
previous auction sale system which allegedly fostered the operation of 
"combine" buying, forcing out the small trader and resulting in higher 
30 
consumer prices. Reporting on the first year's trading under the 
new conditions, Austin made no bones about declaring that the 
inexperience of Gilmour, the manager, and his staff had contributed to 
the trading loss registered. As in the case of the State Produce 
Agency, he nevertheless defended the management against public 
31 
criticism, asking for time to get the undertaking established. By 
1921, the failure of direct sales conducted by the enterprise was 
acknowledged and business reverted to the auction system conducted 
32 this time by the Fisherman's Co-operative. Five retail shops, which 
had been set up to counter a move by private traders to circumvent new 
33 
regulations gazetted in May 1919 under the State Fishery Act, were 
also a commercial failure. How much these failures could be 
attributed to poor management was difficult to isolate, given the 
number of other factors impinging on the operation of the Enterprise. 
What was easier to catalogue but harder to comprehend was the fate of 
the Wynnum Fish Depot. 
Set up as a model facility in 1917 on the advice of Queensland 
government officers who had studied the New South Wales State 
Fisheries, its objective was to reduce spoilage of fish supplies by 
34 facilitating speedy marketing procedures. The Depot offered wharves 
for landing the catch, ice for maintaining it on the way to the 
Brisbane market, local inspection, cold storage rooms and a smoking 
plant. There was even a motor van available to transport fish to the 
nearest railway station for delivery to the market. Little was 
reported about the Depot until a Question in Parliament in October 
1921 elicited the information that the original staff of five had been 
35 
reduced to a maintenance team of two. It appeared that staff had 
oc 
been hard to keep, even with the inducement of overtime. Further 
probing revealed that the Depot was now badly run-down - the wharves 
were in disrepair and their surrounds a jumble of seldom-used crates. 
Because of cost-cutting or lack of maintenance, the ice-making plant 
functioned only intermittently and fishermen soon learnt to take their 
business elsewhere and to rail their catch direct to market. By 1925, 
the Depot was in such a state of neglect that Gilmour decided to close 
it temporarily to reduce costs, a move he only belatedly relayed to 
Austin, who first learnt of the decision through a newspaper 
^ 37 
announcement. 
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The apparent indifference to the state of the Depot, its 
long-standing underutilisation (at no stage had fishermen applied to 
use the cold storage rooms which were eventually leased to the local 
State Butcher shops, the landing wharves were used infrequently and 
the smoking plant dismantled and transferred to the market) and the 
absence of any moves to 'rationalise' the situation reflected badly on 
the manager, and indeed on Austin's administration. It might have 
been explained by Gilmour's special expertise in refrigeration 
engineering. He had been in charge of building the cold storage 
facilities at the Charleville Meatworks when they were purchased by 
the Government in 1918 and was also responsible for the extensive 
coldrooms included in the South Brisbane Market. It was probably for 
this skill rather than any managerial expertise that he had been 
retained, for he was not dismissed in 1926. He went on to be the 
longest serving manager in the Enterprises, presiding over a State 
Fishery whose functions gradually diminished until the remnants of its 
38 business were finally wound up in 1936. 
Unsound business decisions such as that of the manager of the 
State Cannery who bought fruit pulp and tinplate supplies at the top 
of the market might be excused in the light of the need to keep the 
39 Cannery in production after the Stanthorpe fruit crop failed, just 
as the manager of the State Produce Agency had gambled on produce 
buying in the south. The action of the manager of the State Sawmills, 
however, showed an incompetence that bordered on farce. At the urging 
of local settlers, it was decided to erect a fourth State sawmill at 
Liverpool Creek, near Innisfail in North Queensland. The manager 
investigated the feasibility of purchasing an existing mill, 
dismantling it and re-erecting it on the new site at a cost of £3,000. 
The plan was approved by Cabinet, but before it could proceed the 
builder of the mill died. It was only then realised that no 
construction plans existed, so that by the time the mill was rebuilt, 
40 
the cost had climbed to double the original amount. 
Allegations were made in Parliament that the managers of the 
State Produce Agency and the Railway Refreshment Rooms were operating 
outside the law but these efforts to cast doubt on the management 
practices in these Enterprises paled into insignificance beside those 
aimed at the State Stations. The historical view of the State 
Stations management was summed up by Murphy who, in linking the 
magnitude of the failure of the Chillagoe mines and smelters with that 
iUU 
of the State Stations, commented that "both suffered from inadequate 
management in industries that required the most competent managers". 
In 1917, allegations of corruption involving Labor ministers in the 
purchase of Wando Vale Station for the State Enterprises obliged the 
government to appoint a Royal Commission. While the allegations were 
unproven, a major thrust of the Commission's line of inquiry as well 
as that of the Legislative Council's Select Committee on Government 
Expenditure on the Industrial Enterprises which was sitting about the 
same time, was to demonstrate McGugan's unsuitability for the position 
43 
of State Stations' manager. 
In his evidence, McGugan stated he had formerly been the manager 
of Buckingham Downs, one of the smaller but long-established cattle 
stations he then purchased for the government. He had purchased 
Lyndhurst and Wando Vale Stations from J.S. Barnes,and Bowman, the 
manager of Wando Vale, was one of the two assistants who travelled 
around Queensland with him assessing the properties. Bowman remained 
as manager of Wando Vale after its purchase by the government and 
Ferry, the second assistant, was appointed manager of Dotswood State 
Station (see Map of the State Stations, Appendix C). For the 
Legislative Council, these arrangements appeared to represent more 
44 than a fortunate coincidence, particularly in view of the large 
numbers of cattle stations offered to the government during this 
period. Graham, the Under-Secretary for Lands, testified that after 
obtaining confirmation in principle from the Minister for expenditure 
on establishing the State Stations, the means of doing so was left to 
him. In turn, he had given McGugan virtual carte blanche to select 
45 properties and negotiate purchase prices. 
McGugan had been appointed from a field of over 200 applicants. 
His qualifications consisted of 12 years working on sheep and cattle 
stations, six of them as manager. Although he had bought and sold 
stock he had never been involved in buying cattle stations. While 
this may have pointed to a lack of suitably qualified and experienced 
pastoral managers in Queensland, in the eyes of the members of the 
1917 Inquiries, McGugan was not suited for the responsibility of 
founding a State-owned grazing empire which represented an investment 
of over £1 million of public money. Moreover it was claimed that 
McGugan had no experience in the sheep industry and had therefore 
bought only cattle stations. It was a pertinent criticism since 
mutton made up a considerable proportion of meat sold in the State 
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Butcher Shops. Private owners supplied these requirements and 
McGugan was kept busy sifting though the numerous offers of sheep from 
48 
stock agents throughout Queensland. In most instances he had to 
rely on the assessments of the local agents. However, since he had in 
fact managed two sheep properties for owners wel1-regarded in the 
industry, it was more likely that restrictions of time and distance 
rather than any incompetence, collusion or preferential treatment on 
his part, dictated this method of stock purchase. 
The matter of the valuations placed on the leases, stock, plant 
and improvements of the Stations at the time of purchase was further 
proof of McGugan's inexperience for the members of the Legislative 
Council, many of whom were pastoralists. His method of including 
future variations in the value of a station's assets meant that 
purchase prices were based on assigned rather than true value and 
resulted in the government paying higher prices than private 
purchasers. The contrary view was expressed by witnesses before the 
Select Committee who stated that since cattle prices were rising, so 
too was the cost of properties. The implication which had surfaced 
during the Wando Vale inquiry that government largesse was responsible 
for inflating the market was, according to them, unfounded, and in 
view of the rising prices, McGugan had not paid overmuch for the 
49 
stations. One witness before the Committee went on to say that, 
"put on the same plane to start off with, the government would 'get 
behind in no time', but if prices stayed at their current high level, 
they must make money'.* 
What also invited adverse comment was the practice of paying for 
stock carried on each station on the basis of a book muster rather 
than a 'bang-tail' (headcount) muster. The Committee believed it was 
impossible to be certain of quoted stock numbers after just a brief 
tour of inspection. In reply McGugan was able to show that on a 
number of the stations purchased no muster had been carried out for 
some years, a common practice among private owners because of the 
expense involved. Although he agreed that stock numbers could be 
below the book figures, as had happened with the private sale of Reedy 
Creek Station so that the cost of the stock almost doubled, McGugan 
>^ ightly judged that stock numbers on the State Stations would exceed 
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the book muster figures at the time of purchase. 
The evidence presented to the two Inquiries failed,to demonstrate 
conclusively McGugan's inexperience or unsuitability for the position 
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of manager of the State Stations. Even Barnes, the Nationalist member 
for Bulimba, acknowledged McGugan as a capable man and an expert 
52 
cattle buyer. 
McGugan had purchased for the government a chain of properties 
stretching across 1,000 miles from Cape York to the Townsville 
hinterland in a combination of marginal grazing land and rich pastures 
for stock fattening which heralded a pattern of land usage in beef 
production that has been maintained in Queensland to the present day. 
He had chosen long-established stations and his purchasing judgment 
was vindicated by later developments in which the private empire of 
Queensland Stations was founded on the purchase of many of the State 
53 Stations. However, managing this vast array of properties for an 
employer who was also the government was a different matter from 
managing a single sheep or cattle property for a private owner. 
McGugan resigned in 1920, as the slump in world cattle prices was 
having its effect on the meat industry, and when Barr the new manager 
undertook a familiarisation tour accompanied by Forgan Smith, then the 
Minister responsible for the State Enterprises, there were obvious 
signs of incompetence and neglect. One station had virtually been 
abandoned, maintenance and improvements on many of the stations had 
been haphazard or allowed to lapse, and cattle rustling was rife. 
Four managers were dismissed and three transferred, some for theft and 
incompetence, others as a cost-saving measure. For the same reason 
stations were amalgamated, thereby adding to the problems of managing 
large tracts of grazing property. Managerial incentive was 
undermined when, instead of working toward developing a prime 
investment, the policy for the stations became one of a holding 
operation aimed at reducing the capital debt through accelerated stock 
sales.^^ 
The occasions of fraud, theft and mismanagement that gave the 
Enterprises their long-standing reputation, occurred as they had in 
the New South Wales and Western Australian trading ventures mostly 
during the early years of operation. They were largely the result of 
poor or non-existent accounting systems, the choice of personnel 
ill-equipped to implement Labor's dreams, and the lack of inducement 
for competent businessmen to leave private enterprises. Other reasons 
for the Enterprises' reputation of managerial incompetence had to do 
with the effect of external factors on the task of management. The 
arbitration process was one such factor. It impinged on and exerted a 
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strong degree of control over enterprise managers. Additional 
factors, loosely described as arising from the political and economic 
environment in which the enterprises functioned, exercised a varying 
degree of control. Perhaps more importantly, they created 
difficulties which were often beyond the power or capabilities of the 
managers to overcome, thereby contributing to the general view that 
the enterprises were badly managed. 
In terms of the physical environment, the problems of adverse 
seasonal conditions and lack of agricultural and pastoral expertise 
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were common to private and public enterprise alike, but the wages of 
being a public enterprise was publicity and the effect of these 
problems on the State Enterprises was well publicised. The State 
Hotel was extensively damaged by a cyclone within months of opening 
Rfi 
and its rebuilding added to the initial building costs. The State 
Produce Agency and the State Fishery both had to contend with 'crop' 
failures. The State Cannery had installed jam-making and tomato sauce 
bottling plant to assist the diversification of crops on the Soldier 
Settlements but costs escalated when the fruit crops failed at 
Stanthorpe and Bowen Settlements and fruit had to be purchased from 
57 interstate. 
Paradoxically it was the oversupply of pineapples from the 
Beerburrum settlement that created the most serious problems for the 
Cannery. Plant capacity was too small at peak seasons but too large 
in the off-season and they were supplying to an already overcrowded 
market. Obsolete plant and equipment added to the Cannery's 
production problems while the State Produce Agency was disadvantaged 
in trying to operate out of rented or 'make-do' premises. Spread 
across five different localities, they added to handling problems and 
costs but they were never upgraded despite the Commissioner's annual 
pleas for a central produce store so that the manager could compete on 
eg 
equal terms with private produce agents. The production problems of 
59 the State Coal Mine at Warra were symptomatic of the lack of mining 
expertise that had characterised the failure of the northern mining 
fin 
fields and were evident in the experimental nature of the 
government's efforts to establish the State Iron and Steel Works. 
There was little the. manager appointed to bring the Warra Mine into 
production could do to overcome the physical problems inherent in the 
site of the mine and it was eventually closed in 1919 with a loss of 
£47,000,^^ 
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Problems of communication with the units of those enterprises 
spread across a wide area of Queensland - the butcher shops and the 
stations - were never resolved. Van Rook Station was a manager's 
nightmare. Covering nearly 6,000 partly fenced square miles it was 
accessible only by boat from Normanton and then overland. There was 
little opportunity for consultation with the Brisbane central 
administration and although by the early 1920s other departments such 
as Main Roads and the Railways had instituted a decentralised system 
which incorporated annual "Head Office" consultations, no such 
mechanism was in place for the stations. For instance. It was only 
after three years at Van Rook that the manager, McCawley, was able to 
CO 
visit Brisbane to meet his Minister and the Commissioner for Trade. 
No decentralised network was developed to administer the Stations. 
Managers were given considerable autonomy in day-to-day 
decision-making from necessity, if not design. These decisions had to 
be made, however, within the context of a centrally controlled 
state-wide undertaking and in accordance with the prevailing 
government policy. The success or failure of all the units was judged 
as a single undertaking and by means of the conglomerate balance sheet 
produced annually for Parliament. 
Those opposed to Labor's ideological and pragmatic objectives had 
not overlooked the effect of these problems on the enterprises' 
commercial performance and, on a wider scale, on Labor's image. The 
Brisbane Courier editorial of 16 April, 1920 rejected Labor's claims 
of success for the Enterprises: "The banquet stage has been assumed 
to have been reached in most of its enterprises ... long before the 
appearance of any reason for jubilation." 
In Parliament, Country Party members spoke of "frenzied finance", 
"incompetent handling of State finances" and the State Enterprises 
CO 
being "a burden on the State". Macartney, the Nationalist member 
for Toowong, declared that "no enterprise yet carried on by a 
government has been shown to be any more successful than the 
enterprise carried on by a private individual. ... government 
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management does not lend itself in that direction.' In their view, 
the increasingly dismal financial performance of the Enterprises only 
served to confirm mismanagement. 
In addition to this broad type of opposition, there was hostility 
to the specific functions of the individual enterprises. Private fish 
traders reacted badly to the imposition in 1919 of over 
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150 regulations dealing with fish supply which were enforced by 
officers of the State Fishery and at one stage attempted to establish 
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a rival market. Also unpopular were the State Fishery's control of 
licensing and inspection, with frequent allegations against Fishery 
officers of preferential treatment and excessive condemning of fish. 
Despite figures produced to disprove the charge of excessive dumping, 
such was the feeling against the State Fishery that on the 
recommendation of the Fish Board, an independent inspection was 
introduced under the jurisdiction of the Health Department. In 
April 1920, a writ was issued against nine employees of the Enterprise 
by J. Riley, a fisherman, alleging that by threats and coercion, they 
67 had deprived him of his customers. 
In the same month, an exchange of letters in the Brisbane Courier 
conveyed some of the public feeling about the State Fishery. 
Thomas Welsby, the noted historian and naturalist, .claimed that the 
prices to fishermen were too low. It was his opinion that "the public 
will get cheap fish on the day the business is carried on on business 
lines and when the expenses between buying and selling to the public 
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are lessened." The next week, a Mr Spencer replied that he found 
the business was conducted on "sound economic lines". While he 
believed there was always room for improvement, the industry was on a 
better footing than previously. The problem of high costs and low 
margins was not confined to the Government business. It was general 
69 to the whole fishing industry. 
Both the State Hotel and the Railway Refreshment Rooms were 
accused of increasing the liquor trade rather than curbing it or 
providing a reasonable standard of refreshment and accommodation for 
the traveller. That these enterprises after 1918 gave evidence of 
"proper" accounting practices and returned annual profits throughout 
the life of their operations tended to be overlooked in the rush to 
prove they had failed in their public interest objectives. The 
Butcher Shops came in for their share of hostility because they were 
said to have ruined the livelihood of private butchers who were forced 
to reduce their prices, or the butchers whose only avenue of meat 
supply was through the Supervisor of the State Butchery. While 
there was some basis for these claims, Ross had found many private 
butchers were operating at a subsistence level and there was no 
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shortage of offers of shops for government purchase. 
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The State Stations operated under conditions of hostility that 
had been present, as with the Butcher Shops, right from their 
inception. It began with the criticism of the high cost of their 
purchase and moved on to the government's occupation of land when 
Labor's policy was for closer settlement. The stations were found to 
be exempt, as were all other State Enterprises, from local rates and 
charges. This deprived Local Authorities of much-needed revenue and 
discrimin^ited against private land owners. In an attempt to deflect 
criticism of the arrangement, in 1917 the Auditor-General allowed that 
"possibly the Government might as an Act of grace and equity consider 
the payment of rates on properties acquired by them in connection with 
73 industrial undertakings." 
Hunter had tried to retain an exemption in the 1918 State 
Enterprises Act by pointing out that all Crown land was exempt from 
such charges, but he was no match for Mr Corser, the Nationalist 
Member for Burnett, who carried the opposition in declaring that the 
clause was "dangerous and unfair" in view of the proposed expansion of 
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the Enterprises. After 1918 all Enterprises paid the charges. The 
State Stations also paid the levies imposed on landowners by such 
bodies as the Dingo and Marsupial Board, and the same rentals and 
occupation licences as the previous owners (see Table 5). 
TABLE 5 
STATE STATIONS: RENTS, RATES, ASSESSMENT PAYMENTS 
TO LOCAL AUTHORITIES, ETC. 
1919- 1920- 1921- 1922- 1923- 1924- 1925- 1926- 1927- 1928-
1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 
Rents 18749 18537 18226 18114 18391 18383 16710 18614 20877 20838 
Rates 1463 1241 918 2981 1894 2168 1982 1866 1914 1915 
Assess-
ments 1417 1460 1963 2033 2020 1757 1763 1500 1554 1222 
Source: Annual Reports of the Commissioner for Trade, 1920-1929, Q.P.P, 
The real point of dissension was the State Stations' exemption 
from Land Tax payments. This was particularly galling to the 
pastoralists in the light of the 1920 land tax reassessments where 
increases in excess of 50% had provoked the cries of "repudiation" and 
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a course of action that took the pastoral lobby to London where they 
were credited with blocking Theodore's loan-raising attempts. 
The State Cannery was criticised for wasting public money before 
it had completed its first year of trading. One correspondent to the 
Brisbane Courier complained, "it is nothing short of a scandal that 
these people should squander £50,000 of the people's money on 
establishing the Bulimba fiasco when for half that amount a factory 
could have been established on the North Coast" (near the Beerburrum 
7fi 
settlement). While there were obvious advantages to siting a 
cannery near the settlements, the fate of the Bowen pulping plant in 
the following year suggested that regional locations had their own 
problems (see Page 111). The Cannery had been established to assist 
the Soldier Settlements but it ran foul of an already overcrowded and 
financially shaky market which had geared up to meet war-time demands. 
When, under its own Q.S. brand, the Cannery attempted to follow the 
Premier's dictum of local consumers being given first priority, it 
encountered buyer resistance despite the lower prices, and 
storekeepers were reluctant to carry stocks. The Cannery's 
expansion into jam-making which was intended to assist the fruit 
industry to absorb seasonal gluts provoked a reaction from southern 
manufacturers who, the Commissioner reported, were not about to cede a 
share of the Queensland market to the Cannery even if it meant they 
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were selling their products at a loss. In 1922, the year Queensland 
withdrew from the Commonwealth Fruit Pool having disagreed with the 
prices the Fruit Advisory Board had set for growers and canners, the 
surplus Pool stocks which had failed again to find an overseas market 
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were dumped on the Queensland market. 
Much of the hostility towards the enterprises arose because the 
government had successfully undercut the market and forced private 
enterprise to lower prices. With the passing of "The Profiteering 
Prevention Act of 1920" which attempted to regulate prices of basic 
foods and commodities, the ever-increasing debt of the enterprises and 
the government's preference for co-operative marketing schemes for 
primary produce, the usefulness of the Enterprises as a price 
regulator diminished. The means of achieving lower commodity prices 
through the enterprises which, in view of the heavy financial losses 
had become a form of indirect taxation, was no longer acceptable. 
Hostility took on a universal, non-specific character and became part 
of the ongoing ritual of opposition to Labor's economic policies. 
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After the dust of the economic reverses of the early 1920s had 
settled and some of the Enterprises such as the Cannery had been 
seen to perform in adversity at least as well as many private trading 
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concerns, public hostility still remained. It was fuelled by the 
continued existence of the huge public debt which had first been 
incurred by the purchase of the State Stations and was fed by their 
annual trading losses. The extensive cutbacks in the operational 
scope and consequently the turnover of the Enterprises signalled that 
the debt would never be significantly reduced. However, after 
accumulated losses were written off in 1924, most of them began to 
return a small trading profit. What seemed to emerge was a 
recognisable loyalty to the Enterprises on the part of the managers 
and staff. There were well-recorded examples of staff self-interest 
and abuse of public trust, but their actions and the publicity that 
accompanied them may have obscured the instances of managerial 
innovation and public service to the particular industry in which an 
enterprise functioned, that were evident well before the twilight 
years of the State Enterprises. 
If many of the managers worked to serve the public interest, why 
did they do so? Although the concept of the public interest has 
proved difficult to define, Albrow pointed out that that when it was 
applied to administration, there was an initial assumption that 
government employees worked in the public interest. Yet the public 
interest in that context has proved to be a subjective assessment of 
functions or objectives which can depend on the tasks at hand and the 
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values of those administering them. Accordingly, the contribution 
of Enterprise managers could be viewed in the light of self-interest, 
where they were motivated to retain their jobs in the face of a 
deteriorating employment market. Similarly, the Commissioner's 
defence of his managers' competence could have been self-defence and a 
preparation for his transfer to the permanent position as 
Under-Secretary of the newly formed Department of Labour and Industry 
in 1926. Another perspective draws on Peres's notion that 
non-material rewards, such as participation in implementing decisions 
within public corporations or semi-autonomous bodies, may promote 
internal contributions which are essential for achieving policy 
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objectives. Thus, the diminution of political attention to the 
Enterprises' objectives that occurred after Labor's electoral image 
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weakened in the early 1920s may have allowed increased managerial 
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participation in decision-making and a corresponding increase in 
loyalty and public service. 
At one end of a scale of instances of staff innovation and public 
service were the attempts by the State Fishery to increase turnover by 
preparing a cookery book and cooking and selling fish to customers at 
the South Brisbane markets. The State Butchery introduced cash meat 
carts for their customers' convenience although they were eventually 
condemned as unhygienic by the Health Department.^* The State Hotel 
contrived a club-like atmosphere with the installation of a billiard 
room for the Babinda sugar-mill employees who were the Hotel's major 
customers. It was a profitable venture until rival billiard rooms 
were opened nearby. At the other end of the scale were the steps 
taken by the Butchery under Ross's guidance, the Produce Agency and 
the Cannery to improve the marketing position, not only of their 
enterprise but the industry in general. 
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Ross's plan to provide meat for consumers across Queensland 
through a network of meatworks, cold storage and butcher shops working 
in conjunction with the railways was the first co-ordinated scheme for 
State intervention in the meat industry. Although approved by 
Cabinet, it was never implemented due to the influence of a number of 
factors: its cost of over £2,000,000, the volatile state of the meat 
industry, the vested interests threatened by it and the failure of the 
government to push legislation for compulsory acquisition of private 
meatworks. Undaunted, Ross proceeded with trials of chilled beef 
shipments railed from the State-owned Charleville Meatworks to 
Brisbane, and the much promoted "bulletbox" storage method which did 
flfi 
not need ice. Frozen beef from the Gulf country in Queensland's 
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remote north was shipped to Britain for sale. The first 
two experiments were commercially successful but were never repeated. 
Another innovation that came to nothing was the proposal for a 
State Tannery selling leather at a fixed price. As the Butchery was 
responsible for selling by-products, such as hides, it had tried to 
lower the price of leather which was usually imported and expensive, 
by selling hides cheaply to local tanneries. When the tanneries 
failed to pass on the cost savings. State intervention was recommended 
88 by Austin but not implemented. 
The record of the Produce Agency was always overshadowed by the 
fatal grain purchase in 1921 and its financial repercussions. At the 
same time it instituted a range of services designed to lower costs 
no 
for the small farmer and expedite sales of his produce. In some 
instances, the Agency provided seed but did not require payment until 
the products were marketed. By 1920 the Agency was able to supply the 
89 farmer with seed, fertiliser and bags at reduced prices. By 1926 it 
acted as the receiving and selling agent of a number of Produce 
Marketing Boards and, in the following year, contracted with the 
State-owned Queensland Radio Service to produce daily market 
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reports. 
Despite Labor's view of the worthlessness of the Enterprises when 
it was decided to sell them in 1925, the manager and some of the staff 
were convinced enough of the Agency's commercial viability to buy it 
91 for the highest tendered price. Their action was also an indication 
of the loyalty that developed, not so much to the notion of public 
service through public enterprise as to the individual enterprise, as 
they struggled to overcome the adverse operating conditions. 
The clearest indication of the existence of a service ethic in 
Enterprise management was found in the efforts of the State Cannery 
staff to meet its objective of assisting the Soldier Settlements and 
the fruit industry in the face of overwhelmingly poor market 
prospects. While the procession of four managers in as many years 
through the Cannery might have had an unsettling effect on the 
employees and on the Enterprise's commercial prospects, the managers 
in question were all experienced in the industry. Sparkes, the first 
manager, had accompanied Rose the Supervisor of the Beerburrum 
Settlement on the tour sponsored by the Queensland government and the 
92 State War Council to inspect the Hawaiian pineapple industry. As an 
acknowledged cannery expert, Sparkes was appointed in 1917 to oversee 
the construction of the factory at Bulimba on the Brisbane River. He 
resigned in 1920, the first year of Cannery operations, and one could 
speculate that the chaos and unprofitability of that first year and 
the official responsibility for the situation were among the reasons 
for his resignation. After a brief period when Watson, a former 
manager of Hoadley's Confectionery Factory in Melbourne, was in 
charge, the assistant manager O'Driscoll was promoted to Manager in 
1921 and remained in that position until replaced by Gault in 1923, 
who had been with the Cannery since its inception. 
The managers worked to introduce a wide range of marketing 
initiatives as the means of overcoming the plight of the Soldier 
Settlers. The Soldiers and their families had been the victims of 
Ill 
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political games and unsound agricultural advice and were locked into 
a precarious existence in the fruit-growing industry. The management 
tried everything from extensive advertising even in suburban movie 
houses and designing a striking product label, to drawing up 
guidelines for product packaging as a result of their experience with 
the London market. These were universally adopted by the Commonwealth 
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and private canneries across Australia. Trial shipments in 
conjunction with private canneries had been sent to European markets 
but the poor quality of the fruit, the unacceptable packaging sizes 
and the inflexibly high shipping charges combined to preclude any 
profitable result. Growers on the Settlements were encouraged to 
diversify their fruit-growing and the Cannery undertook to process the 
excess crop. Tomato-pulping plants were erected on the Bowen and 
Stanthorpe (Amiens) Settlements as the basis for tomato sauce 
manufacturing. The first year's results were unprofitable as the 
problems of processing and transport had not been overcome and the 
poor quality of the product inhibited its sale. Although the Cannery 
withdrew from the operations because of the high financial loss, it 
offered growers a leasing arrangement of the plant at a nominal rent. 
Under a co-operative scheme, the Cannery would supply the expertise 
and the growers would supply the costs and labour, retaining 
independence in management. However, the offer was refused and in the 
following year when the tomato crops failed at both Settlements, the 
95 plants were closed down and sold. 
Jam-making, another venture designed to absorb seasonal 
oversupply and to make maximum use of the Cannery's plant and 
machinery, was in itself a profitable venture but was prey to crop 
failures and the effects of fierce market competition. The most 
unusual example of assistance to the industry was the canned-soup 
venture at the Pikedale Soldiers' Settlement. According to a report 
in the Brisbane Courier, the Cannery manager had shown the manager of 
the Pikedale factory a recipe for soup making. The idea was 
enthusiastically received by the Settlement's Growers' Co-operative 
who launched the venture with grants from the Land Settlement 
96 Committee and the Cannery. 
Thus, Enterprise managers were not all incompetent and bereft of 
a public service ethic. There were the'rotten apples' but there were 
also dedicated and experienced staff. They attempted to achieve the 
goals set for the Enterprises despite a wide variety of adverse 
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operating conditions. This does not imply that all were paragons and 
that they have been badly served by history but, at the same time, 
they appear to have been caught in the experimental approach of Labor 
to this vehicle of economic reform. From the commercial viewpoint. 
Labor had chosen an inappropriate instrument for State intervention in 
price regulation and grower protection. Compulsory co-operative 
marketing arrangements introduced from 1922 on proved to be more 
appropriate and more successful in achieving the desired outcome. 
Assessments or judgments about public enterprises tend to focus 
on the question of the relationship between managerial autonomy and 
public accountability. Neither the Labor government nor its 
opposition intended to allow the^ State Enterprises the degree of 
managerial autonomy evident in the Western Australian enterprises and 
to a much greater extent in the early public utility enterprises of 
Victoria and New South Wales. Yet, at the same time. Labor intended 
that the Enterprises should be protected from political influence and 
be run on a commercial basis which would lend itself to simple profit 
and loss performance measurement. It has been suggested that the 
level of managerial autonomy was in inverse proportion to the 
importance the State Enterprises had in Labor's overall political 
program, so that as their liability increased, the rewards for 
political interference diminished, leaving managerial decision-making 
largely unhindered. 
This proposal does not lose sight of the fact that internal 
managerial control was influenced to varying degrees by the operation 
of a number of external controls. The effects of some of them on the 
achievement of commercial viability and public interest effectiveness 
has already been examined. Two further areas of control - those to do 
with finance and with Ministerial or Parliamentary control - have long 
been accepted as significantly deterministic of the commercial fate of 
public enterprises. In the Queensland State Enterprises, they had a 
definite role in management difficulties and in their commercial 
failure. 
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SECTION 3 
CONSTITUTIONAL FEATURES OF THE STATE ENTERPRISES 
FINANCE 
(a) Introduction 
One of the criticisms of the State Enterprises had concerned the 
legitimacy of their operations in an area formerly the preserve of 
private enterprise. Another vigorously pursued criticism centred on 
the financial losses incurred by the enterprises. Their establishment 
had demanded a large capital outlay and, despite the early trading 
success of the State Butcher Shops, many of them registered annual 
trading losses and were never in a position to defray the original 
capital expenditure. The one major exception was the Railway 
Refreshment Rooms which had avoided the bulk of establishment costs by 
taking over existing facilities. Advantaged by a monopoly of extended 
liquor trading hours ostensibly intended to cater for the train 
traveller, the enterprise was able to show a sizeable trading surplus 
that not only paid off its Treasury debt within the first few years 
but also helped to reduce the capital debt of other Enterprises. 
Similar criticism had been levelled against the enterprises in 
New South Wales and Western Australia and in all these States, poor 
management tended to be blamed for the high costs of trading which 
were a constant feature of the annual reports. In Queensland, the 
managers and the Commissioner for Trade repeatedly cited the financial 
arrangements that governed the Enterprises and, in particular, the 
pricing policy, the continued interference from external authorities 
and the method of allocating surplus profits as major reasons for 
their difficulties in putting the Enterprises on a commercially sound 
basis. How blame for the final outcome of this type of State 
intervention should be apportioned is, as has already been proposed, a 
complex matter dependent on a number of inter-related factors and the 
relative weight of their influence or control. 
Finance was one factor with a dominant role in influencing or 
controlling the operation and ultimate performance of the State 
Enterprises. Chester made the point that it was intertwined and at 
2 
the foundation of control of statutory bodies. He went on to agree 
with Robson and Friedmann that the distinction between public 
corporations administering industrial or commercial enterprises and 
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all other "semi-independent" bodies lay in the former's financial 
autonomy: 
a body which has its own independent source of annual income 
and can finance its capital expenditure by borrowing in the 
market is likely to be subject to much less parliamentary 
(and therefore ministerial) control than is a body financed 
wholly out of annual parliamentary appropriations of the 
usual departmental kind. 
On the other hand, it was emphasised that although the public 
corporation has a greater degree of freedom than the Ministerial 
department in matters of finance, budgeting and accounting, it was not 
an autonomous institution. It enjoyed managerial freedom in 
day-to-day decisions, but it was subject to "a full measure of 
4 
accountability". Moreover, although the machinery of managerial 
responsibility should not suffer undue interference, some decisions of 
the corporation Board, particularly in financial matters, should be 
5 
approved by Treasury or the relevant Minister in the public interest. 
The general view has been that the public corporation form of 
administration has allowed the freedom from departmental and Treasury 
c 
controls to develop financial and thus operational efficiency. It is 
assumed to follow the 'break-even' principle, making neither a surplus 
nor a deficit. Its financial aim has been stated as conducting 
operations in such a way that all revenues should be sufficient to 
meet working costs, interest on capital, depreciation and reserves for 
development, "taking one year with another." However, despite the 
caveat that public corporations should not make a loss, the position 
has remained unclear. For example, the phrase, "taking one year with 
another" has defied precise definition. It has also been stated that 
public corporations should generate sufficient surplus revenue to 
provide for capital repayments and to contribute to the "national 
revenue", or alternatively to forego surplus in the interests of 
g 
providing a public service. 
Again in Australia, there have been wide variations not only in 
the provisions governing statutory corporations but also in the 
discretionary controls granted to the Treasury. The extent of 
financial autonomy has been an important indicator of the overall 
autonomy of public corporations. Insofar as public corporations have 
been assessed by classification, the reality of public corporations' 
financial provisions has been that few have had complete financial 
autonomy. Wettenhall's classification of government agencies by 
organisational type suggested that not only was complete financial 
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autonomy, that was, "a standing apart from centralised budgetary 
arrangements," rare, but that the type of control exercised over their 
finances placed many statutory bodies in a departmental rather than a 
9 
public corporation category. 
This lack of financial autonomy was as pronounced in the period 
before 1930 as afterwards, despite Webb's contention that the effects 
of the economic Depression across Australia promoted a trend away from 
corporate freedom towards more centralised control. 
The historical perception of the early public utility enterprises 
in New South Wales and Victoria was of a considerable degree of 
autonomy from centralised financial control, particularly in Victoria 
where the political interference which had caused chaos in the railway 
experiments of the 1880s and 1890s was consciously excluded when the 
new push for public enterprise began under Irvine, Watt and Swinburne 
at the turn of the century. Sir Henry Parkes had also followed a 
policy of independence from political control in the New South Wales 
Railways. Nevertheless, public enterprises across Australia were not 
financially self-sufficient, some form of financial control usually 
being imposed on them because of the demand for accountability in 
public expenditure. Eggleston believed that the problems of financial 
control originated from the need of public enterprises to draw on 
public funds, which then precluded "any financial equilibrium". He 
reported a number of control devices imposed in Victoria and, 
accordingly, classified statutory corporations as: 
(1) Those which are completely independent. 
(2) Those which are completely autonomous, but make 
contributions to Treasury. 
(3) Those which have complete control of their revenues, 
but depend on the State for their loans. 
(4) Those which pay their moneys into, and make their 
payments from, the public account. 
(5) Those which are subsidised or are not self-supporting, 
but do not use the public account. 
In Britain Chester had identified three "simple" forms of financing 
government authorities: 
(a) Independent [own] source, from sales or levies. 
(b) Parliamentary appropriations in the departmental 
manner. 
(c) Parliamentary Grant-in-aid - does not require detailed 
accounting to Parliament or for unspent money to be 
surrendered each year. 
l^i 
while also noting that some bodies belonged to two categories since 
they received grants as subsidies to their income from operations, a 
feature also found in Australian authorities such as the early Country 
Roads Board in Victoria. 
What then of the financial administration of the State 
Enterprises? Given that the political objective of establishing the 
Enterprises was economic reform and thus directly concerned with their 
financial operations, did they have a financial autonomy consistent 
with and promoting the financial efficiency claimed for the public 
corporation model which would follow the lines of "business" rather 
than departmental management? Or was there close external control of 
finances, in keeping with Labor's record of hostility towards Boards 
and Commissions elsewhere in Australia and in recognition of the 
central role the State Enterprises were assigned to play in Labor's 
. ,14 
economic reform program? 
The following discussion has used the practice common in public 
corporation literature of examining perceived major features of 
financial administration as a means firstly of describing variations 
in statutory provisions and discretionary practice, and secondly of 
assessing the extent of managerial autonomy. These features are: 
capital funding and repayments; 
pricing policy; 
surplus "profits"; 
reserve or special funds. 
This approach has been confined to the years after 1918, as before 
the State Enterprises Act was passed in 1918, there were no statutory 
provisions governing the enterprises as a financial entity. The 
entire financing of the Enterprises during that time was governed by 
an ad hoc approach to problems raised and solutions sought in what was 
an experiment in government policy. Consequently, in the period 
before 1918, the arrangements for finance have been presented in the 
context of such problems and their outcome rather than in a public 
corporation framework. 
(b) State Enterprises' Finance prior to 1918 
From the time the first State Enterprise was set up in November 
1915, the capital outlay and running expenses for the Queensland 
enterprises were advanced wholly from public funds. In his initial 
forays into trading undertakings Ryan was guided by the experience of 
the Western Australian Labor government which had faced the 
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Legislative Council's implacable opposition to any moves to establish 
State enterprises. When Labor came to power in Queensland they had 
immediately attempted to institute two legislative measures to give 
them the power to acquire commodities as well as meatworks and other 
enterprises engaged in primary production and distribution. The 
first, "The Sugar Acquisition Act of 1915", was passed by the 
Legislative Council in deference to the war effort but the Meatworks 
Bill failed repeatedly over the next two years to get past the 
15 Council. Its putative power to introduce socialist ideals was 
considered too strong to be countenanced. In the wake of this defeat 
Ryan resorted to the same stratagem as the Western Australian 
government had used - that of executive action - which was to become 
the pattern for the establishment of State trading enterprises in 
Queensland. The first Butcher Shop in Roma Street, Brisbane was 
opened in November 1915 with an advance of £2,000 from the 
Supplementary Trust Funds of the Chief Secretary's Department. The 
Meatworks Bill and the Commissioner for Trade Bill both failed again 
in 1916 to pass the Legislative Council, so the government remained 
committed to financing the enterprises through the Loan and Trust Fund 
accounts of the various departments in which they had been 
established. 
The first funds for the State Butchery, State Coal Mine and the 
State Sawmills were made available by Executive Minute and then placed 
17 
on the Supplementary Estimates for 1915-15 of the parent department. 
From 1916, funds were voted on the departments' Loan and Trust Funds, 
Supplementary Funds, and, in some cases, were classed as Unforeseen 
Expenditure (see Tables 6 and 7). "The State Fishery Act of 1916" and 
"The State Produce Agency Act of 1917" provided that funds should be 
appropriated annually by Parliament for the purpose of the business. 
Although these votes remained as part of the estimates of the 
Treasurer's department and the Department of Agriculture and Stock, 
the State Produce Agency was established under the authority of an 
Executive Minute of 31.1.1918 and provision for salaries and wages was 
made by a further series of Executive Minutes, the amounts to be 
18 included in the Supplementary Estimates for 1917-18. 
As the enterprises earned their first revenue, an account was 
opened at the Treasury in the name of each enterprise, for example, 
the Fish Supply Fund. All moneys received and paid out for working 
expenses by an Enterprise were handled by Treasury through the 
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TABLE 5 
SOURCE OF STATE ENTERPRISES' FUNDS 1916 
Retail Butcher 
Shops 
Stock Consignments 
Retail Butcher 
Shops 
Sawmills 
Sawmills 
Sawmills 
State Stations 
State Stations 
State Stations 
Coal Mine 
Coal Mine 
Coal Mine 
Coal Mine 
Battery 
Battery 
Battery 
Fish Markets 
Hotels* 
Chief Secretary 
Chief Secretary 
Chief Secretary 
Public Works 
Public Works 
Public Works 
Public Lands 
Public Lands 
Public Lands 
Mines 
Mines 
Mines 
Mines 
Mines 
Mines 
Mines 
Treasurer 
Home Secretary 
Trust Funds 
Trust Funds 
Supplementary Trust 
Funds 
Supplementary Trust 
Funds 
Loan Fund 
Supplementary Trust 
Fund (Sawmills Trust 
Fund Account) 
Trust Funds 
Supplementary Trust 
Funds 
Supplementary Loan 
Funds 
Trust Funds 
Loan fund 
Supplementary Trust 
Fund (Coal Mine Fund) 
Supplementary Loan 
Fund 
Trust Fund 
Loan Fund 
Supplementary Trust 
Fund 
Loan Fund 
Loan Fund 
£100,000 
10,000 
2,000 
46,000 
3,000 
17,000 
151,150 
81,000 
25,000 
5,500 
12,000 
1,800 
5,000 
2,000 
5,000 
800 
35,000 
30,000 
*Hotels were planned at Babinda and South Johnstone. Compensation 
paid to Messrs Allen and Sons, Ltd, amounting to £7,179 from 
Supplementary Loan Fund Estimates, on account of establishment of 
State Hotel at Mount Cuthbert. 
Source: Estimates of Expenditure, Q.P.P., 1915-17. 
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TABLE 7 
STATE ENTERPRISES EXPENDITURE AND RECEIPTS 1917-1918 
Hotels 
Sawmi11s 
Fish Market 
Coal Mines 
Railway 
Refreshment 
Rooms* 
Butcher 
Shops* 
Stations 
Produce 
Agency 
Expenditure 
£ 
1,220 
(Construction) 
1,604 
(Cyclone Damage) 
18,000 
(Wages and 
Maintenance) 
1. 11. 0 
49,534 
(Wages and 
Purchases) 
19,590 
19,058 
8,500 
(New Farm Land 
Purchase) 
12,309 
(Machinery) 
1,470 
83,000 
(Salaries, 
Rent, Stock) 
208,200 
(Salaries, 
Purchases) 
114,120 
(Purchase of 
Van Rook) 
100,000 
5,716 
9,805 
(Wages and 
Expenses) 
(U( 
Fund 
Loan 
Loan 
iforeseen) 
Trust 
Loan 
Trust 
Loan 
Trust 
Loan 
(Unforeseen) 
(Ur 
(Ur 
Loan 
Trust 
Trust 
Trust 
Trust 
iforeseen) 
Loan 
Trust 
iforeseen) 
Trust 
(Unforeseen) 
Receipts 
£ 
15,654 
5,700 
17,000 
515 
98,973 
348,815 
201,599 
394 
(Commissions) 
*For 1918-19, Unforeseen Trust Fund Expenditure: 
Railway Refreshment Rooms: £12,716. 
Butchery: £14,927. 
Sources: Statement of Expenditure and Receipts, Q.P.P., Vol. 1, 1918; 
Auditor-General's Report, 1919, Q.P.P., Vol. 4, 1919-20. 
.tJt.^ 
relevant Fund. They were included in the Public Account as Trust 
Funds and attracted an interest rate of 5% on credits and overdrafts. 
Although amounts advanced to the various State Enterprises were 
included in the departmental votes and began to be challenged by the 
Parliamentary opposition by 1918 in the debates on Supply, the 
Enterprises' accounts were separate from the departmental accounts. 
1 Q 
They were subject to periodic examination by Audit Inspectors. 
Financial statements of the operations of each Enterprise were to be 
certified by the Auditor-General and presented annually to Parliament. 
This process represented the main avenue of accountability for the 
functions and the financial performance of the Enterprises. The 
Treasurer's credibility had been undermined by discrepancies in his 
statement of profit for the State Stations, particularly in relation 
to Mount Hutton station where, the opposition alleged, false stock 
20 
sales had been registered. 
The Auditor-General's report to Parliament represented a higher 
degree of financial control over the Enterprises than was exercised 
over the New South Wales trading ventures where managers engaged 
private firms to audit the accounts and provide certifications for 
21 
Parliament. Separate accounts had been established for the 
Enterprises at the Treasury without recourse to special legislation as 
was the case with "The Special Deposits (Industrial Undertakings) Act 
of 1912" in New South Wales. A monthly audit of two enterprises had 
been established and the Auditor-General had presented a balance sheet 
for each enterprise to Parliament in 1915. However, the question of 
financial accountability or the lack of it, had been given prominence 
by the findings of the Legislative Council Select Committee on 
Enterprise Expenditure and the Wando Vale Royal Commission, both set 
up in October 1917, that "proper" accounting systems were non-existent 
or inadequately implemented. Moreover, it was difficult to reconcile 
the establishment and operation of separate working funds for the 
enterprises in the Treasury with McGugan's evidence that the money 
from State Station cattle sales was paid direct to Consolidated 
22 Revenue. Mure Robertson was having difficulty receiving returns 
from all the Enterprises in time to present his report to Parliament. 
He gave an incomplete report in 1917 and in 1918 his report was so 
delayed that opposition members complained they were in the invidious 
position of having to debate the State Enterprises Bill without any 
23 information on the financial situation of the existing enterprises. 
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He was particularly scathing of the poor accounting methods of 
the State Stations but there was little hint of the battle that had 
raged between him and McGugan, the State Stations manager in the 
Auditor-General's announcement that he "had recently had an interview 
with the general manager of the State Stations, and he has promised me 
24 that the matter will receive early attention." He was equally 
critical of the State Sawmills manager, holding him responsible for 
the lack of a costing system and the subsequent trading loss which, he 
said, was due to the manager's below-cost sales of timber to southern 
25 
States. For the Auditor-General, a further disquieting feature of 
the Labor government's financial arrangements which involved State 
Enterprises funding was the excessive use of Unforeseen Expenditure. 
In 1942, Bland commented on the growth of "crisis-finance" and the 
remedy sought by Treasurers through the omission of items from the 
original Estimates. The items were then submitted as Unforeseen 
Expenditure, in the hope that later in the year there would be 
sufficient revenue to pay for them. In Bland's view, this ploy and 
the manipulation of Trust Funds without recourse to Parliament, 
constituted an abrogation of the "vital principle of prior 
authorisation". Parliamentary control was rendered ineffectual while 
"the safeguard sought by insisting upon the Governor's warrant to any 
oc 
Treasury issue of funds [was] destroyed." Bland could have been 
quoting Mure Robertson's arguments. In his report for 1915-16, the 
Auditor-General drew attention to the existing Audit Act passed in 
1874 when government expenditure was on a much smaller scale. The Act 
had not been amended so, consequently, it allowed Departments: 
to underestimate their expenditure or requirements knowing 
that subsequently they can supplement the amount as 
Unforeseen Expenditure by Executive Authority ... 
In addition ... each year large sums are charged as 
Unforeseen Expenditure to the Loan and Trust Funds - on 
Executive Authority. 
The Treasurer's Warrants for Unforeseen Expenditure are not 
signed by me, consequently I have nQ.,responsibil ity in 
regard to authorising the payments. 
The practice was not confined to the Labor government, the 
previous Denham government having voted nearly £500,000 in Unforeseen 
Expenditure in 1914-15, more than double Labor's votes in the same 
category for the 1915-16 period. Nor were the State Enterprises the 
worst offenders. However, in the years to 1918, Unforeseen 
Expenditure on behalf of most of the State Enterprises was authorised 
28 by the Executive. 
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During this time, McGugan had purchased a number of cattle 
OQ 
stations for the government for a total outlay of nearly £700,000. 
Theodore as Treasurer was finding it difficult to compete for loan 
funds for Labor's programs against the priorities demanded by the War 
and had asked Ryan not to purchase any stations for cash. The 
solution to the problem of financing such concentrated capital 
expenditure was to issue debentures in part payment for the State 
Stations and other enterprises. Western Australia had used this 
method to finance the trading ventures there but the Auditor-General 
was unhappy with its particular use for the State Enterprises. 
Although the debentures were issued under "The Government Loan Act of 
1914", it appeared they were part of the purchase money of the 
stations and this, in the opinion of the Crown Solicitor, constituted 
a practice contrary to the legal intent of that Act. Mure Robertson 
was further concerned at the "practically unlimited" power of the 
Executive since the purchase money had also been authorised under 
Unforeseen Expenditure by Warrants signed by the Governor but not by 
himself. His concern was not diminished by Ryan, in the capacity of 
Attorney-General, advising there was no legal barrier to his 
countersigning the debentures. Finally, however, having made his 
30 public protest, he took Ryan's advice and signed. 
A total of £500,000 in debentures was issued in this way, 
£482,000 in respect of the State Stations (see Figure 1 below). 
Mount Hutton £38,500 
Dotswood and Others 178,000 
Wando Vale 72,000 
Dillalah 20,000 
Van Rook 156,800 
State Sawmills 23,000 
Figure 1: Debentures issued for purchase of State Enterprises to 
1917. 
Source: Auditor-General's Report, 1917, Q.P.P., p.51. 
31 Financed by loans from the State Government Insurance Office, they 
attracted a 4.5% interest rate, were redeemable at any time and 
matured at varying times up to 1941. The amount of £90,500 still 
32 
outstanding in 1930 was taken over by the National Debt Commission. 
One effect of this method of financing was to mask the initial 
cost of the Stations for the Estimates or accounts of expenditure 
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dealt with cash outlays. The evidence of J.H.S. Barnes, the vendor of 
Wando Vale Station, before the 1917 Royal Commission of Inquiry into 
the government's purchase of that station, cast further doubt on the 
legal position of the government in regard to the Debentures' issue. 
Debentures were free of State but not Federal income tax. The States 
were not permitted to make separate arrangements to waive the latter, 
yet Barnes testified that he had been given to understand he would not 
be liable for the Federal tax because of an arrangement between the 
two governments. Nor, he added, did he have any intention of paying 
33 
the tax.-^ *^  
The use of debentures had allowed the capital costs of 
establishing enterprises to be spread over a number of years. The 
more usual means of capital financing was through the Loan Fund. The 
conventional practice which followed the reading of the Constitution 
Act was to use Loan Funds for capital expenditure. Trust Funds for 
wages and general running expenses, no money being drawn from 
Consolidated Revenue. (This demarcation was to provoke heated 
exchanges during the debates on the 1918 State Enterprises Bill.) The 
source of Loan Fund deposits was identified as: repayments of back 
deposits, repayments by local authorities, railways, etc., receipts 
under "The Land Sales Proceeds Act of 1906" and Advances on account of 
loans from the Commonwealth. The latter followed a loan agreement 
whereby from 1915 until one year after the war, the Commonwealth would 
be the sole borrower overseas while the States retained the right to 
34 
raise an agreed amount within Australia. Trust Funds were supplied 
from the Trust Fund of the Government Savings Bank. 
To 1917 the advances to the State Enterprises from Government 
Savings Bank trust moneys were: 
Railway Refreshment Rooms £14,491 
Butcher Shops 154,255 
Sawmills 48,678 
Stations 295,744. 
Figure 2: Government Savings Bank Trust Fund advances. 
Source: Queensland Parliamentary Debates, 1917, p.29. 
The Premier described them as Loan moneys, but failed to 
convince his opponents. Many of them believed that for the government 
to spend the deposits or trust moneys lodged with the Bank on the 
State Enterprises was unjustified when farmers were refused the Bank 
35 
advances to which they were entitled. 
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(c) Financial Arrangements after 1918 
In 1918 the Ryan government made another attempt to obtain a 
legal base from which to establish or acquire enterprises, when it 
presented the State Enterprises Bill to Parliament. There were 
two specific areas of contention in the Bill which, had they been 
resolved in favour of the government, would have allowed for 
substantial alteration in the conditions for the provision of funds. 
The first of these was embodied in a clause which had become standard 
to all the Bills introduced by Labor for the extension of State 
Enterprises. As it appeared in the State Enterprises Bill, Clause 10 
sought to empower the Governor-in-Council or the Minister in charge of 
the enterprises to secure funds "by way of loan from any financial 
company, corporation or institution." A further sub-clause was to 
allow the government to make loans to the Minister for the purposes of 
the Enterprises. Taken with the proposed Clause 9, which authorised 
the Treasurer to make payments from Consolidated Revenue where no 
reserve or other funds were available, these provisions would have 
sanctioned a situation, as Mr Swayne, the Nationalist member for 
Mirani argued, "where the government can, without any discussion in 
Parliament commit the country to an expenditure of hundreds of 
thousands of pounds without any check whatever". In supporting a 
proposal that capital expenditure in State Enterprises in excess of 
£20,000 should be referred to a Public Works Commission in the same 
way as capital expenditure on railway construction, he concluded that 
2 
it was "not in the public interest to remove all safeguard." The 
opposition had already succeeded in placing a limit on expenditure for 
the proposed State Iron and Steel Works, in line with the 
recommendation of the Royal Commission convened to report on the 
3 
matter in 1917 and in 1918 and this had been one of the reasons for 
the failure of that proposal. However, in the face of explanation 
from both sides of the House that it would be unworkable, this 
proposed amendment was dropped. 
Swayne went on to move an amendment to delete the reference to 
Consolidated Revenue as a source of capital funding for the 
Enterprises, on the grounds that it allowed too wide a scope for the 
use of public funds. The Premier and the Leader of the Opposition 
used the same Clause 34 of the Constitution Act to convey what each 
understood by Consolidated Revenue. MacCartney insisted on the 
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distinction between Loan Funds and Consolidated Revenue. The latter 
was for the purpose of "carrying on", not for funding development 
4 
works or unauthorised government enterprises. Ryan on the other hand 
was equally firm that Loan Funds and Trust Funds were part of 
Consolidated Revenue. To emphasise this point, he asked where the 
Minister would obtain the money for State Enterprises if not from 
5 
revenue. After some weeks of amendments and counter-amendments 
passing between the Legislative Council and the Assembly, the matter 
was resolved. No 'outside' loans were to be authorised and it was 
made clear that moneys advanced for the business of the State 
Enterprises would come from the Loan Fund or from debenture issues 
authorised by the Governor-in-Council. Nor was there any provision 
for the Treasurer to "top up" funds from Consolidated Revenue. Under 
the State Enterprises Actj the sole provision for capital funding and 
repayments that survived the Legislative Council amendments was: 
The Governor-in-Council was to make loans to the 
Commissioner, on Treasury approval, from the Loan Fund or by 
the issue of debentures. Loans were to bear interest and 
be repayable on terms set by the Governor-in-Council (S.18). 
To this extent, a formal check over capital funding was retained. The 
government had failed to expand the scope of funding for the 
enterprises beyond the public account, a potentially serious problem 
in view of the State's limited borrowing capacity and the expansionist 
c 
plans for the State Enterprises at this time. The Act had not 
blocked Parliamentary scrutiny but it had retained government control 
over the Enterprises. 
Self-contained finance was identified as one of the principles of 
the public corporation. Financial operations were separate from the 
public account and some independence maintained in capital borrowing. 
However, in both British and Australian public corporations some form 
of policy control on overall borrowings has been sought. Australian 
federal corporations have not had independent capital borrowing powers 
while in the States, a variety of controls has been instituted in the 
enabling Statutes. The British public corporations were mostly 
empowered to raise their own loans by various means but all proposals 
were subject to Ministerial approval. Advances by Treasury were made 
to cover capital expenditure for a given number of years, with further 
advances subject to Parliamentary approval. Total borrowings were 
calculated as part of Treasury's total national investment, and as 
Robson commented, these mechanisms of control, related to the 
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availability of investment funds, served as an effective brake on the 
g 
expansion of the British nationalised industries. Chester 
distinguished five categories for capital borrowings but they have not 
translated exactly to the Australian variations. The latter have been 
summarised simply as being of two categories: those which have 
independent borrowing powers and are therefore more independent than 
9 
the second category which is wholly financed by the government. 
Further variations as, for example, when statutory authorities are 
wholly capital financed but excluded from the budget, have been 
identified in Eggleston's classification of five categories which has 
also given an indication of the corresponding level of financial 
autonomy (see Page 120). 
Section 17 of the State Enterprises Act provided for the 
establishment of separate State Enterprises funds. This meant the 
finances of the Enterprises were to be removed from the budget and 
annual appropriations procedure. Also under S.17, management of 
internal funds was to be "as the Commissioner from time to time 
directs", which again implied a degree of financial autonomy. 
Consequently, the Enterprises should have qualified for inclusion 
in Eggleston's third category of statutory corporation financial 
arrangements where corporations have complete control of their revenue 
but depend on the State for their loans. However, Eggleston himself 
was suspicious of the independence suggested by a separate bank 
account. He declared it to be "fictitious" particularly when heavy 
capital losses required the account to be topped up from revenue as 
had occurred with the Country Roads Board in Victoria. The 
authority over capital finance vested in the Governor-in-Council by 
S.19, the authority to intervene in the management of internal funds 
vested in the Governor-in-Council by S.21 of the Schedule to the Act, 
together with the escalation of the Enterprises' capital debt to 
Treasury suggested then that financial autonomy was limited. The 
Enterprises' actual financial arrangements would then have placed 
them, not in the third category, but in Eggleston's fifth category of 
corporations which are subsidised but do not use the public account. 
Insofar as Wettenhall's classification could be applied to financial 
provisions, the State Enterprises' arrangements did not approximate 
to any of the five organisational types, except that they were removed 
from the central budgetary processes and therefore were not a 
conventional ministerial department. 
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Part of the problem of determining how much independence the 
Enterprises had in capital funding and expenditure lay in the 
statutory provisions which proved to be inadequately or loosely 
defined. As has been observed in other areas of public enterprises, 
this situation was not unique to the State Enterprises. However, it 
left the Enterprises open to ad hoc measures to fill the gaps, and 
vulnerable to external influences and controls probably beyond those 
intended. 
Some indication of the effect of these problems can be gained 
from examining how these measures originated, and were implemented. 
(d) Capital Funds and Repayments 
To the 31st December, 1918, which was immediately prior to the 
State Enterprises Act coming into operation, the Enterprises' debt to 
the Treasury stood at £939,857 - £448,080 in advances from the Loan 
Fund, and £491,777 in overdrafts on the Trust Accounts. By 
30th June, 1919, it had increased to £1,123,234, divided in similar 
proportions between the two funds (see Table 8). 
Section 18 of the Act provided for the Governor-in-Council to set 
the interest rates and the terms of repayment on capital advanced from 
the Loan Fund. Up to 1919, no provision had been made for loan 
repayments. The enterprises had been operating on a Treasury 
overdraft for working (Trust Fund) expenses while capital 
expenditure was a debt to the State's Loan Fund. 
To regularise the situation and to "simplify" the financial 
arrangements between the Treasury and the Commissioner for Trade, an 
informally designated Finance Committee comprising the 
Auditor-General, the Under-Secretary, Treasury and the Commissioner 
for Trade, was convened. The Committee used S.18 to draw up a 
proposal, subsequently approved by the Governor-in-Council, in which a 
loan covering the outstanding debts and a further amount for working 
expenses would be issued to the Commissioner. The loan was repayable 
over 40 years at 5% interest. A separate working account, the Trust 
Fund, would be established with advances from the Loan Fund to handle 
all receipts except for new capital, and all expenditure. A 5% 
12 interest rate was to be charged on Trust Fund overdrafts, or was 
13 payable to the Commissioner for Trade on weekly credit balances. By 
comparison, the terms for repayment of capital loans for the 
nationalised industries in Britain and for early Railways loans in 
Australia were usually over 90 years. Contemporary legislation in 
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TABLE 8 
STATE ENTERPRISES 
Indebtedness to Treasury at 30th June, 1919 
Loan Fund Trust Fund Total 
£ s. d. £ s. d. £ s. d. 
State Stations 470,038 5 9 550,454 0 11 1,030,492 5 8 
State Retail 
Butcher Shops Cr.66,511 19 3 Cr.66,511 19 3 
State Sawmills 30,179 8 5 18,551 18 7 48,731 7 0 
State Hotel 
(Babinda) 25,001 17 4 3,783 5 2 28,785 3 6 
State Produce 
Agency 11,592 9 0 11,592 9 0 
State Fish Supply 50,911 10 9 11,739 19 10 72,551 10 7 
Railway Refresh-
ment Rooms Cr. 5,283 3 1 Cr. 5,283 3 1 
State Coal Area 
(Bowen) 2,365 8 2 2,365 8 2 
State Trade Office 
£588,496 10 5 
1,511 11 
£534,738 3 
0 
2 
1,511 11 
£1,123,234 13 
0 
7 
Source: Annual Report of the Commissioner for Trade, 1919, Q.P.P., p.981, 
Queensland setting up such statutory authorities as the State 
Government Insurance Office and the Government Savings Bank had no 
provisions for loan repayments. These bodies operated under the 
expectation of self-sufficiency and any funds advanced to them drew on 
Consolidated Revenue. The Railways Acts of New South Wales and 
Queensland similarly made no specific provision for loan repayments, 
although loans taken out to cover Queensland's program of public works 
were repayable over 40 years. In both British and Australian public 
enterprises, it was the practice to establish sinking funds for the 
repayment of short-term loans or to replace a capital asset. A 
sinking fund had been one of the statutory provisions stipulated by 
the Auditor-General for the Queensland State Enterprises, and included 
in the provisions for Western Australia's trading enterprises, but 
although there was provision in the State Enterprises Act under S.15, 
one was never established. 
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The Enterprises arrangements for capital repayments or redemption 
tended to be obscured in the Annual Reports. A Loan Redemption 
14 Account of £40,000 appeared in the 1920 Annual Report but it was not 
readily apparent that this amount represented transfers from the 
surplus of Enterprises such as the State Butchery. Similarly, in the 
1920 Report, a detailed table of the loan redemption payments 
allocated to each Enterprise appeared for the first and only time. 
Thereafter, a total annual amount was directed towards redemption 
payments (see Table 9) although whether the percentage contribution by 
each Enterprise remained the same was never disclosed. 
TABLE 9 
ANNUAL REDEMPTION PAYMENTS 1920-1928 
Year 
Amt 
Total 
1920 1921 
10,417 11,255 
21,673 
1922 
11,796 
33,469 
1923 
12,385 
45,856 
1924 
13,005 
58,861 
1925 1926 
13,442 16,851 
72,304 89,155 
1927 
17,291 
106,457 
1928 
18,543 
125,101 
Source: Annual Reports of the Commissioner for Trade, 1920-1928. 
These redemption payments were made on the consolidated loan of 
£1,123,234 taken out in 1919. The increases in Loan Fund indebtedness 
which were recorded each year for the Enterprises appeared to be a 
separate issue with any reductions being the result of transfers from 
15 
the Trust Funds to the Loan Funds of individual Enterprises. 
However, at no stage did the redemption payments on the original loan 
1 C 
reach the level required to repay a 40-year loan. The Finance 
Committee may have decided on a level of repayment commensurate with 
the Enterprises' capacity to pay, it may have been a token gesture on 
the part of the government to answer public criticism or there may 
have been some adherence to principles such as those set out for the 
Indian Railways where a percentage of the gross profits was allocated 
for capital repayments. The whole question of capital repayments 
for public enterprises has tended to elicit ambivalent responses. In 
some Australian public corporations, provision has been made for 
self-liquidation of capital debt, in others, a moratorium on capital 
repayments has been declared until the enterprise is 
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18 
established. Railway provisions have usually favoured new 
constructions and renewal of rolling stock ahead of capital 
repayments. In addition, Kewley has noted that variations in the 
approach to capital repayments have resulted not so much from 
different statutory provisions as from the discretionary power of the 
19 Treasurer. 
Any principles guiding capital repayment levels not only for the 
original loan but for Loan Fund indebtedness, were masked by the 
practice of loading up Trust Funds and ignoring the onus of capital 
debt reduction, the clearest example of which was with the State 
Hotel. Although it made a surplus profit each year and was in credit 
in the Trust Fund, no attempt was made to reduce its capital 
indebtedness until 1927 when Trust Fund credits were sufficient to 
20 
clear the whole of the debt. 
The informal Finance Committee of the Enterprises was also 
designated the capital cost Committee and was delegated to determine 
the capital costs of each enterprise under S.H (1) of the Schedule to 
the Act. What constituted this cost appeared to vary. With the 
Cannery, initial working expenses were capitalised whereas with other 
Enterprises such as the Railway Refreshment Rooms they were calculated 
as a loss on the first year's trading. In general, the expenditure on 
the establishment of each enterprise was determined as its capital 
cost and was considered to represent the book value of its assets with 
some addition for improvements. Much of the issue of determining 
capital costs for the British nationalised industries revolved around 
the question of compensation to private companies transferred to 
public ownership and so was largely irrelevant to the Australian 
situation. The method adopted for the State Enterprises was similar 
to that of some of the Commonwealth corporations engaged in 
21 
competitive trading. The determining of capital costs was to become 
important when the Moore government, in attempting to gain the maximum 
political mileage out of the State Enterprises' financial losses, set 
purchase prices for the Enterprises at the level of their original 
capital cost. When these prices were not realised, the shortfall was 
added to the Enterprises' total losses. Sizer, the Minister for 
Labour and Industry at the time, had engaged two outside valuers as 
well as the Commissioner for Trade to settle on valuations for the 
State Stations, to serve as their reserve prices at auction. In 
several cases, Sizer altered the values upwards to approximate the 
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initial capital outlays, whereas Austin and the other valuers had 
based their assessment on depreciated values and the state of the 
22 property market. . 
If the initial valuation of the stock assets of the State 
Stations had been questionable, the method followed in writing-off 
stock losses and devaluations was even more so. A very high 18% of 
stock held on the Stations in 1928 was written off. Although the 
matter was said to be under investigation, the figure was accepted and 
23 £124,000 was written off the assets. The official reasons given 
were the effect of the drought and extensive cattle rustling, 
particularly on the vast Van Rook Station which had remained largely 
unfenced, but there was an inference that the management had not been 
entirely straightforward in compiling the figures. In 1921 the 
accumulated profits of the Stations had been directed towards making 
up the written-down value of the stock but in 1928 no such relief was 
available. On both these occasions, the decision to write off the 
losses and the value assigned to them was made by the General Manager 
with the eventual approval of the Commissioner, but the Committee was 
not consulted. 
The variations in the value of capital assets and the movement of 
funds between Loan and Trust Funds added further strain to a system of 
accounting which, in spite of the 1918 statutory provisions, was still 
proving inadequate in meeting the demands of public accountability. 
Monetary transfers were still far from clearly defined, and figures 
varied from year to year and between the Reportsof the Auditor-General 
and the Commissioner. 
At the end of trading in 1930, the total debt owing on the 
24 Enterprises was £2,493,266 which was said to represent Loan Fund 
indebtedness. However, the distinction between Loan and Trust Funds 
appeared to be rather arbitrary. As Ferricks, the Member for South 
Brisbane, summed up: 
Money is borrowed and put into State Enterprises, enormous 
losses are made, and these losses, when made, find their way 
to Trust Accounts, and finally are transferred to Loan 
Account. Thatpposition is wrong ... economic law ... has 
been violated. 
Capital 'borrowings', capital expenditure and capital repayments 
were thus vital but confused issues in the operation of the State 
Enterprises. Before 1918, capital for the Enterprises' establishment 
had been advanced from the State's Loan Fund by means of departmental 
appropriations, on an ad hoc needs basis. With the first State 
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Enterprises Bill in 1918 the Labor government had attempted to secure 
"outside" borrowing powers, not for an independent State Enterprises' 
authority, but for a State Enterprises' Minister having the powers of 
a corporation. The State Enterprises Act, in its amended form, 
provided for the separation of finance from the public account, 
allowed loans only from the Loan Fund and gave power over capital 
loans, interest and repayment to the Governor-in-Council. Although 
the Commissioner for Trade had some statutorily defined autonomy over 
internal funds, the overall authority of the Governor-in-Council in 
financial matters, the discretionary power of the Treasurer and the 
Enterprises' subsequent reliance on government "topping up" of funds 
categorised them as wholly reliant on government funds and thus having 
little independence from Ministerial control. The statutory 
provisions relating to capital financing were comparable to those of 
British and Australian public corporations, and the Enterprises fitted 
one category of a broad Australian classification of public 
corporations. However, there were variations in their actual 
operations that reflected the influence of their immediate 
environment. 
Another source of influence on the extent and management of 
capital funds and on many other aspects of the enterprises' financial 
situation arose from the pricing policy under which they traded. 
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(d) Pricing Policy 
Pricing policy has been considered a controversial issue for 
public enterprises. Questions raised about its implementation have 
revealed a divergence of opinion on a number of its aspects and a 
considerable gap not only between the principles of public corporation 
administration and their practice, but also between the statutory 
provisions governing pricing and the realities of its management. 
Moreover, because it has concerned "policy", it has had important 
implications for political control. 
Lewis set out two "simple" rules for public corporation pricing: 
(1) that neither a profit nor a loss should be made after all capital 
charges are met; and (2) the prices changed for different services 
2 
should correspond to relative costs. While these rules adhered to 
the basic "break-even" principle of the public corporation, he 
concluded that they provide only the framework for considering 
3 
pricing's complex realities. For example, the question of relating 
charges to costs has not been successfully separated from questions of 
the public interest. Should prices be based on marginal or average 
costs; should prices be subsidised to provide a public service; what 
level of surplus revenue should the price of goods and services 
generate; and what deflationary or inflationary effects will pricing 
levels have on the economy; have been some of the major issues 
4 
generating debate. 
Bland, among others, acknowledged the difficulties inherent in 
setting rates and charges. He suggested that, although it was 
relatively simple to enunciate principles such as covering costs and 
encouraging the maximum use of capital equipment, determining who 
5 
should have the power to set prices was a complex problem. While 
c 
there was support for managerial autonomy on the one hand or for some 
form of ministerial policy control on the other, he considered that 
neither provided the answer. Parliament and Cabinet would be 
constrained by political considerations whereas the public corporation 
Board might set prices on a purely commercial basis without 
considering the public interest. Bland's solution was to vest pricing 
g 
powers in a representative Board. 
The dilemma he outlined was related to the objectives of public 
enterprises and whether commercial viability or the national interest 
should take precedence. Should every activity pay for itself or 
should the national interest be served with the aid of subsidies from 
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revenue? In Robson's view, if pricing policies were to be framed with 
the national interest as the first objective, then it was a 
Ministerial, not a management, decision. However, an important 
corollary to this principle was that any losses sustained by the 
enterprises in providing a public service on the Minister's directive 
should be compensated for from the Exchequer. Through it, the problem 
of reconciling ministerial responsibility with managerial 
responsibility for commercial performance was seen to be 
g 
accommodated. The "recoup" provision was pioneered in Australia by 
the Victorian "Railways Act of 1896". It has been a basic feature of 
British public corporation finance, but although recommended for 
Australian public corporations, its use has largely been confined to 
State Railways and the Australian national airlines. Eggleston, on 
the other hand, ceded financial responsibility to the managers on the 
grounds that they and they alone were responsible for the performance 
of a public enterprise. In Britain and Australia, there has usually 
been statutory provision requiring Ministerial or other external form 
12 
of approval for some aspects of public corporation pricing. 
However, the demarcation between pricing as a policy decision and as a 
managerial decision has remained obscured. Morrison's view was that, 
except in matters clearly concerning the public interest, there should 
be a minimal interference in the machinery of the public corporation. 
13 
The Board "must even have responsibility thrust down its throat." 
Another view was that the problem lay with the inadequate 
14 
statutory definition of Ministerial powers and responsibility. 
Inevitably, however, pricing represented a critical political issue 
and a focus for debates on the public accountability and control of 
public corporation administration. 
In the Queensland enterprises, prices represented the basis of 
the pragmatic and ideological objectives of the Labor government. The 
State Enterprises Labor established were to supply basic commodities 
to consumers at a lower price than private enterprise, not only 
through the elimination of the need for profit but also because of the 
greater efficiency to be demonstrated by public ownership. The 
enterprises would be, as Brigden suggested, an example of applied 
Fabianism with lower operating costs passed on to consumers in the 
1 R 
form of lower prices. The official position of the enterprises lay 
within the general principle of Labor's economic platform - that 
production was for use, not for profit. In terms of their management. 
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the Commissioner for Trade stated on a number of occasions that the 
enterprises were implementing a policy of charging a price sufficient 
to cover working expenses plus interest and depreciation and to 
1 fi 
provide a small profit. Thus pricing policy was an external, 
"political" responsibility, while its implementation was an internal 
managerial responsibility. 
Eggleston was suspicious of the rhetoric of state enterprises and 
the promises made for their pricing strategy: "The desire for gain", 
he said, "is not as good a motive as disinterested idealism, but it is 
better than humbug". In Queensland, the vested interests of the 
pastoral and fishing industries in particular had a field day 
attacking Labor's pricing policy as unrealistic and,for the most part, 
18 
unsuccessful in lowering consumer prices. 
There was no specific provision in the State Enterprises Act for 
the setting of rates and charges, except in relation to goods supplied 
to other government departments where the Commissioner could negotiate 
a price not exceeding the current market rate (S.8 [8] of the Schedule 
to the Act). Although the authority vested in the Commissioner under 
S.8 (9) of the Schedule to make decisions for the carrying on of 
business in the same way as a private person, allowed the 
interpretation that he could set prices, the Governor-in-Council 
retained an over-riding authority, exercised through the 
Orders-in-Council and Regulations provided for in the Act. 
Under S.18 (1) of the Schedule to the Act, the Commissioner set 
out statements of revenue and expenditure for each financial year. 
These figures were confirmed in the Auditor-General's annual report 
although some discrepancies between the two reports occurred. The 
costs were itemised for each year (see Table 10). All enterprises 
paid local rates but unlike many British and Australian public 
corporations, particularly those engaged in competitive trading, did 
not pay taxes. Fees were paid to the Treasury as account handling 
charges and to the Auditor-General for auditing services. Among the 
ongoing costs were insurance premiums (paid to the State Government 
Insurance Office for which the Commissioner acted as agent and 
received commission) and State Trade Office expenses. After 1920 
insurance premiums were paid to the State Insurance Department and 
commission received by the Commissioner for Trade who acted as 
19 insurance agent. Under S.17 of the Act which vested authority in 
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TABLE 10 
EXAMPLES OF STATE ENTERPRISES' EXPENDITURE 
£ s. d, £ s. d. 
State Fishery Business 1929 
To Stock, 30th June, 1929 
" Purchases 
" Market Wages 
" Gross Profit 
1,053 17 4 
5,597 0 8 
1,350 3 10 
951 5 9 
£10,052 7 7 
To 
To 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
Branch Shops -
Wages 
Rent 
Expenses 
Market Wages 
Market Expenses 
General Stores 
Motor Trucks -
Working Expenses 
Maintenance 
Postages 
Printing and Stationery 
Telephone Rents 
Samples 
Salaries 
Refrigeration Wages 
Engineers' Supplies 
Machinery Maintenance 
Power 
Lighting 
Water and Sewerage Rates 
Insurance 
Unemployment Insurance 
Travelling Expenses 
Market Building Maintenance 
Destruction of Offal 
Cash Discounts 
Advertising 
Bad Debts Written off 
Add Reserve, 30th June, 1930 
Less Reserve, 1st July, 1929 
211 
50 
261 
100 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Audit Fees 
State Trade Office - Proportion 
Expenses 
Surveys 
Depreciation 
Net Profit for Year 
512 
427 
149 
536 
219 
19 
50 
57 
28 
52 
89 
1 
1,593 
2,021 
120 
78 
1,491 
167 
29 
152 
28 
11 
329 
89 
4 
4 
2 
19 
15 
14 
0 
11 
4 
7 
0 
19 
2 
15 
17 
18 
19 
5 
0 
18 
6 
17 
14 
3 
8 
4 
1 
1 
5 
1 
10 
7 
9 
11 
10 
7 
0 
4 
4 
10 
1 
8 
11 
0 
9 
4 
5 
9 
7 
4 
1 
0 
9 
9 
161 0 0 
25 0 0 
240 14 0 
60 0 0 
1,502 17 9 
954 14 2 
£11,225 19 2 
(Continued) 
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TABLE 10 
EXAMPLES OF STATE ENTERPRISES' EXPENDITURE 
(Continued) 
State Produce Agency 1919 
To Advertising 
" Bank Exchanges 
" Horse Feed 
" Insurance 
" Preliminary Expenses Written 
Off 
" Rents and Rates 
" Salaries and Wages 
" Stable Expenses 
" Stamps and Stationery 
" State Trade Office -
Proportion Expenses 
" Travelling Expenses 
" Trade Expenses 
" Bad Debts Reserve 
" Depreciation 
" Balance Carried Down 
" Interest to Treasury 
Nett Profit for Year 
£ 
188 
59 
615 
75 
397 
786 
4,521 
88 
318 
78 
61 
531 
250 
325 
s. 
15 
15 
15 
1 
1 
11 
17 
10 
14 
0 
16 
13 
0 
13 
d. 
5 
1 
7 
1 
0 
1 
6 
1 
5 
8 
7 
10 
0 
6 
£ 
8,299 
1,817 
£10,116 
764 
1,052 
£1,817 
s. 
6 
3 
9 
13 
10 
3 
d. 
11 
0 
11 
0 
0 
0 
Source: Annual Reports of the Commissioner for Trade, 1919-1929, 
Q.P.P. 
the Commissioner over the various Enterprises' funds. State Trade 
Office expenses were apportioned among the various Enterprises (see 
Table 11). 
Ministerial travelling expenses were also apportioned among the 
Enterprises. One feature of Trade Office expenses was the amount of 
overtime paid to clerical staff. Although the Public Service 
Commissioner had conducted a campaign to reduce overtime, particularly 
after all wages and salaries of Public Service and Crown employees 
were reduced in 1922, the State Trade Office continued to pay overtime 
20 
even in 1931 when the Enterprises formally ceased to exist. 
Overall, Head Office expenditure was comparatively low and, spread 
over the Enterprises, was usually calculated as being less than 
21 
one-third of a per cent of their total expenditure. The largest 
single item of expenditure after purchases was comprised of wages and 
salaries. With increases granted by the Arbitration Court which the 
713 14 
2,582 11 
237 18 
59 9 
59 9 
237 18 
713 15 
11 
6 
4 
7 
7 
4 
0 
1 
1 
1 
,503 
,503 
501 
400 
100 
501 
,503 
1 
1 
0 
16 
4 
0 
1 
8 
8 
6 
5 
1 
6 
8 
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TABLE 11 
APPORTIONMENT OF STATE TRADE OFFICE EXPENDITURE 
1919-20 1920-21 
£ s. d. £ s. d. 
Stations 
Butcheries 
Produce Agency 
Cannery 
Hotel 
Fishery 
Refreshment Rooms 
4,504 17 3 5,012 5 5 
Source: Auditor-General's Report, 1921, Q.P.P.. p.1081. 
reductions brought in in 1922 only temporarily reversed, and the 
introduction of holiday pay and sick pay, the annual wages bill 
climbed steadily and Enterprises such as the Cannery were hard-pressed 
to maintain figures within the overall wages/turnover ratio of 17.0% 
The Commissioner had stated that approximately 40% on turnover was 
22 
needed to meet costs, outside of purchases. Although this level was 
never achieved, prices were supposedly calculated on average costs 
with a margin of surplus and the Commissioner made his recommendations 
for pricing along these lines. Cabinet, however, determined pricing 
levels on the basis that they should be below those obtaining in 
private businesses. 
The result was a pricing system that became a point of 
contention between the management of the Enterprises and their 
political masters. The arguments on price setting were to escalate as 
the boom conditions which had obtained up to 1920 and which had helped 
enterprises such as the Butcher Shops to demonstrate a commercial 
success, gave way to the depressed economic conditions of the 1920s. 
Murphy has stated that the Butcher Shops were successful in 
lowering the price of meat for consumers. Labor's opponents 
argued that these lower prices were obtained only because of the 
Enterprises' trading advantages. They saw the major advantage as the 
low cost at which the Butcher Shops obtained their meat supplies. The 
provisions of "The Meat Supply for Imperial Uses Act of 1914" and "The 
Sugar Acquisition Act of 1915" had placed Ryan in a position to secure 
149 
cheap and regular supplies of meat for the State Butcher Shops from 
the meat companies. He had traded off an increased price for meat 
supplied by the companies to fill Imperial Forces supply contracts, 
for which the Queensland government was the negotiating authority, for 
a guaranteed annual tonnage at below the prevailing wholesale price. 
Because of this arrangement, the State Butcher shops were a commercial 
success in the early years and the government found it more profitable 
to sell State Station cattle to the British government instead of 
23 
supplying the State Butcher Shops. 
However, the margin between the low wholesale cost of State 
Butcher Shops meat and the low retail prices remained a critical 
factor. It placed the onus for a display of operational efficiency on 
the managers, particularly as the initial impetus for Labor's 
establishing the shops had been to examine the costs of meat supply.^^ 
As Ross, the Imperial Meat Purchasing Officer and supervisor of the 
State Butchery enterprise, had found in assessing the viability of 
some of the private shops offered for sale to the government, many of 
25 them were barely making a living. 
In the State Butcher Shops and the Railway Refreshment Rooms, an 
early established check system had enabled costs to be contained and 
working expenses covered within the set retail price. Both these 
enterprises had a large number of outlets - up to 90 butcher shops and 
40 refreshment rooms - which served a correspondingly large number of 
customers. The Butcher Shops served during their operational life 
oc 
40 million customers with a total cash turnover of £5 million. This 
situation was viable for as long as Ross was in charge. The check 
system worked and under the agreements with the meat companies, meat 
supplies remained cheap. But in 1920 Ross retired, industrial 
disputes added to wages costs and the advantageous meat supply 
conditions evaporated as the Imperial meat contracts ended and world 
cattle prices slumped. In April 1920, Fihelly, the Minister in charge 
of State Enterprises at that time, renegotiated an agreement with 
14 private meat companies to supply to the State Butcher Shops 20% of 
the State's meat production, amounting to double the tonnage of the 
previous agreement, for the same cheap rates. In return, he agreed 
not to sell State Station beef outside Queensland but to the State 
Butcher Shops, sealing the agreement with a threat that the government 
27 
still had the constitutional power of acquisition. The sale of 
State Station beef to the State Butchery was a mixed blessing. For 
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instance, in 1920, the Butchery took 14,000 head of cattle at a fixed 
price of £10 and £11 per head. However, while this boosted the 
trading account of the Stations, not all of the cattle were delivered, 
cattle values fell and the Butchery were hard pressed to cover the 
costs of the transaction. Thereafter State Station cattle were sold 
to private meatworks, the State Butchery continuing to purchase in the 
open market but also negotiating for lower-cost beef from private 
28 
station-owners. 
From 1920 on, prolonged drought and low market prices for cattle 
caused a scarcity in meat supplies. Many of the shops built their own 
slaughter yards, buying cattle from the saleyards rather than the meat 
29 
companies as a cost-saving measure and to ensure supplies. Where 
possible, they bought in excess of requirements and sold the surplus 
on the market. There was by then no plan to set up a State-wide 
network of government abattoirs in competition with private 
enterprise. The government had already moved in the direction of 
co-operating with the meat industry to overcome some of the worst 
problems of meat supply and, following an official inquiry in which 
Austin, the Commissioner for Trade, was a key figure, "The Meat 
Industry Encouragement Act" was passed in 1923. 
However, the scarcity of meat supplies in the early 1920s helped 
to undermine the fragile balancing act of the State Butcher Shops' 
pricing policy under which the net margin of profit was less than a 
half-penny per pound of meat sold. Turnover was nearly halved and 
some Butcher Shops in country towns were scheduled for closure since 
they were no longer commercially viable. 
"The Profiteering Prevention Act of 1920" introduced voluntary 
regulation of meat prices, and although the Commissioner for Prices 
reported that many private butcher shops had reduced their prices to 
compete with the recommended price obtaining in the State shops, there 
was evidence of some breaking away from the accepted pricing formula 
for State Enterprises. Forgan Smith, who had replaced Fihelly as 
Minister for State Enterprises, had to reject claims that prices in 
some of the State Butcher Shops were higher than those of their 
private competitors. Prices might vary, he stated, because State 
Butcher Shop prices were calculated on average costs plus a small 
. ^ 30 
margin to cover expenses. 
A further blow to the pricing margin on which the enterprise 
operated came in 1921 when private butchers switched to selling only 
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fresh meat. The State shops, caught with 1,400 tons of frozen beef in 
storage and no market, arranged a shipment to Britain. Due to lack of 
a market there and the high freight charges that prevailed during this 
31 period, there was a loss of £15,000 on the transaction. Austin 
argued for a small increase in the retail price to cover the loss but 
32 
was turned down by Cabinet in the interest of the consumer. 
The pattern of reduced supplies, reduced turnover and higher 
stock prices necessitating the closure of shops was repeated 
throughout the 1920s. The problem of cost increases which were not 
passed on to the consumer was exacerbated by private competitors 
engaging in a price-cutting war. In 1923 they retailed meat below the 
buying price of cattle in the open market to which the State Shops 
were now subject. The State Butchery decided, according to the 
Commissioner's Report, that, in the public interest, it would meet the 
competition and reduced retail prices accordingly. The result was the 
33 first trading loss for the enterprise. The position was reversed in 
subsequent years but at the cost of reduced service to the public and 
a weakening of the concept of State intervention in this area of 
industry. 
The pricing policy for the State Stations was obscured by the 
vagaries of the accounting system but it appeared to be based on the 
premise of what the market would bear, particularly after the practice 
of selling State Station cattle for the Imperial meat contracts at the 
ruling higher prices had ceased. 
In contrast, the Railway Refreshment Rooms experienced few 
difficulties under the government's pricing policy. Their supplies 
and their level of turnover remained firm, allowing them to undercut 
other liquor outlets without financial loss. So popular was the 
railway service that the government was able to resist suggestions to 
follow suit when the New South Wales Railways cut their Refreshment 
Room prices in 1922. In both the Railway Refreshment Rooms and the 
State Hotel, liquor sales subsidised food costs, enabling prices to be 
34 kept low, as in the popular 1/- Railway Buffet. The Hotel was not 
in as strong a position as the Refreshment Rooms, being dependent for 
its turnover level on the length of the crushing season at the nearby 
Babinda Sugar Mill."^^ 
The State Produce Agency had several problems in regard to 
pricing, a major one being the different provisions of the 
two statutes under which it operated, "The State Produce Agency Act 
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of 1917" and "The State Enterprises Act of 1918". Although the Agency 
was deemed a State enterprise under the authority of the Commissioner 
for Trade and subject to the State Enterprises Act, the opposition in 
Parliament insisted that its business should be conducted according to 
the provisions of the State Produce Agency Act. Under this Act the 
Agency was restricted to conducting sales on commission. Some 
discretion was allowed in setting commission fees in that they had to 
be "fair and reasonable" with "due regard being had to the trouble and 
expenses incurred in connection with the sale of each class of 
product" (S.3 [8]). The initial 5% fee set by the government may have 
borne some relation to the handling costs then, but the same rate 
continued to apply throughout the 1920s when private agents were 
charging commission of between 10% and 15% on sales. 
At that rate, the Agency was entirely dependent on volume of 
sales yet, because it aimed to assist the local producer, it was 
vulnerable to seasonal fluctuations and failures in local produce 
supplies. In 1918 the government had recognised this by attempting to 
amend the Act to allow the Agency to buy and sell produce, as well as 
establishing it as a preferential creditor and extending credit to 
30 days. Speaking in the debate on the amendments, the 
Hon. J. Thynne argued that if the Agency could not do business on the 
basis of consignment it should not be in business. To support his 
argument he cited the Farmers' Co-operative which charged 4% 
o c 
commission and still made a profit to distribute to shareholders. 
The Premier refused to accept the view of the opposition and the 
amendments they put forward. He claimed they would destroy the spirit 
of the Act, which was to assist producers to achieve the best possible 
38 
37 price for their produce, and to supply them with grain and seed at 
lower prices than those of private produce agents.' 
The amendments were allowed to lapse but this did not prevent the 
Agency from continuing to trade outside the provisions of the State 
Produce Agency Act. There was no specific provision under the State 
Enterprises Act to cover this situation, but presumably under the 
freedom granted to the Commissioner to make business decisions as a 
private business person (S.9 of the Schedule to the Act), the Agency 
continued to buy and sell produce as well as selling on commission. 
The Agency was committed to a policy of undercutting private 
agents, but the costs of this policy were high. Working expenses and 
i.3'3 
handling charges increased as the Agency had to buy in supplies to 
maintain its service to producers, while the value of produce 
declined. Moreover, the public benefit basis of the pricing policy 
was placed in doubt when private agents were able to buy cheaply from 
the Agency one day and find a ready resale market at a higher price 
39 the next day. 
However, the consignment service and the trading section were 
popular enough to generate sufficient turnover to allow, with careful 
attention to costs, the Agency to return a small trading profit in the 
40 years after 1923 and, to this degree, overcome the commercial 
disadvantages of externally imposed pricing. 
There was little to choose between the State Cannery and the 
State Fishery as the enterprise most affected by a government-imposed 
pricing system, although for different reasons. The State Cannery was 
demonstrably a victim of the objectives underlying its establishment. 
It commenced operations in 1920 specifically to process the Beerburrum 
Soldier Settlement's pineapple crop. In that first year, it absorbed 
95% of Beerburrum's output, paying above the market rate to the 
growers for a product that was often unsaleable, firstly because of 
its substandard quality and secondly because the Cannery was competing 
in an already over-supplied market. Against the advice of the 
committee sent to Hawaii in 1917 to investigate the pineapple industry 
41 there, the Cannery was also used to encourage the development of 
fruit growing on the Settlements and as a State-wide industry. As all 
these ventures involved the Cannery in substantial financial loss, it 
appeared that the public interest had priority over financial 
self-sufficiency. The experience of the Commonwealth Fruit Pool 
provided an example. 
In 1921, the Commonwealth Fruit Pool was formed in response to 
the demands of growers throughout Australia, many of whom were soldier 
settlers, dissatisfied with the high costs and low returns that had 
characterised the fruit-growing industry. Under the Pool scheme, 
subsidies were paid to canneries as a means of reducing their 
production costs and consequently the market price of canned fruit. 
Of the three participating canneries in Queensland, the State Cannery 
undertook the lion's share - over 50% of the fruit sent to the Pool. 
The Pool guaranteed growers across the nation a flat rate of 3/- per 
case of fruit. In Queensland, the Labor government had already 
guaranteed growers a price of 5/- per case which took up 75% of the 
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projected profit for the Cannery if all fruit supplied was sold. For 
the Beerburrum soldier settlers, the government added a further 
42 
subsidy of 1/- per case. Moreover, the Queensland government had 
had to agree to carry half of any losses incurred in sales made 
through the Pool and thus the Cannery became liable for the loss 
when two-thirds of the Pool's canned fruit shipped to London for sale 
failed to find a market. In the following year, Queensland withdrew 
from the Pool in protest against the prices set for both growers and 
canneries by the Commonwealth Fruit Advisory Board. 
The pricing fiasco of the Pool compounded the Cannery's problem 
of relating prices to costs. In order to cope with the expanding 
pineapple crop from Beerburrum which by 1923 had more than doubled the 
1921 output to reach an annual total of 60,000 cases, new machinery 
was installed, more staff employed and scarce processing materials 
imported. However, the Cannery remained subject to a government 
imposed pricing policy of high grower prices on the one hand and low 
retail prices dictated by the political imperative of cheap consumer 
prices on the other. Operating in an over-supplied market and with 
this type of pricing structure, the Cannery management had little 
control. It had no margin to accommodate the cost of serving the 
interests of the Soldier Settlers or the fruit industry in general, 
nor could it absorb the effect of the market strategies of its private 
competitors such as the dumping of surplus fruit from the southern 
States which, in 1922, forced the Cannery to clear its stocks at below 
43 
cost.^ "^  
The price paid to the growers was set by the government above the 
rate paid by private enterprise, yet was considered to be the minimum 
44 
required for them to stay in production. Another view has been that 
this grower protection by the government encouraged inefficiency and 
gave rise to false hopes of a viable industry long after private 
45 
companies would have withdrawn from the market. The latter was 
probably an oversimplification of a situation in which the Labor 
government was committed to a Federal repatriation scheme as well as a 
policy of closer agricultural settlement. Moreover, as was emphasised 
by the Auditor-General and government members in Parliament, the 
Cannery sustained the least loss of all canneries operating in 
Australia in the 1922-23 trading year. In the final count, serving 
the public interest through a fixed-price scheme for growers and cheap 
consumer prices incurred heavy costs and undermined the Cannery's 
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commercial stability. The official pricing policy was clearly unable 
to be implemented. 
Pricing for the State Fishery conformed to the Bland 
recommendation insofar as the power to fix prices was vested in the 
Fish Board, an external, representative control authority constituted 
under provisions of "The State Fisheries Act of 1915". In April 1918, 
the Board replaced the Metropolitan Fish Board which had been one of a 
number of municipal boards charged with regulating the fish industry 
throughout Queensland. There were five members: two government 
representatives nominated by the Minister - Mr Gilmour the Manager and 
Mr Fell the accountant of the State Fishery; two members nominated by 
the Master Fishermen's Association - Mr Lihou and Mr Crouch; and an 
independent Chairman, the Hon. R. Sumner, M.L.C, appointed by the 
46 Governor-in-Council . 
The State had taken over the regulation of the fish industry with 
the object of ensuring cheap, good quality supplies of fish for the 
consumer and a guaranteed income for fishermen. Through the State 
Fishery, it undertook to purchase the whole of a fisherman's catch at 
a fixed price and offer it for sale, also at a fixed price, to traders 
registered by officers of the Fishery. To avoid charges of a State 
monopoly. Cabinet ceded the fixing of these prices to the Fish Board. 
It was not long before problems surfaced. The Commissioner for 
Trade accused the Board of being anything but an impartial pricing 
authority, with its Chairman combining with the fishermen's 
representatives to over-rule the government representatives and grant 
price increases that seriously threatened the economic viability of 
the enterprise. It was his opinion that the Board had leant more 
towards the fishermen and the increased costs they had faced since the 
beginning of World War 1 than to any notion of the extent of the 
production costs faced by the Fishery. Production costs proved a 
continual nightmare for the enterprise. Those of a traditionally 
labour-intensive industry were increased by the demands of the 
Fishery's regulatory functions and the necessity of providing cold 
storage facilities for the bulk purchases it was compelled to make 
under the new government system. Surprisingly enough, the State 
Fishery recorded the best wages/turnover ratio of all the enterprises, 
with a figure of 8.9% for most years in comparison with 17.0% over all 
the Enterprises. 
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As with the Cannery, seasonal peaks and gluts in supply found 
these facilities either inadequate or underutilised, but the fixed 
price structure allowed little leeway in the price/cost ratio, as the 
figures in Table 12 demonstrate. Attempts to achieve a balance 
between costs and pricing were further undermined by the action of 
some of the traders and fishermen who entered into their own 
agreements to circumvent the State market, the result being that the 
State business was often left with unsaleable stock and a trading 
49 loss. New regulations gazetted in 1919 to stamp out these practices 
were not entirely successful, nor did the move the same year into 
State retail shops, suburban agencies and fish carts contribute to 
resolving the cost/price dilemma. 
As with the other enterprises, the price/cost ratios dictated a 
high volume of sales. It had been the government's intention to 
promote the expansion of the fish industry but despite the guaranteed 
price to fishermen and the purchase of a trawler from the New South 
Wales government, there was little increase in supplies. Even though 
the three State fish shops in Brisbane had served 200,000 customers in 
15 months of trading, the losses continued to mount. For Austin, the 
secret to commercial success, whether in State or private enterprise, 
50 
was "plentiful and regular supplies". A profit margin of less than 
Id. per pound of fish required a high turnover level but this proved 
impossible to maintain when fish supplies failed to keep pace. Austin 
put forward the commercial view when he threatened: 
If the State Fish Industry is to be extended on an economic 
basis, there must undoubtedly be a large increase in 
supplies and a decrease in the cost of production, or the 
price of fish to the consumer must be raised. 
Some relief from the effects of compulsory purchase was afforded 
the enterprise by the Government's decision to discontinue the 
wholesale section of the Fishery business. Under an agreement signed 
by the Minister in 1921, the auction system was reinstated under the 
supervision of the Fishermen's Co-operative, leaving the State retail 
shops to buy their fish supplies in competition with private traders. 
Prices advertised in the daily newspapers suggested that the State 
shops were still able to undercut the private traders and Austin was 
at pains to point out that, despite the adverse financial reports, the 
number of customers using the retail services had not declined. But 
in the welter of claims and counterclaims about comparative price 
levels, the true position of retail fish prices was obscured. The 
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effect of the fixed price system on the production side of the 
industry before 1921 was open to debate. There were statements, on 
the one hand, that fishermen were losing their livelihood in being 
52 forced to sell at one price for the season and on the other, the 
Commissioner's view that the State Fishery lost money because it had 
to buy the whole catch at the fixed price, regardless of the 
53 
conditions of supply and demand operating at the time. 
Production costs decreased as staff and services were cut back, 
but even when the huge losses registered up to 1922 were turned into a 
54 
small profit by 1925, it was clear that the existing pricing 
structure precluded the competitive flexibility needed for commercial 
viability. Whether the Enterprise had even served the public interest 
in terms of supplying lower cost fish and breaking up the price-buying 
rings was debatable, given the reports which appeared in the press in 
the 1930s indicating that trading monopolies were again causing 
problems in the fish industry. 
In the annual reports of the enterprises, there were some 
instances where it appeared that the Commissioner, in consultation 
with his managers, had the power to vary retail prices in response to 
55 
market conditions. Closer examination revealed one of the ironies 
of pricing for the State Enterprises. In the buying and selling of 
goods, the upper price limits were mostly dictated by the government 
on the basis of undercutting existing enterprise prices, leaving 
little or no room for managerial initiative. Moreover, the State 
Enterprises Act had stipulated the price of goods supplied to 
government departments (S.8 Schedule to the Act) by the Commissioner. 
Yet it was always a "management" decision rather than the government's 
which resulted in Enterprises' prices being discounted further and 
trading losses incurred, as the price reductions for the Cannery in 
1922 and for the State Butcher Shops in 1923 demonstrated. 
The stated pricing policy of the Enterprises - to set prices 
which would cover working expenses with a small surplus - was in 
keeping with the principles of the public corporation. At the same 
time, there was no statutory provision for pricing for the Enterprises 
as a whole, except in relation to other government departments. The 
State Produce Agency and the State Fishery were directed in pricing by 
separate legislation but in the course of their operations were 
influenced by the government's pricing objectives in the same way as 
the other State Enterprises. There was some evidence that the 
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Commissioner and his managers had some discretion in setting the 
day-to-day prices for goods but only in the context of the 
government's overall objective for the Enterprises. They were 
established to sell goods at lower prices than their private 
competitors and this constituted an objective in the public interest. 
According to Robson's view, pricing then became a matter of policy and 
thus a matter for Ministerial approval or control. Pricing levels for 
the Enterprises overall were set by the government in the public 
interest at below the prevailing private enterprise or market rate. 
That this allowed little flexibility, particularly in relation to 
fluctuations in operational costs, emphasised the priority of the 
public interest over commercial principles. However, there was no 
provision for the Enterprises to recoup revenue lost because of 
government decisions made in the public interest as there was in the 
Railways and nationalised industries' legislation. Nor was there any 
statutory definition of Ministerial powers. Pricing was a crucial 
political issue for the Labor government. Consequently it exercised a 
control over the pricing policy of the enterprises that was more in 
keeping with departmental administration than that of a public 
corporation. As Eggleston pointed out, all political interference 
affected finance. Using the Victorian Water Supply Commission as an 
example, he stated that where public enterprises were not financially 
self-sufficient, managerial independence in matters such as prices and 
charges was incompatible with the government's need for electoral 
survival. Tl 
case in point. 
56 he Queensland State Enterprises seemed to be a further 
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(e) Profits 
How the profits of the Enterprises were dealt with can be divided 
into three time periods: before 1918, 1918 to 1920, and 1920 to 1929. 
Before 1918, the profits remaining after working expenses were met 
were allowed to accumulate in the Treasury Trust Funds for each 
enterprise and were part of the public account. They were not applied 
to a reduction of the Enterprises' debt which stood at over £1,000,000 
by the end of 1918. After 1918, the State Enterprises Act included 
detailed provisions governing the disposal of profits. Ultimate 
authority was vested in the Governor-in-Council under S.21 (3) of the 
Schedule to the Act. Statutory provision was made for sinking, 
reserve and depreciation funds and for investment of these funds (S.15 
and S.16 of the Schedule to the Act). However, in the years between 
1920 and 1929, as profit levels declined overall, these provisions 
were not strictly adhered to. Capital repayments were not always a 
first charge on surplus profits. In some years, net profit became 
synonymous with surplus profit so that reserve funds were determined 
after and not before trading losses were offset, while the remainder 
was carried over from year to year to provide the basis for transfers 
to Consolidated Revenue. The application of the profits of the 
Enterprises was a striking example of Kewley's observation that 
financial practice was mostly influenced by "the course of events". 
The over-riding authority of the Governor-in-Council, the influence of 
the Treasury and the discretionary powers of the Commissioner for 
Trade were all evident in the financial transactions but the course of 
events appeared to dictate the supremacy of political judgment over 
decisions based in commercial practice. 
Reserve Funds 
In 1917, the Auditor-General had pressed for the inclusion in 
legislation to govern the financial operations of the State 
Enterprises, provisions covering sinking funds, depreciation and the 
application of surplus profits. 
"The State Enterprises Act of 1918" allowed "for a sum out of net 
profits of any State enterprise for reserve funds to invest or to meet 
losses and depreciation, extensions of business or other purpose" 
(S.15 of Schedule). Reserve funds served the purpose of promoting 
capital development and helping to secure financial self-sufficiency. 
The point has been made that the creation of reserve funds to the 
level where they do what they are expected to do is contingent on 
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pricing policies. Prices set for the State Enterprises did not allow, 
overall, for the building up and maintenance of such funds. The 
reason was largely the same as in public enterprises everywhere, 
2 
namely that the cost would be a price increase. At first, trading 
conditions were such that the Commissioner was able to exercise his 
discretionary power to transfer amounts from net profits to reserves. 
For the year ending 30th June, 1919, and with the written permission 
of the Minister, he transferred £100,000 to reserves from the State 
Stations, State Butcher Shops and the Railway Refreshment Rooms, all 
enterprises with a high level of accumulated profit (see Table 13). 
TABLE 13 
AMOUNT OF NET PROFIT CARRIED TO RESERVES TO 30TH JUNE, 1919 
Accumulated 
Net Profit To Reserves 
Butcher Shops 
Stations 
Railway Refreshment Rooms 
£94,968 
157,214 
21,559 
£30,000 
65,000 
5,000 
Source: Annual Report of the Commissioner for Trade, 1919, Q.P.P., 
Vol. 4, 1919-1920, p.985. 
In the following year, however, the adverse conditions of the 
meat supply market prompted a 'raid' on the reserves. Austin reported 
that amounts of £132,875 and £15,000 had been written off the 
accumulated profits of the Stations and the Butchery. In the case of 
the Butchery the amount written off was covered by a transfer from 
reserves so that a trading profit for the year was still registered. 
However, no reserve of funds was available thereafter to cushion 
adverse trading circumstances and in 1921 the Butchery's total net 
surplus profits of £22,449 were redirected from reserves to meet the 
loss incurred the previous year on a frozen beef shipment to London. 
The initial reserve fund of the Stations was redirected to cover the 
amounts written off in 1920 and also to meet the losses ascertained as 
4 
a result of the General Manager's tour of inspection in 1921. While, 
at first glance, this movement of funds appeared to be at the 
discretion of the Commissioner, the amendment to S.21 of the Act in 
iD3 
1920 vested a final authority over the dispersal of profits in the 
Governor-in-Council. More specifically, it allowed the retransfer of 
profits lodged in reserve funds back to profit and loss accounts and a 
consequent new method of dispersal. In the cases of the State 
Butchery and State Stations, an Executive Minute authorised the 
retransfer and redirection of accumulated profits. The method might 
have been unusual but the use of reserve and other funds to offset 
losses or to cover "unexpected emergencies" was well established in 
British public corporations and to a lesser extent in Australia. 
Moreover, it has become customary for ministerial control and Treasury 
5 
approval to be exercised over their use. 
There were further transfers in 1924 and 1926 to the reserves of 
the State Butchery, the State Hotel and the Railway Refreshment Rooms, 
and these funds were used to offset trading reversals or were 
transferred to Consolidated Revenue. On the other hand, the State 
Hotel's reserve fund of £15,000 remained untouched, being listed as a 
liability in the enterprise's final balance sheets in 1930. 
Robson compared the provisions for reserve funds in British 
public and private enterprises and found the public enterprises to be 
at a disadvantage on a number of counts. A significant factor was the 
difference in approach. Private enterprises had pricing policies 
geared to building up the funds, whereas public enterprises gave them 
little consideration. Moreover, reserve funds were an appropriation 
c 
of profit in private enterprise rather than a charge on revenue. In 
contrast, many of the public monopoly utilities had statutory 
provisions for the establishment of these funds in keeping with their 
general objective of financial self-sufficiency. Although S.15 of the 
Schedule to the State Enterprises Act in Queensland referred to 
investment, reserve or sinking funds, no sinking fund was established. 
This was apparently the trend at that time in Queensland, especially 
with long-term capital loans. For example, no expenditure on public 
works undertaken by the Department of Public Works incurred sinking 
fund obligations for capital repayments. Nor was provision for a 
separate depreciation fund a common practice. There was only 
one instance of a depreciation fund which was created for the State 
Butchery for the first time in 1926. The sum of £15,000 was 
transferred to it by 1927 but was retransferred back to profit and 
g 
loss account by 1929. . Depreciation was a charge on expenses. 
Schedules set according to the guidelines established by the State 
Insurance Office distinguished between different classes of assets but 
ibt) 
were at the final discretion of the managers in consultation with the 
Commissioner. In some years, they were varied to reduce the amount 
charged to expenses and thus return a more favourable trading balance. 
In the State Stations and the State Butchery depreciation fluctuated 
9 
markedly in 1920 for this reason. By contrast, in 1928 and 1929, the 
amounts rose, apparently as part of the mechanics of realising on the 
Enterprises' assets. The lack of a depreciation fund in public 
enterprises such as the railways throughout Australia had attracted 
considerable criticism on the grounds that it hampered enterprise 
expansion and resulted in an unjustifiable inflation of capital costs 
and thus of interest payments. A similar criticism, although on a 
smaller scale, was applicable to the State Enterprises. The most 
pressing problems lay with the State Cannery and State Fishery. Both 
had been acknowledged as being overcapitalised from the time of their 
establishment. For instance, it had been noted in Parliament as early 
as 1917 that the government fishing industry was "overcapitalised by 
many thousands of pounds." The State Fishery business had never 
expanded to the extent the government had expected and it was never in 
a position to support the initial capital expenses of establishing the 
South Brisbane Fish Market, its extensive cold rooms and the Wynnum 
12 Receiving Depot. The State Cannery was in the same position, with a 
capital debt for machinery and plant that the Enterprise was incapable 
of servicing, given its conditions of trading. 
In each of these cases, depreciation and interest charges were 
not covered by revenue and were thus added to the total Enterprises' 
debt at the Treasury. In 1924 accumulated losses and 
"over-capitalised assets" of £90,000 for the Cannery and £44,000 for 
the Fishery were written off. This had the effect of reducing 
interest charges (see Tables 21 and 22, Appendix A) and resulted in an 
improved trading return. The same course of action and result 
occurred with the State Produce Agency when the debt incurred by the 
manager's illegal purchases in 1921 was cancelled by transferring 
funds from the State Butchery reserves. Reducing capital debts by 
these means invited considerable public criticism at the time and 
proved, for Labor's opposition, that the Enterprises were a financial 
disaster. Another view was advanced by Copland in regard to State 
Railways. While not condoning overcapitalisation or any attempt to 
avoid the interest charged on the surplus capital, he argued that a 
high capital debt with little prospect of reducing it, was counter to 
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13 
managerial efficiency and independence. The State Stations 
Enterprise was in a slightly different position from the other 
Enterprises where capital expenditure was written down. The bulk of 
its capital costs was represented by livestock purchases. Some relief 
from high interest charges was afforded by writing off capital losses 
but it was only temporary as expenses increased and returns on cattle 
sales declined. By 1928 the financial situation of the State Stations 
was such that the Governor-in-Council directed that interest charges 
14 be waived. 
Despite the initial attempt by Austin to create reserve funds in 
order to foster financial security and the possibility of financial 
independence for the Enterprises, the conditions of trading did not 
permit their retention, particularly in the face of the statutory 
control over their application vested in the Governor-in-Council. 
Moreover, the enterprises' objective of serving the public interest by 
providing cheap goods and services, coupled with the overall failure 
to generate surplus revenue, precluded a private enterprise or 
'business' approach to the maintenance and use of reserve funds. 
Surplus Profits 
Surplus profits have been defined as the surplus revenue 
remaining after all running costs and charges are met. According to 
the principle of 'disinterestedness', no public corporation is 
required to make a commercial profit. This has usually been 
interpreted to mean that a corporation should "break even" although 
15 
there may be annual surpluses or deficits over a number of years. 
Morrison advocated that surpluses should be put back into the 
1 fi business, whereas in Australia a variety of practices have been 
followed. For some corporations, there have been no statutory 
provisions covering the conditions of profit or loss. With others, 
including the State Enterprises, surplus could be paid into general 
revenue or directed by the government to cover losses in other areas. 
The application of the surplus profits of the State Enterprises 
appeared to be dictated, as was the case with other Australian 
enterprises, by "the course of events" rather than any specific 
principles of finance. 
Before 1918, the Queensland enterprises were subject to no 
statutes regarding profits except the very general application of the 
Audit Act. After working expenses, interest and depreciation were 
deducted from the gross profit, the remaining surplus was held by 
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Treasury as accumulated profits in the Trust Fund of each enterprise. 
Losses were added to the overdraft on these separate Trust Funds. 
After 1918, the State Enterprises Act set out provisions for 
controlling profit and loss. Section 15 of the Schedule determined 
that losses be met from the reserve funds established from net 
profits. The repayment of capital indebtedness was a first charge on 
the remaining profits. Thereafter, the surplus was to be paid to the 
Treasurer and credited to Consolidated Revenue or applied as the 
Governor-in-Council directed (S.21, 3 [a] and [b]). 
In the first year of trading after the passing of the Act, all of 
these provisions were complied with. The Commissioner declared a net 
surplus profit of £162,940 after deducting the accumulated losses of 
the Fish Supply and Sawmills, A further deduction was made on the 
capital account of the State Stations, State Hotel and State Produce 
Agency to reduce their Treasury debt. From the remainder, an amount 
was redirected to reduce the loan fund indebtedness of the State Fish 
Supply, the State Sawmills and the State Produce Agency and a 
contribution made to Consolidated Revenue. After all such deductions 
were made, the surplus was held over to the following year (see 
Figure 3). 
Accumulated Net Profit £252,940 
Less Transfers to Reserves 100,000 
Less Accumulated Losses 13,338 
162,940 
Less Deductions for Capital Debt 
on Stations, Hotel and Produce 
Agency 75,000 Approx. 
Net Surplus of Butcher Shop and 
Railway Refreshment Rooms 71,851 
Less Paid to Treasurer re Loan 
Account of State Fish Supply, 30,000 
State Sawmills and 20,000 
State Produce Agency 10,000 
60,000 
Less: Credited to Consolidated Revenue 11,000 
£71,000 
Figure 3: Application of Surplus Profits 1919. 
Source: Annual Report of the Commissioner for Trade, 1919, 
Q.P.P., 1919-20, p.985. 
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This treatment of the net surplus profits of the enterprises 
established a pattern discernible throughout the 1920s wherein the 
first year followed the same lines as above, while in the second year 
the remaining surplus was held over as accumulated profits. 
When the State Sawmills were transferred back to the Lands 
Department in 1920, the Commissioner successfully petitioned to have 
the £20,000 paid out from the surplus profits of the State Butchery to 
the State Sawmills repaid to the State Enterprises Account. On the 
advice of the Crown Solicitor and with the approval of the 
Governor-in-Council, the Act was amended to effect the repayment. 
Section 21 (3) then allowed for surplus profits paid to Consolidated 
Revenue or "otherwise" to be repaid to the profit and loss account of 
18 
the particular enterprise. In the event, this provision was invoked 
only in the case of the State Sawmills in 1920. No attempt was made 
to effect any repayment when the Railway Refreshment Rooms were 
transferred back to the Railways Department in 1929. The Railway 
Refreshment Rooms had been the biggest contributor to Consolidated 
Revenue over the twelve years it had functioned as a State Enterprise 
(see Table 14), and £20,000 of the transfers from its surplus profits 
had been credited to the Railways Account of Consolidated Revenue. 
TABLE 14 
PAYMENTS TO CONSOLIDATED REVENUE AND TRUST FUND 1919-1928 
. . . . To Consolidated .^ -r J. c J T 4. T Enterprise n To Trust Fund Total 
'^  Revenue 
£ s. d. £ s. d. £ s. d. 
State Butchers' Shops 5,000 0 0 30,000 0 0 35,000 0 0 
Railway Refreshment 
Rooms 97,361 0 0 25,000 0 0 122,361 6 10 
State Hotel, 
Total 
Babinda 5,000 
107,361 
0 0 
6 10 55,000 0 0 
5,000 
162,361 
0 0 
6 10 
Source: Annual Report of Commissioner for Trade, 1929, Q.P.P., 1929, 
Vol. 2, p.5. 
However, the amendment to S.21 now allowed for surplus profits to 
be re-transferred from the reserve funds to the profit and loss 
account of each enterprise at the direction of the Governor-in-
Council. In 1921 and 1922, Executive Minutes authorised two payments 
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by this means from the State Butchery reserve fund. The first was to 
meet half the cost of reimbursing the meat companies who successfully 
claimed the Butcher Shops had drawn more than their allocation of 
cheap meat. The second was to offset the loss incurred on a frozen 
beef shipment to Britain. The State Butchery paid out £88,497 on 
these accounts as well as £35,000 to Consolidated Revenue and the 
Trust Fund Account, all from its trading surplus (see Table 15). The 
amendment to S.20 also furnished the means for the State Produce 
Agency to fulfil its statutory obligation under the State Produce 
Agency Act to distribute to farmers its surplus profit as a rebate on 
sales' commissions. The Agency had made a small surplus in 1920 which 
the Commissioner had transferred to reserves. Pressed by the 
TABLE 15 
APPLICATION OF NET PROFITS OF THE STATE BUTCHER SHOPS 1915-1928 
(Total Accumulated Net Profits = £154,758) 
In part settlement of Meat 
Export Companies' Claim, 
1920 (£50,000 plus Interest 
£1,047) 51,057 
Towards meeting loss on State 
Cattle Trading (Frozen Meat) 
Account (1920-21) 15,000 
Towards meeting loss on 
consignment of frozen meat to 
England (1921-22) 22,449 
88,497 
Profit on State Butchery 
Business 56,261 
Paid to the Treasury to the 
credit of -
Consolidated Revenue 5,000 
Loan Fund (a/c State Fish 
Supply) 30,000 
Transferred to General Reserve 6,000 
Transferred to Reserve for 
Depreciation 15,000 „., ^^^ 
^ " 56,000 
Leaving a balance in Profit and Loss Account of £10,261 
Source: Annual Report of the Commissioner for Trade, 1927, Q.P.P., 
p.973. 
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opposition who insisted that the provisions of the State Produce 
Agency Act should take precedence over the State Enterprises Act 
and the financial decisions of the Commissioner, the government 
decided to distribute the whole of the amount held in reserves. 
Accordingly, £2,500 was transferred to the Agency's profit and loss 
account and paid out to over 1,500 farmers, much to the dismay of the 
Commissioner who appeared only slightly mollified when the farmers 
showed their appreciation by increasing the number of their 
19 
consignments to the Agency. 
Thus the surplus profits in conjunction with the reserve funds of 
the enterprises were used to cover trading losses, to reduce capital 
debt and to contribute to Consolidated Revenue, as provided for in the 
Act. Despite the provision allowing the Commissioner to make 
recommendations, the management of the Enterprises had little control 
over the application of surplus profits. The amendments to the Act 
sought by the Commissioner in 1920 for the specific case of the State 
Sawmills worked against his efforts to maintain some element of 
financial security for the enterprises by building up the enterprises' 
reserve funds. In addition, they encouraged the political 
intervention in the enterprises' process of financial decision-making 
that saw their funds being manipulated and profits siphoned off to 
meet political obligations and to satisfy Treasury demands. While 
this was not unique to the State Enterprises and was in keeping with 
commonly used provisions to impose Ministerial control and some 
overall financial responsibility, it was another factor adding to the 
Enterprises' problems of financial viability. 
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SECTION 4 
MINISTERIAL CONTROL 
Three areas where control could be exercised over public 
corporations have been examined. The fourth such area concern 
Ministerial control, the exercise of which is seen to be of central 
importance to the main issue of public corporation theory - the degree 
of public corporation autonomy compatible with public accountability. 
The established principle has been that Ministers were responsible for 
policy matters and did not interfere in day-to-day management but 
where the demarcation line has lain has been a matter for conjecture 
and disagreement, both between corporation Boards and the Minister and 
in the literature on public corporations. 
Ministerial controls have already been seen to operate in matters 
of Board appointments, staffing and finance. The principle of public 
accountability has also encompassed other methods of potential control 
over public corporations. These have been identified as: 
Control by departments and officials. 
Parliamentary control. 
Legal and judicial controls. 
The exercise of these controls has been closely related to the 
exercise of Ministerial control and, as with the staffing and finance 
areas of State Enterprises' management, has helped to demonstrate the 
full extent of ministerial control and its implications for the issue 
of public corporation autonomy. 
(a) Control by Departments and Officials 
The relationship between departments and statutory authorities 
has constituted a further area of potential control over managerial 
autonomy. Such control may have been determined by statutory 
provisions. It may have accrued from discretionary powers vested in 
the Treasurer and the Auditor-General or been the outcome of a 
"business" relationship between other departments and the public 
corporations. It has been suggested that the higher the controversy 
quotient of a statutory authority, the more competitors there will be 
for control. 
Some aspects of the role played by the Auditor-General and the 
Treasury in the financial operations of the State Enterprises have 
been examined. In contrast to New South Wales and Western Australian 
arrangements, the Queensland Auditor-General audited the accounts of 
Tt^f-
the enterprises when they operated in separate departments. From the 
first, he had a well-developed sense of responsibility for the 
institution of a 'proper' accounting system and was largely 
instrumental in having many elements of it included in the 1918 State 
Enterprises Act. The Act affirmed that the powers of audit granted 
him under the Audit Act extended to the accounts of the State 
Enterprises. In addition to the provisions relating to reserve funds, 
surplus profits and capital repayments which he had pressed for in 
1917, the Act allowed that the Auditor-General could prescribe the 
form of accounts, including the statement of accounts and balance 
sheets, to be laid before Parliament annually (S. 20 [1] and [2]: 
Schedule to the Act). 
Both the Auditor-General and the Commissioner for Trade presented 
separate reports to Parliament, giving them some freedom to comment 
from their different positions of responsibility on the performance of 
the enterprises. Although confined by legislation to reporting on the 
accounts. Mure Robertson did not hesitate to go beyond his official 
responsibility to recommend the changes to enterprises' financial 
2 
arrangements. While the figures and comments of the Auditor-General 
and the Commissioner for Trade mostly, if not always, coincided, 
annual returns from the separate enterprises were amended before 
certificates of audit were signed. This practice was most prevalent 
in relation to the State Stations where there was disagreement between 
the Manager and the Auditor-General over stock numbers and 
valuations. 
A further opportunity for exercising financial control was 
afforded the Auditor-General and the Treasurer through S. 14 of the 
Schedule to the act, which delegated to a Committee comprising the 
Auditor-General, the Under-Secretary, Treasury and a Ministerial 
nominee - the Commissioner for Trade - the power to determine the 
capital cost of each enterprise and accretions or extraordinary losses 
to capital. An important rider was that such declarations or 
additions were to be acted on by the Commissioner without further 
reference. However, the implementation of this statutory-based 
control was not straightforward. The capitalisation of the first 
year's working expenses for the State Cannery attracted considerable 
public criticism although the Commissioner defended the decision, 
citing the precedent established by the capitalisation of the Central 
Sugar Mills' expenses under the provisions of "The Sugar Works Act of 
1911".^ 
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In July 1924, the Committee declared extraordinary losses for 
three of the enterprises totalling over £800,000 (see Figure 4). 
Accumulated Losses Written Off to 30.6.1924 
State Stations £574,789 
State Cannery 89,959 (inc. over-capitalised assets) 
State Fish Supply 44,080 
£808,829 
Figure 4: Accumulated losses written off to 30.6.1924. 
Source: Annual Report of the Commissioner for Trade, 1927, Q.P.P 
p.966. 
Apart from recommending the amounts to be written off, the Committee 
had little input into this decision. Forgan Smith, the Minister in 
charge of State Enterprises from 1921 to 1925, had been confronted 
with the certain knowledge that, due to the generally adverse economic 
situation and the poor performance record of these enterprises, they 
were unlikely to recover from their deficit position or reduce their 
Treasury indebtedness to any significant or publicly acceptable 
extent. As the Industrial Gazette reported, he had publicly announced 
at the beginning of 192S that some action would be taken. Although 
his successor in that year, the Hon. T. Dunstan, was aware of the 
statutory provision delegating final powers to the Committee, Cabinet 
approval was sought, with Forgan Smith, by now the Minister for 
5 
Agriculture and Stock, successfully arguing the case before Cabinet. 
The Committee's failure to declare extraordinary capital losses 
added to the legal convolutions encountered in the sale of the 
State Hotel Babinda which took from 1929 to 1936 to resolve. 
Initially the hotel was sold for £50,000 to be repaid over ten years. 
Difficulties over the transfer of a liquor licence from the State to a 
private owner in what had been a prohibited liquor sales area under 
"The Sugar Works Act of 1911" forced the Moore government to enact a 
"State Hotel, Babinda,Sale Act" in 1929. The Labor opposition claimed 
that the whole issue was centred around obtaining a licence for the 
c 
Italian Club at Babinda, but the Act enabled the sale of the State 
Hotel to be completed. Over the next few years, the owner fell behind 
in repayments. Trade had fallen off because the hotel had been 
declared off-limits to cane-cutters following hostilities between 
Australian and Italian cane gangs and because of the owner's illness. 
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In 1935, he applied to Cabinet for permission to lease the hotel to 
the Burns Philp Co., but this would have contravened the liquor 
prohibition clauses of the Sugar Works Act which apparently still 
applied to the Hotel. The Labor Cabinet decided to reduce the hotel's 
total sale price to £30,000, which was nearer Austin's estimate of its 
sale value in 1929. However, in 1936 it was brought to the attention 
of Foley, the Minister for Labour and Industry, that Cabinet's action 
should have been by Order-in-Council under S.4 of the 1931 "State 
Enterprises Repeal Act." In addition, it was the opinion of the Crown 
Solicitor that the Finance Committee of the State Enterprises should 
have declared the extraordinary capital loss incurred by the reduction 
in sale price under S.14 of "The State Enterprises Act of 1918" which 
apparently still had legal force despite the 1931 Repeal Act. This 
tangled legal situation was finally resolved by an Order-in-Council 
proclaimed at the end of 1936 but it had done little to dispel the 
public view that the government and its officials lacked competence in 
commercial transactions. 
Mure Robertson's actions in pursuing the installation and 
maintenance of an accounting system for the enterprises which saw him 
publicly criticise many facets of their operations, were not examples 
of the hostility that was seen to be characteristic of the relations 
g 
between the Labor government and its public officials. That he 
should sometimes side with the Enterprises against public criticism, 
as with his defence of the trading losses posted by the State Cannery 
and the State Butchery in 1923, or praise the manager of one State 
Sawmill while censuring another, attested to an impartiality in the 
discharge of his official duties. 
As with the Queensland State Enterprises, the influence of 
Auditors-General over the financial provisions of public enterprises 
in Australia usually resulted in departmental accounting standards and 
procedures being applied. Consequently, it has been criticised as 
exerting an inappropriate form of control over supposedly flexible, 
commercially attuned decision-making. The 'tyranny of the annual 
budget' has been seen to be particularly inappropriate for public 
Q 
enterprise accounting as has annual performance, i.e. economy and 
efficiency, testing based on profit and loss accounts. Webb made 
the point in relation to the Aluminium Production Commission that 
there was a difference of opinion as to the definition of the 
Auditor-General's role in this type of industrial enterprise. In the 
same way as the Auditor-General had queried the valuation certificates 
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of the Queensland State Stations in 1917 and again in 1921, so the 
Auditor-General in 1954 queried the asset valuation of the Aluminium 
Production Commission, a procedure that Webb challenged as 
inappropriate interference. 
British public corporations were required to keep accounts 
usually in a form that adopted commercial practices and maintained 
17 
separate accounts for each of an enterprise's different activities. 
The Minister was often empowered to appoint private auditors, although 
he had no control over the form and content of accounts, this being 
the province of the Board. There was no separate account presented to 
Parliament. In most cases, the Minister was responsible for conveying 
financial information in the form of properly audited accounts from 
the Board to the Parliament. Public officials were not appointed to 
13 the Boards of industrial corporations in Britain. The 
Auditor-General had no direct financial role and consequently no 
potential capacity for financial control. In his report to the Royal 
Commission on Australian Government Administration, Wettenhall 
supported the recommendation of the Joint Public Accounts Committee 
Inquiry into the Aluminium Production Commission that auditing 
procedures for public corporations should reflect their difference 
from Ministerial departments . He did not suggest a blanket removal 
of the Auditor-General from a position of control or supervision in 
14 the auditing of public corporation accounts. 
Although with the Aluminium Production Commission the Treasury's 
involvement was more pervasive than with other public corporations, 
concern has been expressed at the level of control the department has 
exerted over the finances of public corporations. In many instances, 
the statutes have provided for Treasury to handle the diverse funds, 
arrange loans from the public loan capacity, fix or approve the 
15 interest rates and claim surplus profits for general revenue. With 
the Queensland State Enterprises, the Treasurer had defined statutory 
authority over some of these aspects but in others exercised a 
discretionary power devolved from the Governor-in-Council. 
One important discretionary power was demonstrated in the 
Treasury's management of interest rates for the Enterprises. These 
were initially set at 5% for both Loan and Trust Funds, 0.5% above the 
interest rate on Public Loans and Debenture issues. When the rates on 
Public Loans were raised in 1921, interest rates on the Enterprises' 
Trust Funds went up to 6%, encouraging a movement between their Loan 
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and Trust Funds which was difficult to follow at times, particularly 
in the light of the transfers to reserves and to Consolidated Revenue 
and the re-transfers to profit and loss accounts, that were decided on 
at the same time. In 1921, the Auditor-General protested at the 
practice of charging interest rates which penalised the Trust Funds by 
loading them up in favour of reducing the Loan Fund debt and making 
1 C 
repayments to general revenue. As occurred with Commonwealth public 
corporations in later years, he suggested that interest rates be 
deferred until such time as the enterprises were well established. 
However, the immediacy of Labor's financial problems and the 
opposition's assertions that the enterprises were already receiving 
unfair financial advantage over private business, precluded official 
or political support for any such decision that might incur a 
long-term financial commitment. The writing-off of the capital losses 
of the State Stations, the Cannery and the Fishery was expedient to 
the extent that it was a factor enabling the Cannery and the Fishery 
to return a trading profit rather than a loss after 1925 (see 
Tables 21 and 23, Appendix A). Interest was payable on Loan Fund 
indebtedness and was charged to expenditure on an Enterprise's profit 
and loss statement. Writing-off the capital losses reduced the 
capital debt, the interest charges on the debt by nearly half and thus 
the gross annual expenditure. Revenue exceeded expenditure, which was 
equated with gross profit exceeding gross loss^and a net profit was 
registered. Interest rates for the State Stations were reduced in 
1925 but it was not until 1928 that further interest charges were 
waived when the inability of the Stations to pay, resulting in 
Consolidated Revenue being credited with amounts it did not receive, 
was finally acknowledged. The opposition did not dismiss this 
disclosure so easily and in calculating the extent of the financial 
burden the enterprises had placed on the Public Account, added 
£577,860 in uncharged interest to arrive at a total net loss of 
£2,041,309.-^^ 
The Commissioner's figures showed that, at the close of trading 
in 1929, the enterprises had paid just under £1,000,000 in interest 
(Table 18, see Appendix A). Both Austin and the Auditor-General made 
a point of showing in their final reports the effects of the movements 
of funds between enterprises, in terms of the loss of interest for the 
more profitable ventures such as the Railway Refreshment Rooms and the 
Butchery, and the writing-off of losses and interest charges which 
i/y 
gave a false picture of their total indebtedness. The result was a 
somewhat confused financial picture. It demonstrated the difficulty 
of using annual profit and loss accounts as a measure of commercial 
performance, but it also showed the effect of external financial 
controls. 
Whether or not the Treasury was the predominant influence on the 
setting of interest charges and the transfers of surplus profits, 
its relationship with the State Enterprises was based on commercial 
practices. That meant it charged a commercial fee for all financial 
transactions. At the same time, the State Enterprises Act provided 
that all goods and services supplied to other government departments 
were to be at less than the current market price (S.8 (8): Schedule 
to the Act). Despite the rhetoric of commercial practices, 
socialisation of the means of production or simply of price 
regulation, the State Enterprises were used in the same way as the 
trading ventures in New South Wales and Western Australia had been 
used to supply cheap products to other government departments. In 
addition, some departments were able to influence the direction in 
which Enterprises were established. The Railways Department had 
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recommended the purchase of the Warra Coal Mine as the means of 
providing cheap steaming coal. Similarly it was proposed that both 
the Railways Department and the Department of Public Works should have 
the benefit of cheap timber from the State Sawmills, and Public Works 
became the Sawmills' major customer. 
The focus of the relationship of other departments to the 
Enterprises was thus essentially financial. The Railways Department 
was consulted on any proposals to open new refreshment rooms which it 
then rented back to the State Enterprises. It gave no freight 
concessions on the carriage of any goods for the State Enterprises, 
the rate being calculated as a percentage of annual turnover until 
20 1927 when a more flexible agreement was signed. 
Both the Auditor-General and the Treasury charged an annual audit 
and handling fee at commercial rates and although the Commissioner for 
Trade had become an agent of the State Government Insurance Office to 
save on commission fees, there was no concession given for the very 
extensive coverage the State Trade Office was obliged to hold on 
behalf of all the enterprises.^^ The Lands Department had begun by 
charging the State Sawmills the same high rate of timber royalties as 
it imposed on private sawmills, but following applications by the 
General Manager in April and then again in August 1919, it agreed to 
grant a rebate in 1920 which helped the Sawmills to register an 
impressive profit that year of over £10,000 in contrast to its 
22 previous losses. It was stated at the time that this decision would 
allow a more equitable competition base with private sawmills which 
had been able to buy Crown land cheaply, clear it and resell at a 
profit, whereas the State Sawmills were confined, under a policy 
insisted upon by the Director of Forestry, Mr Jolly, to selective 
milling of designated State Reserves. 
The State Stations paid rent on average of £20.000 per annum to 
the Lands Department for its leases (see Table 20, Appendix A). At 
the same time, there was constant pressure for the Stations to be 
reopened for closer settlement as Mount Hutton State Station had been 
in 1919. In 1924, the Assistant Under-Secretary of the Lands 
Department, Labbat Payne, who was later to head the Land 
Administration Board, had entered into correspondence with Austin 
regarding the status of the land held as State Stations. The Lands 
Department proposed that the stations be opened up for closer 
settlement under S.40 of the 1924 Lands Act which would necessitate a 
formal surrender of title deeds where they existed. (In fact, title 
transfers had not always been documented and some title deeds could 
not be found, although formally they were lodged with the Commissioner 
23 for Trade. ) Following negotiations among the principals involved, 
five of the Stations were considered suitable for closer settlement or 
occupation lease. For the other stations, it was proposed that a 
30-year lease be granted the Commissioner for Trade with rentals to be 
determined by the Land Court on the basis of valuations of other 
properties in the same locality, a procedure that was to become 
standard for the Land Administration Board's determining of land 
21 
valuations and rentals. 
These proposals remained in abeyance until the Premier's 
announcement of the sale of the State Stations in 1926 brought a 
notice from the Lands Department setting out rental increases for the 
Stations. At a Conference of the Minister for Lands, his 
Under-Secretary and Inspector, the Trade Commissioner and Secretary, 
the General Manager of the State Stations and the Minister for Labour 
and Industry whose responsibility the State Enterprises now were, the 
rents for the marginal grazing holdings were agreed on. There was 
some dissension over rates for the better quality land but eventually 
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the Commissioner for Trade succeeded in reducing the proposed rate by 
up to 25%.^^ 
Further manoeuvring by the parties involved,supported maximising 
the return from any sale of the Stations rather than encouraging their 
subdivision for closer settlement. It was announced that, in keeping 
with Labor's election promises, designated Stations would be opened to 
public application for pastoral leases at the Lands Office. However, 
the Minister for Lands approved priority to be given to the 
Commissioner for Trade on the payment of the first year's rent with 
his lease application. The General Manager was instructed to draw 
Pfi 
cheques accordingly, and on 1st January, 1927 consolidated leases 
were obtained by the Commissioner by order of the Governor-in-Council. 
Terms were for a 30 year lease on the agreed rents, securities to be 
27 held by the Secretary of the State Trade Office. These arrangements 
provided a sound legal and commercial basis for the sale of the 
stations but in the event, three of the Stations reverted to the Lands 
Department and were opened for closer settlement. 
The actions of the other departments left the impression that the 
State Enterprises were often as much in competition with them as with 
private enterprise, apparently not an unusual occurrence with 
statutory authorities and ministerial departments, particularly where 
28 both were included in the same ministerial portfolio. The first 
priority of the departments appeared to be to extract the maximum 
revenue possible, whether by statutory provision or by negotiation. 
Whether this stance came within the conventional departmental-
statutory authority rivalry, whether there was an added degree of 
hostility or whether this was considered to be sound administrative 
practice cannot be conclusively determined in the absence of 
contemporary anecdotal material. It did, however, represent a form of 
external control over managerial decision-making that was only 
tenuously connected with the concepts of public accountability through 
ministerial responsibility. 
Morrison and Robson considered that defining a separation between 
managerial and policy decision-making was fundamental to the concept 
29 
of public corporation autonomy. In addition, one of the benefits of 
bringing like functions under one independent statutory authority was 
the degree of protection it afforded the managers from undue 
interference from other departmental heads. Statutory provisions 
allowed for intervention in financial matters by the Treasury and the 
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Auditor-General, but there were also examples of what Morrison had 
termed "undue interference". The favourable outcome for the 
enterprises of the negotiations between Austin and the formidable 
Labbat Payne was in sharp contrast to the problems encountered by 
Romilly, the first manager of the State Sawmills, arising from the 
interference in day-to-day management decisions by Mr Jolly, then the 
director of the Forestry Branch within the Lands Department. Opinion 
in Parliament was divided on the merits of the protagonists' 
30 
respective stances which reflected the wider argument of whether 
land in the Gympie district should be cleared for closer settlement or 
retained as State Forest. Following the dictates of his own selective 
logging policy, Jolly intervened in matters ranging from prescribing 
the limits of the area from which the sawmill could take its timber to 
denying requests from a local dairy co-operative for butter boxes, the 
supply of which was a perennial problem. Romilly complained to the 
Under-Secretary and Minister for Lands that Jolly's restrictions 
prevented him from running the mill at a profitable level and in due 
31 
course he resigned. 
This example of "outside" intervention and others less clearly 
outlined were pursued in the name of the public interest. They 
supported a general proposition that managerial autonomy, a 
politically defined objective of the enterprises but unprotected by 
legislation before 1918, was compromised. In the debates in 
Parliament on the introduction of the State Enterprises Bill in 1918, 
the appointment of a Commissioner and a single administrative 
authority for the enterprises had been seen as a response to the 
managers' complaints of interference. On the other hand, the controls 
exercised by the Auditor-General, the Treasury and other government 
departments may have been equated with a level of supervision over the 
Enterprises that was in keeping with their high expenditure of public 
money, their experimental nature and their importance to Labor's 
electoral image. They were relevant to Labor's conception of 
Ministerial administration of the Enterprises as presented in the 1918 
State Enterprises Bill. Moreover, they presaged the types of controls 
used to restrict further the autonomy of Australian public 
32 
corporations after the 1930s. 
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(b) Parliamentary Control 
What was often overlooked in assessments of Parliamentary control 
was the role of Parliament in creating and assenting to the statutes 
governing public corporations. It conferred Parliament's inalienable 
right to secure public accountability that has tended to become 
subsumed by the expectation of public corporation independence from 
political control. A principle of public corporation administration 
in Britain has been that although they are subject to Parliament, 
Parliament does not interfere in the day-to-day management of public 
corporations. The principle was based on the concept of a formal 
separation between policy and management which meant, in effect, that 
the Minister was answerable to Parliament for matters of policy but 
2 
not for routine management matters. Morrison saw the Minister as the 
link between the public corporation Board and Parliament. According 
to his concept of the relations between public corporations. Ministers 
and Parliament, the Minister transmitted information from the Board to 
Parliament where it supplied the material for members' questions, 
3 
discussions and criticisms of the work of the corporation. The 
difficulty of identifying the line beyond which parliamentary 
4 
questions should not probe was readily acknowledged in Britain, 
whereas in Australia there were no statutory restrictions on the 
subject matter of Parliamentary questions. They have dealt routinely 
with matters of day-to-day management in much the same way as with the 
activities of government departments. One explanation for this 
approach has identified the wide range of statutory Ministerial 
controls over public corporations and thus the wide scope of his 
5 
responsibility for their operations. 
The State Enterprises Act provided that every enterprise should 
be administered by the Minister (S.6 [1]), giving him a responsibility 
limited only by the rider that the Commissioner was empowered to carry 
on the business of the Enterprises and by the superior authority 
vested in the Governor-in-Council (S.6 [2]). Parliament appropriated 
money for wages and salaries (S.16 [4]), and received the annual 
reports of the Auditor-General and the Commissioner (S.20 [1] and 
S.21 [2]) of the Schedule), in contrast to a number of Australian 
corporations where, even if an annual report was prescribed, there was 
often no obligation to present it to Parliament. Either House of 
Parliament could disallow, within a certain period of time, the 
regulations made by the Governor-in-Council under the Act (S.21 [3] 
and [4]), but this power was never invoked. 
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Parliament was the forum for major attacks on the State 
enterprises and these were often repeated verbatim in the daily 
newspapers. There was no restriction on the type of question asked 
the responsible Ministers. They ranged from staff numbers, wages and 
conditions to those concerning the Enterprises' role in Labor's 
economic policy. Many of the questions were based on constituents' 
complaints and information since the formal annual reports from the 
Commissioner for Trade and the Auditor-General were often not 
available until the end of the calendar year and Ministers had become 
adept at avoiding giving detailed information on the Enterprises. 
Contrary to the assertion that Parliamentary questions have not 
played a significant part in imposing accountability on statutory 
g 
authorities, in the Parliament of that time they enabled the 
opposition to maintain pressure on Labor and reinforce their arguments 
against the State Enterprises. One instance of the effect of 
Parliamentary questions was seen in Hunter's announcement in 1917 of a 
Royal Commission to inquire into the government's purchase of Wando 
Vale Station. There had been so many allegations of government 
corruption, he said, that a Royal Commission was the only way to 
9 
settle the matter publicly. 
The Legislative Council was, before its abolition in 1922, not 
only effective in eliciting information about the management of the 
State Enterprises, but also in curtailing their expansion. As well as 
maintaining a constant presence throughout the Wando Vale Inquiry, it 
convened a Select Committee in October 1917 to enquire into government 
expenditure on the "Industrial Enterprises". Although hampered by its 
lack of power to compel witnesses or material, it made a number of 
telling points about the inadequacy of government administration and 
planning in the establishment of the State Enterprises. The Council 
was largely responsible for the defeat of proposals to establish a 
State Iron and Steel Works in Queensland. Assisted by the pressure 
exerted by opposition members in the Legislative Assembly, the Council 
manoeuvred the government into holding a Royal Commission in 1917 on 
11 the proposed State Iron and Steel Works, and had a ceiling imposed 
on capital expenditure for the Works. By deleting the State Iron and 
Steel Works from the definition of State Enterprises under the 1918 
12 State Enterprises Act, the Council obliged the government to 
introduce a separate State Iron and Steel Works Bill which it then 
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refused to pass. The Meatworks Bills and the Commissioner for Trade 
Bill were all "lost" in the Council and both "The State Produce Agency 
Act of 1917" and "The State Enterprises Act of 1918" were 
significantly altered by the amendments insisted on by the Council. 
Parliament, in the form of the Legislative Council, had thus 
exercised its right to create and confirm the legislation governing 
the State Enterprises. By the time the Legislative Council was 
abolished in 1922, the number of non-Labor members in the Legislative 
Assembly had risen to a more effective level of opposition. At the 
same time, the role of the State Enterprises in Labor's reform 
policies had begun to diminish as their commercial performance 
worsened and as Labor turned to other means of price and market 
regulation. There were other more pressing matters for Parliament to 
debate. Parliamentary control over the Enterprises was seldom in 
evidence except for an occasional thrust at the financial management 
of the Enterprises and intermittent efforts to keep their financial 
13 losses as a public issue. The government had largely pre-empted 
questions and debates on the enterprises by taking them off the 
Parliamentary agenda and after 1922 the Governor's speech at the 
opening of Parliament made no mention of State Enterprises. Interest 
revived for a time when in 1925 McCormack admitted the failure of the 
Enterprises to Parliament and announced they would be closed down and 
sold. But by then, Parliamentary control was to all intents and 
purposes confined to the formal exercise of its statutory powers under 
the State Enterprises Act. 
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(c) Legal Controls 
Statutory authorities have been accorded a legal capacity by 
virtue of the fact that they were established and governed by 
legislation. Statutory provisions have defined the legal 
responsibilities, powers and duties of these authorities and also 
their relation to Ministerial and Parliamentary controls. One group 
of statutory authorities, the statutory corporations, has been given a 
legal identity and capacity comparable to private companies. This has 
often but not always been the case for statutory corporations engaged 
in commercial activities. The legal personality of a statutory 
corporation has served to separate it, although not conclusively, from 
a ministerial department mode of administration in that it has 
perpetual succession, can sue and be sued, can enter into contracts, 
2 
and buy and sell land and other commodities. Moreover, incorporation 
has signalled the separation of a statutory authority from the Crown 
and a consequent granting of some measure of independence through the 
removal of the restrictions of Crown privileges, rights and 
immunities. 
Sawer has challenged the use of the corporate device to give 
commercial freedom to statutory bodies along the lines suggested by 
Morrison. His opinion was that in many instances the public 
corporation was unnecessary for the same ends could have been achieved 
by legislative provisions to meet specific requirements. He concluded 
that the public corporation was a convenience for governments to 
resolve the legal problems of statutory authorities. As a result, the 
law of statutory corporations "is a wilderness of single instances" 
that suggested the need for a universal set of legal provisions 
3 
pertaining to public corporations. 
Expanding on this argument, Sawer determined that many of the 
Australian public corporations have not enjoyed separate legal status 
from the Crown. Taking a stance that echoed Webb's question of 
whether public corporations actually exhibited the qualities for which 
4 . . . 
they were established, he identified statutory provisions where 
public corporations were subject to the Minister, were to represent 
the Crown or were to exercise all the rights, powers and privileges of 
the Crown. These powers were vested in the responsible Minister or a 
public official and, for administrative purposes, he believed the 
5 
public corporation might as well have been a government department. 
On the basis of the statutory provisions governing the State 
enterprises, the corporation of the Commissioner for Trade was not a 
lyu 
separate legal entity from the Crown. Section 1 (a) of the State 
Enterprises Act provided that nothing in the Act shall restrict or 
abridge any prerogative, right, power or privilege of the Crown. 
Section 6 (1) designated the Commissioner as representing the Crown, 
while S.l (1) of the Schedule to the Act provided for the Commissioner 
to exercise all the rights, powers, privileges and remedies of the 
Crown. These clauses were subjected to some debate in the Legislative 
Council, but were not altered from Labor's original draft of the State 
Enterprises Bill. Accordingly, they conformed with Sawer's view that 
Labor governments in Australia displayed a preference for bringing all 
statutory bodies under Ministerial control. Where Labor set up 
statutory corporations, either the Minister or the senior public 
official responsible for the government activity was designated a 
"corporation sole". In law, it appeared that they had no separate 
legal identity from that of the Crown. They were classified by Sawer 
as Crown corporations having little autonomy and being largely 
indistinct from ministerial departments. 
Other statutory authorities established by Labor in Queensland 
during this time exhibited a mixture of these features. For example, 
the State Insurance Commissioner was not a corporation but he could 
enter into contracts, sue and be sued, and buy and sell land.^ On the 
other hand, the Commissioner for Trade was invested with all the legal 
powers of a corporation (S.9 [1]) and all legal proceedings could be 
brought against his official name (S.l [ii] Schedule to the Act). He 
had control over land for the purposes of the State Enterprises and 
could enter into contracts (S.19; S.2 [1], S.8B[1] and [2], S.9 [1] 
Schedule to the Act). In Sawer's categories, this would not have been 
sufficient to concede any autonomous legal status for the State 
Enterprises. Incorporation allowed the keeping of separate accounts 
for the Enterprises and other functions such as contracts and the 
buying and selling of Crown land deemed necessary for a business 
undertaking. Again, these could have been established by specific 
9 
statutory provisions and within a government department. 
Queensland's Labor government appeared to have acted consistently 
with the pattern of Labor governments in Australia by instituting 
close ministerial supervision over the State Enterprises. It may have 
been a legal convenience, but the designation of the Commissioner for 
Trade as a "corporation sole" was a political move instigated by the 
hostile Legislative Council in 1918 to remove some management powers 
from the Minister to a public official. Although a Commissioner with 
the powers of a corporation had been Labor's intention in 1915 it 
reverted to the pattern of Australian Labor governments' relations 
with statutory corporations when in 1918 it proposed that the Minister 
be incorporated under the State Enterprises Act. 
A further aspect of legal controls over public corporations 
arising from their legal separation from the Crown has been the 
exercise of judicial control. A total legal separation was a 
comparatively recent feature of the statutory provisions governing 
both British and Australian public corporations. The protection of 
the Crown had the effect of restricting a public corporation's legal 
liability, but it also restricted the independence conferred by its 
legal personality. While public corporations have been prosecuted for 
criminal offences, the crucial issue for the exercise of judicial 
control has been seen to relate to the concept of ultra vires. The 
courts and both government and Parliament have had extensive legal 
powers over corporations, firstly because of the capacity of the 
courts to ensure that corporations operate according to the provisions 
of their governing statutes and not outside them (ultra vires), and 
secondly, because the Minister usually has been given the power to 
issue general directives. Some problems have occurred because of the 
difficulty in defining either the powers granted to corporations by 
the statutes or the precise extent of the directive power. Zines has 
drawn the distinction between British corporations and Federal 
corporations in Australia in relation to the application of ultra 
vires. In Britain, some corporations have been empowered to give full 
use to the powers conferred by the Act as necessary for the purposes 
of the activity. Other corporations have been governed by more vague 
statutory provisions but, in both cases, the difficulty has been for 
the courts to determine the extent of the corporations' powers under 
the governing statute before an action could be declared ultra 
vires. The Commonwealth corporations in Australia have been subject 
to constitutional limitations on their powers. As a result, it has 
been difficult to determine whether Federal Parliament has the 
constitutional power to give statutory powers to Commonwealth 
corporations in certain areas, let alone to determine whether the 
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corporations have exceeded their statutory powers. Both the State 
Produce Agency and the Railway Refreshment Rooms might have been 
declared to be operating ultra vires. The Produce Agency bought and 
sold produce directly, thereby operating outside the provisions of the 
State Produce Agency Act which permitted only sales on commission. 
The Railway Refreshment Rooms traded illegally in selling liquor to 
patrons who were not bona fide travellers. However, although 
opposition members referred to these breaches on several occasions in 
Parliament, they did not pursue the matter before the courts. 
Similar difficulties have occurred in relation to the Minister's 
general directive power. Where its definition has been vague, the 
courts have considered whether compliance with a Ministerial directive 
has changed the legal status of a corporation. In some instances, it 
has been found that the corporations were, in complying with a 
directive, to have been acting as representatives of the Crown and 
thus were immune from the application of common law. Consequently, 
as in other areas of political control, the legal position of public 
corporations was not clear-cut. The designation of "corporation" did 
not give an unequivocal independence from political control, nor have 
there been clear-cut grounds for measuring the degree to which 
corporations are subject to judicial controls. 
The State Enterprises were no exception. Although not explicitly 
stated, the power conferred on the Minister by S.6 (1) of the Act to 
administer the Enterprises was similar to a general directive power. 
Similarly, the Act did not separate the corporation of the 
Commissioner for Trade from the Crown. The Commissioner appeared as 
the representative of the Crown in all matters before the Arbitration 
Court dealing with the industrial awards for State Enterprises' 
employees. On the other hand, the Commissioner was legally liable in 
his official name (S.l [ii]) Schedule to the Act), and legal 
proceedings could be instituted against the Commissioner by the 
courts. There was no record of any court action against the State 
Enterprises. The writ issued by a fisherman against employees of the 
15 State Fishery in April 1920 was not mentioned by the Commissioner in 
his annual report and the matter apparently did not go before the 
courts. 
The legal power implicit in the Minister's administrative power 
was never tested before the courts for, while the Commissioner 
publicly disagreed with some of the Ministerial or Cabinet directives, 
as with the State Butchery prices, he always acted in accord with 
them. As Sawer pointed out, "the executive head of a government 
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corporation would be silly to criticise a ministerial direction to 
which Parliament had subjected him; such criticism cannot improve his 
1 c 
position and is likely to make it worse." However, Austin had 
little cause to feel insecure in criticising directives since it would 
have been difficult for the Labor government to replace him. 
Recourse to the courts to enforce a directive power or to 
determine the full extent of a public corporation's powers has not 
been unknown but it has not been a common occurrence. Yet, in Sawer's 
opinion, the very existence of a directive power has seriously 
compromised public corporation independence. That this legal issue 
was directly related to issues of political control only served to 
obscure the legal concepts of a statutory corporation. The 
independence that was conferred on the State Enterprises by the 
designation "corporation sole" appeared to be compromised not only by 
the Ministerial power but also by the wider directive power vested in 
the Governor-in-Council. The Act had provided that all provisions 
pertaining to the business of the Commissioner under the Act could be 
altered or amended by the Governor-in-Council (S.6 [2]). Moreover, in 
addition to a power of veto over some aspects of staffing, finance and 
the purchase of land, the Governor-in-Council could make regulations 
to give full effect to the Act (S.21). Consequently it was the 
Governor-in-Council rather than the Commissioner who could use the 
full force of a discretionary power that in British corporations 
enabled the Commissioner or Board to "do such things as may seem 
18 
necessary and expedient" for carrying out an activity. The power 
conferred on the Commissioner to administer the Enterprises was 
subject to the legal controls vested by the Act in the Minister and 
the Governor-in-Council. 
In many respects, the legal and the potential judicial controls 
imposed on the Queensland State Enterprises by statute identified them 
as a Crown corporation according to Sawer's classification. The 
Minister and the Governor-in-Council exercised considerable legal 
powers over the Enterprises, the corporate personality of the 
Commissioner did not give the Enterprises a separate legal identity 
from the Crown and did not confer the autonomy which the status of 
statutory corporation implied. However, the corporation of the 
Commissioner was legally liable, could institute legal proceedings 
before the courts and had some discretionary power over the 
Enterprises' management for the purposes of fulfilling the provisions 
of the Act. 
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(d) Ministerial Control 
In the preceding discussion on the constitutional features of the 
State Enterprises, several areas of Ministerial control were 
identified. The most pervasive use of Ministerial power occurred in 
financial matters where it went beyond the formal limits expressed in 
the statutory provisions to over-ride the delegated powers of the 
Commissioner and the so-called Finance Committee. A similar but less 
extensive mode of intervention was evident in staffing and personnel 
matters. 
While the range and depth of legal Ministerial control in British 
and Australian public enterprises varied from none at all to a 
departmental mode, Morrison's concept of the separation of policy and 
management as the basis for determining the limits of such 
intervention has been elusive in implementation. Even in the legal 
sense, the boundaries of Ministerial control have defied exact 
definition. There are perceived to be two contributing factors: the 
extent of the Minister's discretionary powers (or powers hidden in 
2 
other statutes ) and the inability of a Minister to recognise the 
3 
distinction between policy and law. The extent to which these 
factors impinged on the experience of the State Enterprises has not 
been calculable to any significant level, again largely because of the 
absence of anecdotal material from that period. However, in terms of 
discretionary power, the implication of S.5 (1) which provided that 
"subject to this Act, every State Enterprise shall be administered by 
the Minister," was a legal carte blanche for Ministerial intervention 
and control which, in turn, was restricted, or alternatively augmented 
by the authority vested in the Governor-in-Council. Whether this was 
the intention of the legislation was clouded by the changes in Labor's 
legislative proposals in 1916 and 1918 but an important outcome of the 
vagueness in the statutory definition of Ministerial control was the 
capacity for informal control. In the literature, it has been noted 
that Ministers had access, through their governments, to means of 
persuasion or inducement beyond their legal powers, and the soubriquet 
the "lunch-time" directive summed up the informal opportunities to 
4 
influence and intervene in day-to-day management decisions. 
The Queensland historian, A.A. Morrison, observed that because 
Queensland's government and the range of its functions were 
comparatively small during the years under review, ministerial-
official relationships were characterised by proximity and 
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5 informality. One outcome of the small scale of Queensland's 
government was the physical capacity of Ministers to be involved in 
all the administrative details of their portfolio. But Morrison 
believed in a more pressing reason for the close Ministerial scrutiny 
he identified. In his opinion Labor Ministers did not trust their 
public officials, particularly those inherited from the previous 
government (the most notorious instance of this being the continued 
hostility between Gall, the Under-Secretary to the Home Secretary, and 
c 
Fihelly) to carry out the sweeping reforms dictated by the party 
platform, even though enabling legislation may have been instituted. 
As they became entrenched in office this distrust diminished. They 
had come to realise the electoral benefit of carrying out their 
Ministerial duties and being seen to be in control of their 
departments. Nonetheless, the habit of attention to detail was not 
broken and even after many years in office, the Labor Cabinet was said 
g 
to be still involved in "remarkably trivial matters". 
The Queensland way of government thus presented ideal grounds 
advancing the theoretical justification of the use of public 
corporations - to remove certain government functions usually of a 
revenue-producing or trading nature from close ministerial scrutiny 
and from the overall political control exerted by government, 
9 
Parliament and other central personnel and financial authorities. 
Under the Labor government of the time, several statutory authorities 
with corporate status were established. However, the opinion has been 
that Queensland followed a 'fairly consistent' line of placing public 
corporations under Ministerial direction. The State Enterprises 
fitted this general description but to what extent has eluded a 
precise definition. 
In addition to the vague but encompassing power vested in the 
Minister by S.6 (1) and his demonstrated control over financial and 
staffing matters, there were two further clearly defined powers: 
firstly, the Minister should have access at all times to the financial 
records of the State Trade Office (S.8 [10] of the Schedule) and 
secondly, he should have the powers of inquiry into all matters 
concerning trade, commerce and industries (S.IO of Schedule). Little 
publicity was given the outcome of the latter provision since it was 
not implemented on the scale initially envisaged, nor was it probably 
seen as important in the context of the many other crucial issues of 
that period in Queensland, Moreover it was a power that could be 
197 
delegated to the Commissioner for Trade. In this capacity, Austin was 
appointed chairman of the Fish Board in 1924. He was responsible for 
the new fish marketing arrangements drawn up the following year and 
had an ongoing role that saw him take a significant part in the review 
of the fishing industry conducted in 1935 and in the subsequent 
11 drafting of new legislation. In 1926, Austin was appointed to the 
Commission enquiring into certain matters relating to the beef cattle 
industry, which recommended among other things, the adoption of the 
1 7 
proposal to appoint a Commonwealth Beef Cattle Advisory Board. All 
correspondence and submissions for the Commission were handled through 
13 
the State Stations Office. Austin had previously been the State 
Official Representative to the Australian Meat Council and had 
participated in the meetings of the National Fruit Council which had 
succeeded the ill-fated Commonwealth Fruit Pool. 
The statutory power of access to all State Trade Office documents 
vested in the Minister demonstrated a high level of formal Ministerial 
control. However, it was doubtful whether this power was exercised 
unilaterally, it being more likely that access was accomplished by 
consultation with the Commissioner particularly in view of the 
frequent changes in Ministers given responsibility for the State 
Enterprises. Moreover, after 1920, the importance and desirability of 
the Enterprises as a Ministerial responsibility diminished as their 
political importance diminished and they were moved from the Chief 
Secretary's responsibility to the Secretary for Public Works and from 
there to the Secretary for Labour and Industry in 1926. These changes 
stressed an important influence on the scope and effectiveness of 
Ministerial control - that of Ministerial jurisdiction or portfolio. 
For the Queensland Enterprises, as with the New South Wales and 
Western Australian enterprises, responsibility for their establishment 
and operation was initially in the hands of a number of Ministers (see 
Table 1, Page 7). There were probably various reasons for their 
placement but most were situated according to a community of interest. 
The Chief Secretary's Department had a special interest in the Butcher 
Shops as the flagship of competitive government intervention in the 
economy, the Home Secretary was responsible for the State Hotel in 
keeping with its purported objective of improving public health by 
combatting the menace of 'sly grog'. The Lands Department had an 
obvious interest in the purchase of the State Stations and the 
Treasurer might have undertaken the establishment of the fish markets 
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because, as the opposition had suggested, his department was a 
convenient source of the necessary finance. Whether the Ministers in 
question were in agreement with the allocations of responsibility for 
the enterprises could only be judged by the movement of the various 
enterprises from Ministerial Department to the State Enterprises and, 
in some cases, back again. The Sawmills were developed within the 
Lands Department, were transferred to the Commissioner for Trade in 
1918 and then returned to the Lands Department in 1920, while the 
State Arsenic Mine, Battery and Smelter were retransferred to the 
Mines Department (see Table 1, Page 7). Equally there were some 
designated State Enterprises that never left their parent department, 
the Central Sugar Mills being a case in point. 
Hunter, the Minister for Lands, was delegated the responsibility 
for the enterprises by Ryan before 1918 and was given the task of 
piloting a State Enterprises Bill through Parliament. He was a 
capable and interested Minister and had the advantage over other Labor 
Ministers in that he had previously been involved in the commercial 
world. The same could not be said for succeeding Ministers such as 
Fihelly, Dunstan or Gledson, although Forgan Smith, the Minister for 
State Enterprises in 1924, was already showing signs of political 
capability. There was never a separate Minister for State 
Enterprises. Either it was just one of a Minister's portfolio 
responsibilities or when the number of Ministers was increased without 
the number of portfolios being increased, the Minister without 
Portfolio was directed to the State Enterprises. Gledson was in this 
position until appointed Minister of the newly formed Department of 
Labour and Industry in 1926, whereupon the State Enterprises were 
transferred to that Department (see Table 16), 
The Enterprises therefore had five different Ministers in 
eight years and only two of them appeared to be competent to oversee 
commercial trading ventures. Morrison had remarked that to place 
Ministers in charge of socialised industry was to create an 
unrealistic situation. Although the Minister would, in a 
constitutional sense, be responsible for everything that happened in 
the industry, he could not in fact really manage the industry, even if 
he were personally qualified to do so. In most cases, he would not be 
so qualified. This would be still more the case if a series of 
industries were grouped under one Minister, in order to reduce the 
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TABLE 16 
MINISTERS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE STATE ENTERPRISES, 1918-1929 
Minister Enterprise 
Hon. J.M. Hunter Secretary for Lands and Acting Chief 
Secretary, 1915-28; Vice President, 
Executive Council, 1919. 
Hon. J. Fihelly Secretary for Public Works, 1920-22. 
Hon. W. Forgan Smith Secretary for Public Works, 1922-25. 
Hon. J. Dunstan Assistant Minister, February 1925. 
Secretary for Lands, October 1925. 
Hon. J. Gledson Without office, 1925-1926. 
Secretary for Labour and Industry, 
1926-1929. 
Hon. H, Sizer Secretary for Labour and Industry, 1929-
1932, 
Source: D. Waterson, A Biographical Register of the Queensland 
Parliament 1860-1929, Australian National University Press, 
Canberra, 1974; CA. Hughes and B.D. Graham, Austral ian 
Government and Politics 1890-1964, Australian National 
University Press, Canberra, 1968. 
number of Ministers required. In that case. Ministerial control and 
15 Parliamentary supervision would become more unreal. When applied to 
the State Enterprises, these observations tended to underline several 
aspects of the type of Ministerial control exerted over the 
Enterprises. Ministers did not appear to be held individually 
responsible for the actions of the State Enterprises. In Parliament, 
the Minister answered questions on a wide range of the Enterprises' 
operations, but the censure of the opposition was directed at the 
Labor government as a whole. The Commissioner might have been seen to 
bear responsibl ity for management problems but in the case of the 
illegal purchases made by the State Produce Agency manager, he was 
careful to disclaim any responsibility for the manager's actions (see 
Section 2, Page 44). 
With the exception of Hunter and perhaps Forgan Smith, the 
Ministers were not personally qualified to manage a series of diverse 
business undertakings. This was a major argument put forward by Labor 
in 1916 and then by the opposition in 1918 to support the appointment 
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of a business "specialist" to manage the State Enterprises rather than 
vest management in the Minister. 
Despite the extensive formal powers of control over many aspects 
of State Enterprises' management that were vested in the Minister, 
several examples - the illegal purchases of the Produce Agency 
manager, the fiasco of the Wynnum Fish Depot, the shaky financial 
dealings of the State Stations and the losses incurred by the Cannery 
and Fishery in carrying out the government's policy - tended to place 
in doubt whether the Minister actually exercised his statutory powers 
of management or whether his statutory controls were effective in 
securing public accountability. It appeared that there was some 
separation between policy and management arising more from expediency 
than from statutory provisions and that the Commissioner, by dint of 
his experience and specialist qualifications, exercised a degree of 
management independence that belied the Minister's powers of control. 
A further factor adding to the complexity of determining the 
extent of Ministerial control were the statutory provisions for 
over-riding controls to be vested in the Governor-in-Council. These 
provisions could be explained as the means of avoiding placing an 
excess of power in the Ministerial office. But the dispersal of 
control and responsibility they engendered blurred the lines of 
responsibility for the economy and efficiency of the Enterprises, 
given that they had been designated a corporate authority with 
objectives that were to be attained through independence from central 
political control. Despite their insistence on public accountability 
for the State Enterprises, members of the Legislative Council were 
even agreed that political control, particularly in technical and 
1 fi 
financial matters, would prove a disaster. 
Bland had referred to the incompatibility of Ministerial control 
with the achievement of efficiency and economy, yet following the 
enquiry into Victorian public enterprises 30 years later, he condemned 
the loose-knit organisation undermining the principles of democratic 
accountability which had sprung up as a result of a policy of public 
18 
corporation independence. Others have pointed to the difficulties 
of defining the Minister's responsibility since statutory provisions 
contained nothing to impose on them the duty of obtaining efficiency 
and economy. Nor, it was conceded, would they be in a position to do 
so."*"^  Counterbalancing this argument was the reality of the general 
responsibility of Ministers for the exercise of all their powers and 
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duties, with its logical extension that the wider their powers of 
20 
control, the greater their responsibility. Prescriptions for an 
exact definition of ministerial responsibility as the means of 
21 
overcoming the problem have foundered on the continuing difficulty 
of measuring efficiency and economy, particularly when their 
commercial meaning is subordinated to public interest objectives. For 
instance, the setting of financial targets and whether they are 
achieved by public enterprises has not been considered an adequate 
measure of efficiency when adverse circumstances or the priority of 
the public interest rather than bad management might have caused a 
22 
trading deficit. 
Adverse circumstances and the primacy of the public interest as 
understood by Labor have already been proposed as contributing factors 
to the financial deficits lodged by the State Enterprises. Added to 
these factors was a wide range of statutory provisions for Ministerial 
control which were however tempered by the those giving a measure of 
control to officials of the central departments and to the 
Governor-in-Council. There was no doubt for the opposition where the 
responsibility for the Enterprises' performance lay. It was with the 
government. The Minister was seen to have a limited function. He was 
largely the conduit for information about the Enterprises to 
23 
Parliament, the press and the public and represented the public face 
of Labor's responsibility for the Enterprises. 
Nevertheless, the incumbent Minister was, on various occasions, 
instrumental in changing the financial conditions under which the 
Enterprises operated in order to retrieve something of their public 
image. The favourable contracts with the meat companies which were 
renewed until 1922 were the result of negotiations between Fihelly and 
the Meat Companies. The leasing of the South Brisbane Market to the 
Fisherman's Co-operative in 1921 and the transfer of wholesale fish 
marketing from the State Fishery to the Co-operative were the outcomes 
of an agreement made by the Minister with the Co-operative. The 
writing-off of capital losses in 1924 were examples of Ministerial 
intervention in the Enterprises' management which, although probably 
suggested by the Commissioner and approved by Cabinet, attempted to 
attain some element of economy and efficiency, or at least prevent 
further financial losses. However, the extent to which Ministers 
could fulfil such a responsibility was restricted not so much by the 
limits of their own capabilities and interest, as by Labor's overall 
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policy objectives for the Enterprises. That the government's initial 
experiment with the Butcher Shops to prove that public enterprise or 
state-run trading concerns were more efficient and could therefore 
deliver more economical outputs than private enterprise was initially 
successful was only partly to do with Ministerial responsibility or 
control. It was largely due to a buoyant market, good growing seasons 
and favourable purchasing agreements but after 1920 these conditions 
were reversed for all the Enterprises. It was the emergence of staff 
pride in their work, as the Commissioner noted in his reports during 
the 1920s, and the need to justify their operations, rather than the 
judicious exercise of Ministerial control that enabled some of the 
financial objectives of the Enterprises to be salvaged. 
A subsequent evaluation of operational efficiency in Australian 
public enterprises suggested that: 
these organisations are very anxious to justify their 
existence and show themselves to be efficient. To the 
managers of government business undertakings the original 
political motives behind the establishment of their 
organisations are irrelevant to the question of operational 
efficiency. 
The same perception could have been applied to the State Enterprises 
after 1920. Hunter, the first Minister in charge of them, had gone 
and the financial losses had begun to persuade Labor politicians that 
the Enterprises were not likely to spearhead economic reform, but the 
management maintained their efforts to deliver a service to the public 
and to contain operating costs. 
In the context of Bland's argument that Ministerial or Cabinet 
intervention led to operational inefficiency, it seemed that a similar 
argument was applicable to the Enterprises. Government policy 
decisions and specific controls over management decisions compromised 
the attempts to achieve a level of "business" efficiency and services 
to the public. In contrast to the Railways, for instance, and to some 
public corporations in Australia engaged in competitive trading, there 
was no "recoup" provision, no moratorium on interest charges until the 
Enterprises were established and no question of deferring capital 
repayments. The Enterprises had to be seen to be paying their way, to 
give substance to the rhetoric of the original objective of 
demonstrating that goods and services could be supplied at a cheaper 
rate than by private enterprise. 
Ministerial intervention in areas designated as managerial by the 
provisions of the Act was not a unilateral action guided by individual 
(1U6 
Ministerial responsibility. It was a collective action of government 
dictated by the political necessity of rescuing some public 
credibility for Labor's policy of establishing State Enterprises. 
The motives for such government intervention were understandable 
in the context of the political and economic constraints under which 
Labor governed. The electoral dominance it had achieved in 1915 and 
1918 was eroded as Ryan and Hunter left Queensland politics, 
industrial unrest increased and economic conditions worsened. By the 
time McCormack became Premier in 1926, Labor was fighting to survive 
for another term. McCormack almost immediately conceded the failure 
of the State Enterprises and announced plans for their sale, beginning 
with the State Stations. Even as he did so, both the Railway 
Refreshment Rooms and the State Butcher Shops were opening new 
branches while the State Cannery and the State Produce Agency 
continued to expand their range of services. McCormack had also 
promised that the best possible price would be obtained for the 
25 
Enterprises. Thus, since the managers were attempting to maintain 
operational viability and the task of selling the Enterprises might be 
a lengthy one, administrative arrangements had to be maintained as a 
separate yet controlled entity. 
The Enterprises were brought under the responsibility of the 
Minister for Labour and Industry, and the Commissioner for Trade had 
dual administrative responsibility for the department and for the 
enterprises. The Under-Secretary for Labour and Industry was paid a 
?fi 
separate allowance to administer the State Enterprises until 1949. 
This allowance was maintained even when the Corporation of the 
Commissioner for Trade was dissolved by "The State Enterprises Repeal 
Act of 1931" and replaced by the Corporation of the Under-Secretary of 
the Department of Labour and Industry which was changed by the same 
Act to carry on the business of the dissolved corporation. 
On the one hand, it appeared that the Enterprises after 1926 had 
been brought under departmental control, and functioned as a 
sub-department or branch of the Department of Labour and Industry. It 
appeared to be subject to a level of Ministerial control that 
over-rode the statutory provisions of the State Enterprises Act and 
conformed with a departmental mode of administration. On the other 
hand, it was clearly established that the Commissioner retained his 
separate identity and powers as the Corporation of the Commissioner 
for Trade, that separate State Enterprises' accounts were retained as 
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well as some managerial independence in day-to-day operations. In 
1918 Labor's intention was to exert close Ministerial control over the 
operations of the Enterprises, allowing the managers some discretion 
in day-to-day activities. Although the Enterprises were expected to 
be run on "business" lines, and thus free from political 
intervention, the latter was to be a selective freedom. Parliamentary 
control was to be weakened while Ministerial control was to be 
reinforced. 
However, when the Legislative Council successfully moved to 
transfer corporate powers from the Minister to a Commissioner for 
State Enterprises, the form the provisions of the State Enterprises 
Act took weakened the extent of Ministerial control. This control was 
seen to be reasserted in 1925, when Austin became Under-Secretary of a 
Ministerial department although the statutory provisions were not 
changed. The point about the administrative arrangements of 1926 for 
the Enterprises was that the Under-Secretary was not designated a 
corporation to administer the Enterprises as Sawer, Kewley and others 
have stated. The two positions Austin held were separate and were 
defined separately. Finance was separate, staff were separate and 
annual reports to Parliament were separate. Moreover, the State 
Enterprises were still governed by separate statutory provisions until 
they were repealed in 1931 by the Moore government for the purpose of 
dissolving the Enterprises. 
While the level of formal and informal Ministerial controls over 
the State Enterprises might have been high, the formal statutory 
provisions defined some areas of management independence and these 
areas were extended almost by default since the administrative 
competence of the Commissioner was essential for the survival of the 
Enterprises. Given the variations in the controls exercised by 
Ministers over public corporations, comparisons between the 
administrative arrangements of corporations and those of the State on 
the basis of this type of control have not elicited any conclusive 
definition of State Enterprises' administration. Nevertheless, some 
common features have been demonstrated and can be used to test whether 
the State Enterprises fit into any of the classification schemes drawn 
up for statutory authorities and statutory corporations. 
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(e) Ministerial Control and the Case for Classification 
A number of areas where control over public corporations can be 
exercised have been examined. Established concepts, principles and 
practice and the variations displayed in them in both Britain and 
Australia have been compared with the concepts and practices of the 
Queensland State Enterprises. In the course of this examination, it 
became evident that finance was an important "motherhood" area of 
control. The central issue remained, however, the type and degree of 
external control over statutory corporations that would maintain the 
management independence for which they were established, yet cater to 
the principle of public accountability. Some indication of the 
difficulties of reconciling public corporation freedom with public 
accountability controls is found in the frequent use in the literature 
of the imagery of Scylla and Charybdis. 
Ministerial responsibility to Parliament has been the means of 
achieving public accountability. The principle of Ministerial 
responsibility has dictated that, no matter how nominally, the 
Minister is responsible for the departments and statutory authorities 
under his jurisdiction. 
The public corporation has been seen as the means of achieving a 
degree of efficient administration and service in the public interest 
for certain government functions that was not possible amidst the 
"bureaucratic red tape", inflexibility and political control of a 
2 
conventional department. The price was a managerial freedom that 
appeared to undermine public accountability. 
Morrison and Robson, among others, asserted the principle of 
separating policy and management as the only basis on which public 
corporations and their freedom from departmental constraints would be 
reconciled with the accountability demanded by responsible government. 
But as has been well documented in countries employing this system^^as 
well as in the U.S.A., this separation has rarely been achieved, nor 
has a stable formula for freedom vis-a-vis control in administration 
been formulated. Just how much external control was necessary to 
satisfy accountability, what kind of controls should have been 
imposed, how much freedom and how much control would produce results 
more desirable than those of a Ministerial department, and how this 
could be measured, were some of the dilemmas manifested in public 
corporations and in the State Enterprises. 
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The diversity of responses demonstrated by widely differing types 
of public corporations and their varied constitutional provisions, has 
been a distinctive trait of statutory authorities. Spann considered 
that their statutory foundation was the only feature common to such 
bodies and even then it did not distinguish them from some government 
departments. Specific groups of statutory authorities have had 
identifiable characteristics, one of which is the conferring of 
JV« 
4 
3 
corporate status but even here there has been no defined 
constitutional formula. 
In the face of this diversity, attempts to compare and measure 
results, even in similar types of enterprises, so that the government 
5 
could adopt the type of agency proved to be the most effective, have 
met with little success. Classification of public enterprises 
according to common characteristics has been a widely used method of 
taking the basic step of making some general statements. But, as 
Chester has observed, this approach has emphasised the difficulty of 
making any general statement about a range of public bodies when even 
c 
a universally accepted nomenclature has not been confirmed. Although 
corporate forms of government administration had been in existence for 
300 years in Britain, what was meant by a public corporation was still 
unclear. He summed up the dilemma with this question: 
Are public board, corporation, commission, statutory 
authority, ad hoc board, public utility trust, public 
service board, government corporation, autonomous authority, 
public authority, and others a group of synonyms from 
amongst which, for one reason or another, 'public 
corporation' has emerged as the most fashionable in 
contemporary use? 
Nonetheless, in his view, the classification system has been useful as 
a means of describing the range of features, both constitutional and 
otherwise, that occurs in non-departmental bodies. It also promoted 
the listing of departmental characteristics as a necessary preliminary 
for comparative analysis. 
In Australia, the classification of departmental and 
non-departmental bodies has proceeded with a mixed reception as to its 
value.^ A functional classification has mostly been discarded in 
favour of a classification emphasising the constitutional features of 
such bodies. The major barrier to classifying government 
administrative bodies into the conventional department/public 
corporation divisions, has been the identification of a third group 
9 
which Chester suggested be termed "the rest". The variations in 
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their constitutional features precluded their nomination as 
ministerial departments or autonomous public corporations but they did 
not themselves make up an homogeneous group. Wettenhall offered the 
opinion that this "grey area" of administrative bodies was a product 
of the political process: 
For some reason, some actor in the government system 
(political party meeting? outside pressure group? minister? 
other members of parliament? senior administrator? 
parliamentary draughtsman? decides that some benefit may be 
obtained by giving the statutory form to some part of our 
administrative apparatus, and a statutory authority is born. 
Consistency is not a feature of this process. 
On the basis of the information gathered about the State 
Enterprises' administrative arrangements and how they came into being, 
any or all of Wettenhall's options could be applicable. However, if 
some determination of the nature of the State Enterprises' 
administration and whether it conformed to a public corporation, 
ministerial department or other administrative mode, is to be made, 
then a classification exercise provides some points of reference. 
Given the political importance of Ministerial control for the 
State Enterprises, and the wide range of formal powers vested in their 
Minister and the Governor-in-Council, classification according to 
degree of Ministerial control seemed an appropriate method. 
Wettenhall has undertaken an extensive classification which has 
departed from the departmental/non-departmental dichotomy and from the 
independent/centrally controlled model to employ a spectrum approach 
from which he concluded that at least five categories of 
administrative arrangements could be identified. He anchored these 
categories to the concept of ministerial control and classified 
government bodies according to the degree of closeness to, or 
divergence from, such control. Although Wettenhall concluded from 
this exercise that most government authorities were closer to 
Ministerial control and very few had the independence of the 
theoretically proposed public corporation, he acknowledged that the 
resulting categories tended to overlap. 
On the basis of their constitutional features, the Queensland 
State Enterprises hover between the categories of Departmental Office 
and Departmental Corporation. There are many similarities in features 
but what mainly disqualifies the State Enterprises from inclusion in 
either of them is that the employees of the Enterprises were exempted 
from the Public Service Act. Even though in practice, a de facto 
control was exercised by the Public Service Commissioner and the 
Governor-in-Council had the power of veto in staff appointments, this 
area of State Enterprises' management was not under close Ministerial 
control. In other aspects, the Enterprises could be classified as a 
Departmental Corporation. A "single nominated official at the head of 
the office" was incorporated, the enterprise was involved in 
"operations of a commercial character" and "ministerial control is 
12 limited". Wettenhall stated that these bodies could not be classed 
as public trading corporations proper because their staffing and 
13 budgetary arrangements retained departmental status. Since, 
however, neither of these conditions applied to the State Enterprises, 
there was no logical barrier to their classification as public 
corporations. 
Others have seen the enterprises as departmental entities on the 
grounds that there was close Ministerial control of every aspect of 
14 their operations. However, on the evidence presented, both before 
and after they were co-ordinated under a central corporate authority, 
the enterprises displayed some degree of internal managerial 
independence. What overshadows any display of internal managerial 
freedom was the enterprises' complete dependence on the public account 
for their funds, for although enterprise funds were kept separate from 
the public account, their intractable debt made this an empty 
distinction. 
There are two main arguments for categorising the Enterprises as 
departmental enterprises. The first was the over-riding authority of 
the Governor-in-Council in the financial and personnel aspects of 
their operations, which was exercised through specific statutory 
provisions and through the power to make regulations. According to 
Sawer's classification based on the legal concepts of statutory 
corporations, the State Enterprises would qualify for the category of 
Crown corporation. The Enterprises did not in law have a separate 
legal personality since the Commission represented the Crown and could 
exercise all its rights, power and privileges. Ministerial legal 
powers were significant and, overall, the Enterprises had little 
statutory independence. Sawer's view was that most Crown corporations 
15 
could as easily be departments. The second was that the legal 
status of a public corporation was a convenient measure for buying and 
selling of both commercial and Crown land and for other commercial 
transactions, and to remove the enterprises from political control, in 
particular from control by the hostile Legislative Council. 
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While the individual validity of these arguments can be readily 
supported, there remains the fact that the constitutional form and 
much of the practice of enterprise management was similar to that 
followed in the public corporations established for the management of 
the 'great public enterprises' - the transport, power and water 
resources monopolies - in Australia as well as the nationalised 
industries in Britain some decades later. At the same time, while 
many of the similarities in organisation, structure and constitutional 
base between the Queensland trading enterprises and their counterparts 
in New South Wales and Western Australia ended with the passing of the 
State Enterprises Act in 1918, others remained. 
If the administrative arrangements of the State Enterprises do 
not conform with theoretical models or classifications, they share 
this trait with numerous other statutory bodies, not only in the group 
labelled "the rest" but also within the groups of ministerial 
departments and public corporations. In the same way and through the 
political process, the Enterprises came to have a hybrid mixture of 
both constitutional and operational features which signified that, as 
far as their administration was concerned, they were "a different 
outfit". As Labor had stated through its booklet "Socialism at Work": 
In some enterprises ... the machinery of administration has 
been constructed from its foundation by the Ryan government, 
while (in others) ... the Ministry has consolidated, 
extended, and improved, in the light of subsequent knowledge 
on the work of previous administrations. 
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CONCLUSION 
What are the conclusions to be drawn from this study of the 
administration of the State Trading Enterprises established by Labor 
in its first major period of government in Queensland? 
The enterprises have been remembered chiefly for two reasons: 
firstly, they followed the path, already trodden by the trading 
enterprises set up by the Labor governments of Western Australia and 
New South Wales, to a financial failure of some magnitude, supposedly 
propelled by scandal, corruption and mismanagement; secondly, they 
promoted a long-standing debate on whether they represented a first 
step towards Labor's achieving the "socialist objective" of 
nationalising the means of production, distribution and exchange. 
Although the grand plans for state ownership proposed by Ryan at 
the time of the 1915 election, when Labor swept into power in 
Queensland, were never realised and any notion of nationalisation 
discounted, the enterprises he did establish "to benefit the public" 
constituted a sizeable economic force. Between 1915 and 1930, they 
employed an average of 1,000 staff each year, had a total turnover of 
£12.5 million and had served over 40 million customers. There were 
120 branches of the enterprises at the height of their operations 
spread throughout the entire state. Yet, apart from passing 
references to them in the Australian literature as an example of 
Labor's close Ministerial control of public enterprises, the method of 
their administration has gone largely unremarked. 
How were they administered, what was their formal administrative 
structure, did they follow a particular model of public enterprise 
administration or had Labor devised an innovative means of 
administering what was, for Queensland, an innovative economic policy? 
Moreover, why did the enterprises gain their reputation for 
mismanagement? By exploring the establishment, operation and demise 
of the State Enterprises and comparing them with the theoretical 
models, accepted principles and practices and the literature of debate 
on public enterprise administration, this study has attempted to 
answer these questions and to determine whether they conformed to a 
defined category of administration or whether they were, in Morrison's 
words, "a different outfit". 
The 1918 State Enterprises Act provided for administration of 
designated State Enterprises by the corporation of the Commissioner 
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for Trade. On the basis that this implied some form of non-
departmental administration and some measure of management 
independence from political control, it was proposed to test whether 
or not the State Enterprises conformed to a public corporation model. 
Two theoretical models, the first emanating from the early experience 
of public corporations in Victoria and the second, formulated by 
Morrison in 1933 as the means of administering the British 
nationalised industries, were used as a normative benchmark. In 
addition, the concepts, issues and debates which have occupied 
commentators on public enterprise administration in Britain and 
Australia provided an essential bridge between the theoretical models 
and the variations in practice which have become a notable feature of 
this type of government administration. It was readily acknowledged 
that the size and scope of the public enterprises in Britain and in 
Victoria made an imperfect basis for comparison but they served the 
purpose of providing a framework in which to examine and assess the 
Queensland Enterprises. The example set by the Labor governments in 
Western Australia and New South Wales in establishing trading 
enterprises was also acknowledged and this provided further grounds 
for comparison. 
The central issue of non-departmental or statutory authority 
administration has been the extent to which such a body maintains its 
statutory independence from Ministerial control in the face of demands 
for the public accountability for government decisions and actions 
which is a fundamental principle of a system of responsible 
government. Statutory authorities are seen to be established outside 
the bounds of the close control implied by the conventional 
Ministerial department, for a variety of purposes. In terms of 
administration, the major reason has been to secure an efficiency in 
administration which would stem from independence from political and 
central departmental control. For enterprises engaged in revenue 
producing activities, such independence would allow managerial freedom 
to carry out day-to-day operations according to the business practices 
endorsed by private corporations. Efficiency would also be promoted 
by the development of an esprit de corps among public enterprise 
employees as they worked not for profit but for the public benefit. 
Classification was one means of approaching variations in 
managerial independence and Ministerial control displayed in the 
public corporation so that patterns of usage could be determined and a 
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firm distinction made between the degrees of independence found across 
the range of statutory authorities. The results have been 
inconclusive but the emphasis has remained on examining the 
constitutional features of statutory authorities and statutory 
corporations as the process most likely to identify the extent of 
Ministerial control. 
The aim of the thesis was to determine the type of administration 
of the State Enterprises - whether it represented an innovative 
approach by Labor to match what, for Queensland, was an innovative 
policy of competitive government trading enterprises, whether it 
conformed to public corporation administration or whether it was a 
sub-department whose administrative head was granted the powers of a 
corporation for legal convenience. The issue of Ministerial control 
versus managerial independence was maintained as the central focus for 
an examination of the constitutional features of the Enterprises and 
the variations from the theoretical models they might display. 
Appointment and composition of the Board, staff appointments, finance 
and Ministerial control were the four acknowledged key points of the 
constitutional features of statutory authorities at which political 
control could be exercised. They were seen to be useful in 
identifying and assessing the extent of Ministerial control or 
managerial independence. In addition, it was recognised that 
managerial independence could be subject to Parliamentary and legal 
controls as well as controls imposed by officials of other 
departments. Adopting this method. State Enterprises' statutory and 
operational features were compared with the theory and practice of 
statutory corporations discussed in the relevant literature. The 
results formed the basis on which some assessment of the 
administration of the Enterprises could be made. 
The "Board" of the State Enterprises was a single-member Board -
the Commissioner for Trade - a form not used in Britain but common to 
the range of public enterprises in Australia and widely employed in 
Queensland. There was some support for the managers being a de facto 
functional Board because of the co-ordinated structure of the 
Enterprises' administration. On the other hand. Labor's intention of 
vesting the Minister for State enterprises with corporate powers 
signalled a preference for what Morrison had called "anti-socialist 
nationalisation" - the administration of public enterprises within a 
Ministerial department - which the transfer of corporate powers to the 
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Commissioner changed to only a limited degree. Ministerial control 
was apparently strengthened by the absence of a fixed appointment for 
the Commissioner although, as it happened,the question of Ministerial 
control through the making of short-term appointments never arose. 
Unlike many of the British corporations, no specialist qualifications 
for the Board were determined and the issue of a representative Board 
was not relevant. Austin's qualifications as an audit inspector with 
experience of the State Enterprises' accounts reinforced the priority 
accorded by the government to the financial aspects of their 
administration and also marked Labor's dependence on Austin's 
administrative skills, allowing him a greater freedom in decision-
making than the statutory provisions depicted. Whether he was the 
most suitable candidate to manage a complex mixture of business 
enterprises was difficult to assess, given the political environment 
in which the Enterprises functioned, but the view held by Labor's 
opposition that neither a Minister nor a public official was competent 
to deliver the commercial objectives set for the Enterprises was at 
least a realistic appraisal of the inherent problems of government 
trading enterprises. 
Some statutory independence was granted the Commissioner in 
appointing and dismissing staff. Yet several controls operated which 
allowed him less than a free hand. All staff were employed "at 
pleasure only". This should have ensured a flexibility in staffing 
arrangements that complied with business practices, but it also 
allowed 'outside' intervention that reasserted Ministerial control 
over internal decision-making. As with other areas of Enterprises' 
administration, the Governor-in-Council retained a power of veto over 
staff appointments and dismissals. In theory, the Commissioner had 
limited independence but instances of Ministerial intervention in 
staffing matters were not recorded and it seemed that, by dint of 
their position and operational experience, Austin and the managers 
retained a considerable measure of control. A more effective 
constraint was exerted by the trade unions, and by the arbitration 
process although, in the final analysis, the pricing policy under 
which the Enterprises operated, and their progressively worsening 
financial state, provided the most stringent constraint on staff 
numbers, wages and conditions of employment. 
From a situation of complete expediency as Labor used any 
available means to finance their establishment, the Enterprises moved 
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to one of detailed statutory provisions aimed at securing a level of 
financial accountability satisfactory to both the Labor government and 
its opposition. The initial problems of cash-based businesses in 
far-flung localities and the lack of an appropriate accounting system 
were largely overcome and, under pressure from the Auditor-General, 
the financial administration of the Enterprises was placed on a formal 
basis which derived from both the experience of the Western Australian 
and New South Wales trading enterprises and from the provisions 
governing public corporation finance. In all the various aspects of 
finance, such as capital funding and repayments, pricing policy and 
the application of surplus revenue the Enterprises exhibited many 
points of similarity with the public corporation models and with the 
variations in public corporation financial provisions, both in Britain 
and Australia. However, political expediency continued to exert a 
pervasive influence on this area of Enterprises' administration to the 
extent that the intervention of the government was a major factor in 
their poor commercial performance. The problem of the inherent 
conflict between political objectives and commercial practices was 
never resolved and, in contrast to the British nationalised industries 
and Australian state railway^ there was no "recoup" provision to 
counteract financial losses that resulted from government decisions 
"in the public interest". Thus, the profitability of the State 
Butchery was undermined by government directed transfers of its 
surpluses and reserves, to cover losses in other Enterprises and to 
placate Treasury demands for contributions to Consolidated Revenue. 
The profitable Railway Refreshment Rooms were used in the same way, so 
that when the Enterprises were adversely affected by the depressed 
conditions of 1920, there were few reserves on which to call, despite 
the persistent efforts of the Commissioner to provide for such a 
contingency. Nor was there any relief granted, as had occurred with 
other public corporations, from capital repayments and interest 
charges to allow the enterprises to become established. 
At the same time, while the Enterprises were to make only 
sufficient surplus to cover all charges with a small margin for 
reserves, this goal was impossible to achieve even under the most 
favourable trading conditions because of the Enterprises' political 
objectives. At the one time, the enterprises were to deliver cheaper 
prices than private enterprise, pay higher prices to small producers 
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than private enterprises and demonstrate cost-efficiency in what were 
all labour-intensive areas of production and marketing. Even without 
the intervention of a commercially inexperienced government, the 
difficulties of the physical environment, the hostility of sectional 
interests and the intransigent attitude of other government 
departments, commercial success mingled with serving the public 
interest would have been difficult to achieve and so it proved to be. 
The overall impression of the Enterprises' financial administration 
was that, despite the formal statutory provisions, procedures were 
haphazard, official records were at times suspect and ad hoc responses 
to immediate problems were the rule rather than the exception. The 
Enterprises were not unique in this, as the Western Australian 
experience in particular had shown, but in their case, the statutory 
provisions ostensibly conferring a formal system of financial 
administration had proved ill-defined and inadequate. They allowed a 
level of external intervention that was not compatible with sound 
business practice and they failed to provide a means of administration 
by which the objectives set for the Enterprises could be achieved. 
An examination of the constitutional features of the Enterprises 
confirmed that while much of the statutory machinery under which they 
operated conformed with the theory of public enterprise administration 
and its range of variations, there were significant departures in 
practice that emphasised Labor's intention to maintain close control 
over the administration of the Enterprises. 
An added dimension derived from changes over time in the 
Enterprises' administration, which affected its structure, the scope 
of operations and the type and extent of controls imposed on it. From 
1915 to 1918, the Enterprises were established and operated in line 
with the Western Australian government enterprises, without enabling 
or validating legislation and largely by Executive action. The year 
1918 saw statutory provisions under "The State Enterprises Act of 
1918" determine a formal administrative structure which gave the 
powers and duties of administration to the Minister and to a 
Commissioner for Trade. The latter, under pressure from the 
Legislative Council, was incorporated but remained the representative 
of the Crown. Some independence was given the Commissioner or 
delegated officials in matters of day-to-day staffing and "business" 
operations. However, the Minister had extensive powers of control in 
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all areas of State Enterprises administration. The Governor-in-
Council had a power of veto and could make appropriate regulations, 
yet there was considerable managerial independence resulting from 
government or Ministerial inexperience and limited expertise in the 
management of business undertakings. In 1926, Austin was appointed to 
the dual positions of Commissioner for Trade and Under-Secretary of 
the Department of Labour and Industry. The State enterprises came 
under the control of the Minister for Labour and Industry but there 
was no change in the statutory provisions governing their 
administration. It was only in 1931 when the Moore government which 
had defeated Labor in 1929, introduced "The State Enterprises Repeal 
and "Under-Secretary, Department of Labour and Industry" Corporation 
Act" that a departmental head was incorporated for the purposes of 
administering the Enterprises - or more accurately, supervising their 
disbandment. 
In the context of financial performance, there were distinct 
demarcation years for trading results and for the range of operations. 
From 1916 to 1920, the Enterprises expanded rapidly and returned a 
satisfactory commercial performance overall, due to the outstanding 
success of the State Butchery Enterprise. In 1920, the primary 
produce market suffered a severe economic reversal which affected all 
the Enterprises to varying degrees, and precipitated the abandonment 
of plans for further expansion. Operations were curtailed and 
branches were shut down. As the general economic climate worsened, so 
did the financial position of the Enterprises and in 1925 Labor began 
to sell them off, a process that was finally completed by the 
non-Labor government in 1931. 
Other changes related to the specific enterprises which were 
designated State Enterprises and the responsibility of a Minister for 
State Enterprises. The composition of this group of enterprises 
changed often between 1916 and 1920, the last change being the 
inclusion of the State Cannery which had previously been the 
responsibility of the Lands Department. The Enterprises wandered 
from portfolio to portfolio between 1918 and 1925, often according to 
whichever Minister was currently designated Minister for State 
Enterprises. A final area where the passage of time and events 
brought change was that of industrial relations. With access to the 
Arbitration Court granted to all government employees in 1917, 
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managerial autonomy in staffing matters was constrained by the process 
of arbitration and by union activism. Industrial unrest in the 
Enterprises focused on State Butchery employees and was at its height 
between 1918 and 1920. By 1920, most of the State Enterprises' 
employees were governed by outside awards and employment conditions 
had begun to be standardised across all sectors. Strike action 
diminished, apart from the widespread reactions to the 1922 wages 
reductions and thereafter, industrial relations ceased to be a matter 
of importance. If the State Enterprises were initially envisaged as 
pacesetters for private enterprise in employees' wages and working 
conditions, this was soon dispelled and, after 1922, not only were the 
employees vulnerable to economic change, but they were increasingly 
subject to Public Service control, although never formally brought 
under the Public Service Act, Managers were particularly vulnerable. 
With neither a formal service contract, nor recourse to an appeal 
mechanism, their terms and conditions of employment were eroded with 
the passage of time and by the inexorable slide downwards in the 
commercial performance of the Enterprises. It therefore might have 
been surprising that some staff members served the Enterprises 
throughout the entire period of operations and with some still eager 
for promotion even as the Enterprises began to be dismantled. 
Depending on the overall judgment of the Enterprises, this may simply 
have been a case of fewer and fewer staff hanging on to their 
positions, or it may have reinforced the proposal that they had indeed 
developed an ethic of service to the Enterprises. Overall, the 
changes that occurred in the different areas of Enterprises 
administration over the years of their existence contributed to the 
complexity of categorising or defining them as an administrative 
entity. No striking conclusions could be drawn from the reasons, the 
process or the results except that they demonstrated a lack of 
planning on the part of the government, little appreciation of the 
realities of commercial trading undertakings and consequently a style 
of political decision-making predominantly influenced by "the course 
of events". 
On a wider scale, they demonstrated the conformity of the State 
Enterprises experience with the experience of public enterprise 
administration over the past century and a half. Despite the planned 
approach of the nationalised industries in Britain, and the many 
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variations that have been tried in Britain and Australia, there is 
still no legal or administrative formula that defines public 
enterprise administration. Nor have the problems of appropriate 
controls and public accountability been resolved, since political 
demands and objectives continue, as with the State Enterprises, to 
affect efforts to achieve a "rationally" based administration. 
It may also be argued that little advance has been made or that 
nothing much has changed. The statutory provisions, the operational 
experience of the Enterprises and the extent and influence of 
political control on them found many parallels in contemporary public 
enterprise administration as well as in the ventures that preceded 
them. However, while such structures and controls and the issues 
arising from them have remained more or less constant, one change can 
be noted. After the Queensland State Enterprises were closed down, 
there was no further concerted attempt by a Labor government in 
Australia to establish "meat and fish shop" trading enterprises 
competing against private enterprise, particularly in primary 
production and marketing. Although a few such ventures remained in 
operation, the lessons of the failure of the Western Australian and 
New South Wales ventures, as well as that of Queensland had been 
learnt and other methods of achieving price regulation and stability 
in primary production and marketing were introduced. Thus, the 
Queensland State Enterprises marked the end of Labor's experiments in 
comprehensive public ownership of trading enterprises, closing the 
door on any lingering notion that the "socialist objective" could be 
achieved by this means. 
Mismanagement was one of the most publicised aspects of the 
Queensland State Enterprises. They achieved some notoriety because of 
it, and the general view has remained that it was the prime cause of 
their failure. 
But whether or not mismanagement was responsible for the poor 
commercial performance of the Enterprises and their failure to achieve 
the political goals set for them proved far from such a simple 
judgment. It may have been politically or historically expedient to 
blame "management", particularly as governments moved towards closer 
control of public enterprises in the wake of the economic depression 
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in Australia, but there were a number of inter-related factors which 
influenced and were sufficiently evident in the management of the 
Queensland State Enterprises to question a blanket conclusion that the 
managers were all "a bad lot." 
Certainly in the early years of the Enterprises' operations, 
there were clear instances of theft and fraud among managers and staff 
which resulted in dismissals and transfers. Where it is difficult to 
draw a definite conclusion is in relation to managerial competence. 
For instance, it was evident that the task of managing a Queensland 
State Enterprise was beyond the competence of some managers. Others 
were experienced and competent, yet the circumstances under which the 
Enterprises were established, the type of provisions made for their 
administration and the physical, economic and political environment in 
which they operated, all tended to have an adverse effect even on 
them. The Commissioner for Trade took pains to defend his managers 
and staff against public criticisms about the Enterprises' 
performances and stressed the difficulties under which they worked, 
not the least of which was the public expectation that an experimental 
venture for a Queensland government, as the Enterprises were, should 
be an instant commercial success. Moreover, the basis for measuring 
the performance of the managers and staff was questionable, given the 
provisions for government intervention and control, particularly in 
financial matters such as pricing and application of surplus revenue 
that were severe by any public enterprise standards and allowed little 
scope for "business" practices to be followed. 
Other aspects also need to be considered. Although there were 
numerous applicants for positions as State Enterprise managers, it is 
doubtful whether, on the whole, they possessed the requisite level of 
experience and business expertise to overcome the inbuilt problems of 
managing an experimental public business venture. The drain on 
available manpower as a result of the war and the overall lack of 
financial incentive may also have influenced the calibre of managerial 
appointments. These potential problems had been identified both in 
the Queensland Parliament and in the efforts of the Labor governments 
in New South Wales and Western Australia to establish trading 
ventures. The Ryan government appeared to pay them little heed, 
possibly because it was confident in its own capacity to succeed where 
other Labor governments had failed. The overall result was that 
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despite the intensive financial controls which the Auditor-General had 
pressed for, and which were mostly included in the provisions of the 
1918 "State Enterprises Act", the establishment of business management 
procedures was left to the managers themselves. Even the Commissioner 
for Trade was inexperienced in this field and he failed on several 
occasions to prevent financial mismanagement. His major role was to 
ensure that the "books" balanced so that the public demands for 
financial accountability were at least seen to be met. A crucial 
problem that was never resolved was the application of financial 
controls that would have allowed a business flexibility yet maintained 
a measure of central control. Part of the difficulty was the absence 
of a successful operational model. The many essays into government 
business enterprises, whether of the "meat and fish shops" variety or 
the extensive developmental and regulatory enterprises, had failed to 
resolve the problem of effective and appropriate controls, both before 
the advent of the Queensland State Enterprises and to the present day. 
In this context, the State Enterprises were not unique. 
A further identifiable factor in the Queensland experience was 
that any method of financial control contained the expectation that 
the Enterprises' staff would be honest, reliable and work for the 
public benefit. Morrison made the concept of serving the public 
interest a cornerstone of his championship of the public corporation 
as the most effective means of administering Britain's nationalised 
industries, but the concept was not unknown in Australia at the time 
of the Queensland Enterprises. Eggleston had also identified its 
fundamental role in the effective management of the Victorian public 
enterprises, although later he shared the same view as Brigden that 
across Australia there was no evidence that state enterprise employees 
had any firmer notion of serving the public interest than any other 
government employees. The Labor government in Queensland expected 
that the State Enterprises' staff would be imbued with the ethos of 
the "public benefit". After all, the whole purpose of the enterprises 
was to provide cheaper goods and services to the workers in the 
community who had previously been exploited by the "capitalist" 
monopolies and trusts. That there were strikes that necessitated 
lengthy negotiations before the Arbitration Court and instances of 
theft and fraud seemed to come almost as a surprise to the 
Commissioner for Trade, as did the evident need for some formal 
counter-action. The socialist ideal of the workers' collective had 
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been rejected by Ryan and there was no commitment by the government to 
distributing the enterprises' surplus revenue in the form of higher 
wages and salaries. These were won in the Arbitration Court and were 
identified as a major cause of the Enterprises' operating costs. 
Against this background, there was little incentive for the staff to 
work in the public interest, and it might be supposed that the 
employees viewed the government as a naive and inefficient employer. 
It could further be concluded that the root cause of mismanagement lay 
with the failure of the government to institute a form of 
administration appropriate to the enterprises' objectives. The extent 
of the controls imposed on the management of the Enterprises by the 
1918 Act and subsequent government decisions implied that the 
government did not intend to concede managerial independence. Yet 
the government depended on the managers to keep the Enterprises 
operational. Thus a gap was created between the political necessity 
of close control of the Enterprises and the reality of operating them, 
which demonstrated the ineffectiveness of the controls, as well as the 
futility of assuming the absolute honesty and public interest 
motivation of state enterprises' staff. 
Nevertheless, the view that the Enterprises were fatally 
mismanaged, which was reinforced by the findings of the Legislative 
Council Select Committee Inquiry and the Wando Vale Royal Commission 
in 1917 and later by the "Mungana" Royal Commission, was tempered by 
the many instances where managers and employees made a positive 
contribution to the public interest. Whether it stemmed from 
self-interest, or absorption in attaining efficiency goals as has also 
been suggested, it became increasingly noticeable after the widespread 
economic reversals of the 1920s. Another reason may have been the 
diminution of the Enterprises' importance in Labor's overall policy 
platform, so that managers were almost left to their own devices to 
salvage what they could of an economic experiment that even Labor had 
by then deemed to be a failure. Managerial performance thus had many 
facets that cannot be so easily dismissed by the blanket conclusion 
that the Enterprises were poorly and corruptly managed. 
To the question whether the State Enterprises conformed with, or 
departed from, a public enterprises model of administration, the 
answer must be that, in sum, they were different. Their 
administration, however, was not different in the way that Morrison 
had meant. They were not an autonomous public corporation, different 
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from a ministerial department because of the extent of their 
managerial freedom from political control. They were different 
because they did not conform to any one category of public enterprise 
administration. This was largely the result of the political process 
but it also arose from the particular circumstances surrounding their 
establishment and their functions. Labor drew on a number of 
precedents for their administrative structure. It also changed the 
structure as the situation changed. Clearly one model for the 
Enterprises was provided by Western Australia. This was in evidence 
up to 1918, but even here Labor did not intend to adopt it totally, as 
the proposal for a Corporation of the Commissioner for Trade 
introduced in 1916 showed. However, the passing of the State 
Enterprises Act signalled a significant departure from that model and 
the adoption of a mixture of statutory provisions that were distinctly 
designed to achieve specific ends. The provisions included a number 
of features identical to those used in public corporation 
administration and subsequent practice confirmed other similarities. 
At the same time, there was no doubt that Labor planned to exert a 
substantial measure of Ministerial and Cabinet control over the 
Enterprises operations, allowing only such managerial independence as 
was necessary to cover the gaps in their business experience and 
expertise and achieve the objectives for which the Enterprises had 
been established. The entry of the Legislative Council into the 
debate saw changes to the legislation which purported to weaken the 
extent of Ministerial control and strengthen managerial independence. 
The result was probably not what either Labor or the opposition 
envisaged. Provisions remained giving wide-ranging powers of control 
to the Minister and to the Governor-in-Council. Yet, the Commissioner 
and his managers retained areas of independence that were defined by 
the legislation and often extended by the necessity for the 
Enterprises to maintain some commercial viability. 
A further point of difference stemmed from the provisions of the 
1918 Act. Neither in other trading enterprise ventures nor in the 
developmental public corporations had a number of diverse functions 
been brought together under the administration of a single corporation 
and as the responsibility of one Minister. Western Australia had 
resisted both these moves and its trading enterprises had remained, 
along with those in New South Wales, as separate entities spread 
throughout a number of Ministerial departments. The public 
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corporations of Victoria and New South Wales and the British 
nationalised industries administered a single area or function. Each 
was a separate corporation usually with its own Minister. An even 
more distinctive administrative difference came with the appointment 
of the Commissioner for Trade as the administrative head of a 
newly-created department whose Minister was then given responsibility 
for the State Enterprises. This arrangement had usually been 
interpreted as yet another example of Labor's preference for 
designating the senior official of a department a "corporation sole". 
It was seen to be a legal convenience for administering statutory 
authorities, particularly those of a business nature, while retaining 
a departmental type of control over their operations. Although the 
two positions may have merged on an informal basis, they were formally 
separate. The statutory provisions governing the State Enterprises 
remained unchanged so that employees were still exempt from the Public 
Service Act, accounts were still separate from the department and from 
the public account, and a level of managerial independence was 
retained. 
Diversity of administrative arrangements was not unusual in 
statutory bodies. In the case of the Queensland State Enterprises, it 
was the combination of arrangements, drawn as they were from a number 
of sources and altered to meet the exigencies of the moment, that 
lends weight to the conclusion that the Enterprises were "a different 
outfit". Whether they could be classified as a Ministerial 
Department, a statutory corporation or one of "the rest", as Chester 
had described the group of government bodies that fitted neither 
description, remains inconclusive. The obvious tendency is to 
classify them as a Ministerial, Non-Public Service Department, whose 
senior official has been incorporated. There are a number of points 
in favour of this designation. Labor politicians had spoken of a 
departmental form for the Enterprises before the introduction of the 
1918 Act. The Act provided for the Enterprises to be administered by 
a Minister and for the Governor-in-Council to have a directive power 
and a power of veto over all facets of their operations. Throughout 
the life of the Enterprises, each enterprise was referred to as a 
department while the State Trade Office was often called the State 
Trade Department. It may well have been a case of "what's in a name", 
but this practice reinforced Labor's intention of retaining control 
over the Enterprises. Probably the most telling point is Sawer's 
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argument that many so-called statutory corporations do not in fact 
have the separate legal identity from the Crown that their corporate 
status implies. The Commissioner for Trade, although a "corporation 
sole" acted as a representative of the Crown, and under the provisions 
of the Act, exercised all the rights, powers, privileges and duties of 
the Crown. On this basis, the State Enterprises accorded with his 
classification of a Crown corporation and might just as well have been 
a Ministerial department. However, Sawer acknowledged that this was a 
legal viewpoint and that the issue of administrative independence in 
relation to Ministerial control was essentially a political one. 
The various classification systems designed to define more 
clearly the distinctions between Ministerial departments and statutory 
authorities or corporations were of limited application. The 
different facets of the State Enterprises administrative arrangements 
and the particular combination of statutory provisions disqualified 
them from inclusion in any of the classification categories. The 
Enterprises were not wholly defined as belonging to the category of 
Ministerial Non-Public Service Department as Cotterell suggested, 
because after 1918 they did not receive their finance through 
departmental appropriations. They did not fit any of Wettenhall's 
categories either for the same reason or because the staff were exempt 
from the Public Service Act. On the other hand and despite the 
considerable evidence of political control, the administrative 
features of the Enterprises were within the range of constitutional 
and operational variations for public corporations, both in Australia 
and in Britain. Thus the Enterprises' staffing, capital financing, 
pricing policy, surplus and reserves could all be discussed within the 
context of public corporation categories. However, on balance, the 
conclusion remains that the State Enterprises did not conform with any 
model of public enterprise administration. Their administration 
cannot be defined absolutely as that of a ministerial department, an 
independent statutory corporation or any of the several intermediate 
designations. In 1927 Brigden stated, "Australia has pioneered no 
important methods of control or administration in its public 
enterprises, and it cannot be said that any government follows a 
consistent or thought-out policy of control." The Labor government 
in Queensland did not introduce any innovative administration to match 
its innovative economic policy. In attempting to fulfil its political 
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objectives, it gathered a "hotch-potch" of administrative arrangements 
for the Enterprises that gave no evidence of a planned control policy. 
Nor could they be distinctly identified as a statutory corporation or 
a ministerial department. As Davis has pointed out, this was not a 
unique experience to Queensland. Particularly in regard to the "big 
units" of public enterprises, he believed that governments have 
exerted "such authority over them that in most States it has vitiated 
their semi-independent status and made it difficult to distinguish 
2 
them from the common departmental controls. In Queensland, it was 
the total sum of the State Enterprises administrative arrangements 
that was different to the point of being unique. For public 
enterprise administration they were "a different outfit". 
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Footnotes 
1. Brigden, op. cit., p.45. 
2. S.R. Davis, Diversity in Unity, in S.R. Davis (ed.), op. cit., 
p.695. 
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TABLE 18 
STATE ENTERPRISES - FINANCIAL RECORD 
AS AT 1931 
Total Indebtedness to Treasury 
in Loan and Trust Funds £1,437,143 
Total owing on purchases 
of Enterprises £258,929 
(Does not include the Railway 
Refreshment Rooms and the profits 
paid to C.R., Railways Account) 
Total Turnover 
Total Interest Paid 
Profits paid to C.R. 
Total Rents Paid 
Total Funds invested 
£12,548,177 
Total Capital written off £1,057,794 
£981,805 
£20,000 
£505,700 
£2,494,938 
(£1,031,113 
State Stations) 
(of which over 60% 
was in cash) 
(Amount to 1929 the 
last full trading year) 
(included £933,755 for 
State Stations) 
(plus £57,361 paid to 
C.R. Railways Account 
from Railway Refreshment 
Rooms) 
The Enterprises 
State Produce Agency 
State Hotel, Babinda 
State Cannery 
State Fish Supply 
State Butcher Shops 
State Stations 
Net Loss of £18,685 (including £25,000 
transferred from R.R.R. to reduce 
accumulated losses to 1921) 
Total Net Profit £62,187 
Total Loss £112,695 
Total Loss £32,628 (plus £30,000 paid by 
State Butcher Shops to reduce State Fish 
Supply debt to Treasury) 
Total Loss £29,563 (including £5,000 paid 
to C.R., £30,000 paid re State Fish Supply 
debt and £50,000 paid by State Stations) 
Total Loss £1,702,938 (including £933,755 
written off and £50,000 to State Butcher 
Shops). 
Source: Annual Reports of the Commissioner for Trade, 1929-30, 
Auditor-General's Reports, 1930-31. 
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TABLE 26 
STATE SAWMILLS OPERATIONS: 1918-1920 
Employees 
Turnover 
Profit 
Loss 
Treasury Debt: 
Loan 
Trust 
Total 
Interest 
Depreciation 
Wages* 
1918 
147 
£ 
57015 
7166 
Year 
1919 
121 
E 
65033 
3156 
1920 
107 
£ 
77297 
10677 
29266 
26974 
56241 
2943 
999 
23093 
30179 
18551 
48731 
2428 
1195 
12824 
48437 
1810 
50248 
2463 
2482 
16463 
*1918 + Holiday and Sick Pay = £755; 1919 + £831; 1920 + £1,033. 
Source: Annual Reports of the Commissioner for Trade, 1919-1920, 
Q.P.P.; Auditor General's Reports, 1918-1919, Q.P.P. 
TABLE 27 
STATE COAL MINE, WARRA, OPERATIONS: 1918 
1918 
Turnover 
Profit 
Loss 
Loan 
Trust 
Total 
Interest 
Depreciation 
Rents 
Wages 
548 
1,036 
28,701 
4,514 
33,215 
664 
920 
N/A 
Source: Auditor-General's Report, 1918, Q.P.P. 
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APPENDIX B 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS GOVERNING THE STATE ENTERPRISES 
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S.22 Schedule Commissioner powers for summary remedy. 
S.15, 16 (1) Secretary appointed by Commissioner to assume 
powers and duties of Commissioner. 
S3 (1) Schedule Commissioner may appoint agents. 
S6 Schedule Commissioner may delegate to Secretary or any 
officer. 
Capital Funding 
Before 1918 
No Statutory 
Provisions 
S18 
Capital Costs 
S.14 (1) 
S.14(2) 
Finance 
Through departmental appropriations on Loan and 
Trust Funds, Supplementary Funds and Unforeseen 
Expenditure. 
Loans authorised by Governor-in-Council, approved 
by Treasury, from Loan Funds or debenture issues. 
Previous capital and working expenditure 
consolidated in loan secured by Commissioner's 
bond. 
Determined by Committee of Auditor-General, 
Under-Secretary Treasurer and Ministerial nominee. 
Committee to declare without further reference 
extraordinary losses or accretions to Capital. 
Interest and Redemption 
S.21(3) First charge on net surplus profits. 
S.18 Terms set by Governor-in-Council. 
Two separate procedures: 
(1) Redemption payments of Consolidated Loan. 
(2) Repayment from net surplus of ongoing capital debts. 
Depreciation 
S.14 (4) Commissioner to determine amount. 
State Enterprises Funds 
S.17 Funds separate from the Public Account. 
Separate funds for individual Enterprises; 
separate Loan and Trust Funds. 
S.12 (1) Schedule Expenditure and transfers of funds to be paid out 
(2) of relevant fund. 
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5.15 Schedule Commissioner, with Ministerial approval, to 
establish reserve or sinking funds from net 
profits to direct funds to meet losses, 
depreciation or for development. 
5.16 Schedule Commissioner with Ministerial approval, to invest 
funds as approved by Public Curator. 
Application of Profits 
S.21 (1) Schedule Net surplus profits to be declared by 
Commissioner after transfers to reserve funds 
approved by Minister. 
S.21 3(a) Net surplus profits to discharge capital 
indebtedness. 
S.21 3(b) Remainder to be placed to Consolidated Revenue or 
as Governor-in-Council directs. 
Reserve Funds 
Amendment to Governor-in-Council, on Commissioner's approval, 
S.21 (1) Schedule to retransfer sums from reserves to profit and 
loss accounts. 
Accounts 
5.17 Schedule Commissioner to submit monthly revenue and 
expenditure statement for current and previous 
year to Minister. 
5.19 Schedule Commissioner to submit to Minister annual 
estimates of expenditure and revenue. 
5.20 Schedule Commissioner to keep annual balance sheets to 
(1) and (2) show profit and loss account: assets and 
liabilities, in prescribed form. 
S.18, S.20 Accounts to be presented to Minister, to 
Schedule Governor-in-Council and to Parliament. 
S.8 (10) Schedule Minister to have access at all times. 
No statutory provisions for: profit and loss levels. 
pricing. 
payment of taxes. 
payment of rates (government declared an 
ex gratia payment to Local Authorities 
and Boards for rates and assessments. 
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Ministerial Control 
5.6 (1) Minister to administer State Enterprises. 
5.7 Governor-in-Council to appoint Commissioner and 
fix salary. 
S.ll Governor-in-Council to suspend Commissioner. 
Ministerial petition for removal before 
Pari lament. 
S.14 Minister to direct Secretary in absence of 
Commissioner. 
S.16 (3) Unless Governor-in-Council otherwise directs, 
employees to hold office during pleasure only. 
5.18 Governor-in-Council to authorise Loans, or 
debenture issues; set terms of interest and 
repayment. 
5.19 (1) Governor-in-Council to vest Crown land in fee 
simple in Commissioner. 
S.21 Governor-in-Council to make regulations. 
5.8 (10) Schedule Minister to have permanent access to all State 
Enterprises' accounts and payments. 
S.IO Schedule Minister or Commissioner to have powers of 
inquiry. 
5.14 (1) Schedule Ministerial nominee to be member of committee 
declaring capital costs. 
5.15 Schedule Ministerial approval of transfers to reserve or 
depreciation funds. 
5.16 Ministerial approval for investment of funds. 
S.17 
S.18 (1) and (2) Financial Reports to Minister. 
S.19 
5.20 (1) 
S.18 (1) Annual report to Minister. 
5.21 Governor-in-Council to direct application of 
profits: transfer of funds. 
APPENDIX C 
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Toowoomba Railway Refreshment Room, showing 1/- Buffet. 
247 
Babinda State Hotel. 
248 
Interior view of State Retail Fish Shop. 
Interior view of State Fish Market. 
249 
s ta te Retail Butchery and Fish Shop, South Brisbane. 
Wynnum Fish Depot. 
250 
state Cannery, Brisbane. 
State Cannery, showing Siding and Receiving and Forwarding Platform. 
IBi, 
state SawmlllB, Brisbane. View from Wickham Street. 
State Sawmills. View showing Yard and Sheds. 
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REPORT ON QUEENSLAND MEAT SUPPLY SCHEME 1917 
B R I S B A N E 
21st November, 1917 
The Hon. J.M. Hunter, 
Minister for Public Lands, 
BRISBANE. 
Sir, 
SCHEME FOR THE SUPPLY OF MEAT FOR THE PEOPLE OF QUEENSLAND THAT CAN BE 
REACHED BY THE VARIOUS RAILWAY SYSTEMS OF THE STATE, BASED ON THE 
POPULATION OF THE VARIOUS CENTRES, AND WITHIN, SAY, FIVE MILES OF EACH 
SIDE OF THE RAILWAY LINE, ESTIMATING THAT 75 PER CENT. OF THE TOTAL 
POPULATION WILL BE SUPPLIED, WORKING ON THE BASIS OF 150 lbs BEEF, and 
30 lbs. MUTTON, OR A TOTAL OF 180 lbs. per head. 
- ALSO -
AN ESTIMATE OF THE COST OF ESTABLISHING THE NECESSARY SHOPS, KILLING 
YARDS, REFRIGERATING PLANTS, and INSULATING COLD STORES, RESTING 
PADDOCKS, SPECIAL INSULATED RAILWAY TRUCKS, AND STOCK REQUIRED FROM 
THE STATIONS TO PROVIDE THE QUANTITY OF MEAT &C. &c. 
After discussion with Mr. Geo. Hutton, Architect of the Works 
Department, it is estimated that we require:-
30 Retail Shops to be erected along the Railway 
Line with the necessary cold storage @ £1000 each £30,000 
6 Killing Yards with concrete floors and digestors 
to treat offal, prepare hides, skins, Sc, 
(a £10000 each 60,000 
After discussion with Mr McGugan, Manager, State Stations Dept:-
Breeders required. 
It was pointed out that 45000 head of fat cattle 
will be required per annum; he has at present 
approximately 40000 head of breeders on the 
State Stations and to provide 45000 fats he will 
require a further 140000 breeders which he 
values at £10 £1,400,000 
Resting Paddocks 
Would require six to hold say 300 cattle, 
which call for 20 square miles of country 
each, carrying, say, 15 cattle to the 
s.m. - 120 sq. miles @ £2 rental 240 
700 Bulls to serve breeders 
(a £30 each 21,000 
Dips, Huts, and houses for men, 
pumps &c. say £400 each paddock 2,400 
Fencing, Owing to scarcity of wire 
practically impossible to estimate, 
but say £50 per mile or £1000 per 
paddock 6.000 29,640 
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Mutton requirements. 
To provide our estimate of, say, 
160000 carcases annually for State Shops 
would necessitate acquiring, say, 
35000 breeding ewes which would cost 
at least £1 per head apart 350,000 
altogether from the cost of stations 
or country to be resumed. This on 
assumption to hold 350000 breeding ewes 
at 5 acres to each sheep - roughly -
1,750,000 acres or say 3000 square miles 
Rams to be put with ewes 4500 @ 
£5. 5. 0 23,625 373,625 
Add cost of working 35000 sheep @ £4 per 
1000 1,400 
Special insulated Railway Trucks, say 
12 @ £1500 each 18,000 
1,912,665 
Plus say 10% for emergencies 191,260 
Grand Total, say £2,103,925, 
In the foregoing grand total, please note no provision has been 
made for the acquisition of sheep stations, the value of which has not 
been gone into. 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT 
1. Brisbane to Southport, Tweed Heads, 
Ipswich, Toowoomba, Gympie, Mary-
borough &c., and as far north as 
Bundaberg 
2. Warwick to Toowoomba, Stanthorpe, 
WaUangarra, and west to Roma 
3. Charleville, to Roma, Quilpie and 
Cunnamulla 
Population Stock required 
to be per annum 
served Cattle Sheep 
107,000 
32,000 
5,400 
144,400 
23,000 
7,000 
1,150 
31,150 
80,000 
24,000 
4,000 
108,000 
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Population Stock required 
to be per annum 
served Cattle Sheep 
CENTRAL DISTRICT 
1. Rockhampton to Bundaberg, Mary-
borough, Mount Morgan, Rannes, 
and west as far as Emerald 16,000 3,400 12,000 
2. Emerald to supply Clermont, 
Springsure, Jericho, Blackall, 
Yaraka, Barcaldine, Aramac and 
Longreach 9,300 1,500 5,200 
3. Longreach. This being the 
terminus of the Central Western 
Line, it is proposed to cater for 
it from Emerald at present, and 
when linked up with Winto to 
revise the position 
25,300 4,900 17,200 
NORTHERN DISTRICT 
1. Townsville to supply Ayr, Bowen 
and Proserpine districts to the 
South, also Ravenswood, Charters 
Towers and as far west as Pentland 21,000 4,500 15,700 
2. Hughenden to supply east to 
Pentland, south to Winton 
Terminus and west to Cloncurry 3,800 820 2,900 
3. Cloncurry: this town is distant 
from Hughenden 245 miles, so 
works would have to be erected 
to cater for Selwyn, Duchess, 
Dajarra, Mount Cuthbert, &c. 2,300 500 1,750 
27,100 5,820 20,350 
CAIRNS DISTRICT 
To supply Mareeba, Herberton, Atherton, 
Tarzali, Ravenshoe, &c., arrangements 
might possibly be made with the 
Biboohra Meatworks for supplies 10,500 2,250 7,900 
MACKAY DISTRICT 
To supply all along the Line 
including Eton, Mirani, Kungurra, 
Nethdale, Koumala, &c. 6,900 1,480 5,200 
COOKTOWN DISTRICT I 
CROYDON DISTRICT ? 
Source: Q.S.A. BUT/30, 
£ 3 / 
RECAPITULATION OF POPULATIONS AND STOCK REQUIREMENTS 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT 
CENTRAL DISTRICT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT 
CAIRNS DISTRICT 
MACKAY DISTRICT 
COOKTOWN DISTRICT 
CROYDON DISTRICT 
Population 
to be 
served 
144,400 
25,300 
27,100 
10,500 
6,900 
Stock 
per 
Cattle 
31,150 
4,900 
5,820 
2,250 
1,480 
required 
annum 
Sheep 
108,000 
17,200 
20,350 
7,900 
5,200 
214,200 45,600 158,650 
This is equal to 14,250 tons Beef working on 700 lb. Cattle 
This is equal to 2,833 tons Mutton working on 40 lb. Carcase 
17,183 Tons. 
NUMBER OF RETAIL SHOPS REQUIRED 
To estimate this would necessitate visiting the various centres 
along the Railway Lines, as from an economical working point of view 
shops could only be established in centres where good business was 
assured. I am sure there are many places on the Railway which now do 
a fair butchering trade run in conjunction with small stores, hotels, 
etc., but which would not pay to run as State Butcheries. More shops 
than the 30 provided for on Page 1 will be necessary unless 
arrangements can be made in smaller centres to receive meat, 
distribute supplies to the public, and sell at prices to be fixed by 
the Queensland Government. 
I have the honour to be. 
Sir, 
Your Obedient Servant 
Chas. J. Ross 
Supervisor, State Butcheries Department. 
2bH 
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